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CORRIGENDUM 
 
iii 
The last three paragraphs of page 66 are revised as follows.  
Information on the direction of reforms (whether they are ex-ante likely to have an employment-friendly 
impact by increasing labour supply, labour demand, or easing the matching between supply and demand) 
and relevance (major versus non-major reforms) is codified by means of binary indicators (see Box II.1.1 
and the Appendix for the criteria followed for such classification). 
The taxonomy to construct the indicator of direction of reforms builds on existing economic literature 
(e.g., Nickell and Layard, 1999). Although most of the underlying assumptions are broadly undisputed 
(e.g., policies increasing non-labour income reduce labour supply, policies increasing that tax wedge 
reduce labour supply and demand,…) this taxonomy needs to interpreted with caution as some 
simplifications are inevitable (for instance, because non-standard policy effects may sometimes arise from 
particular values for relevant elasticities). However, an indicator of direction appears necessary when 
analysing determinants and effects of reforms, in order to avoid mixing reforms bringing opposite 
changes in the underlying policy settings.  
It is also important to stress that the taxonomy of reforms into "employment-friendly" and "other reforms" 
has no normative implications (e.g., reforms increasing labour taxation or the generosity of 
unemployment benefit systems might not directly help the creation of employment but may be fully 
justified on different grounds) and should not be understood as necessarily reflecting the 
recommendations of the European Commission in the field of employment and social policies, which 
need to be consistent with the objectives of the Treaty in the field of employment and social policies 
(notably including the autonomy of social partners in setting wages) and that are framed in the Europe 
2020 strategy.  
The compilation of the database is carried out in two steps. Firstly, information is collected by DG 
ECFIN, using publicly available national and international sources and classified according to the criteria 
agreed with the EPC. (1) In a second step, the information collected are sent for validation to national 
authorities via the EPC. At present, LABREF covers policy measures for the EU-25 over the 2000-2010 
period, plus Romania and Bulgaria starting form 2003. Information up to 2010 was validated by the 
Members of the Economic Policy Committee of the ECOFIN Council. The database is accessible through 
the website http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_fina- nce /indicators/labref/. 
 
APPENDIX 1 (pages 103 and 104) are revised as follows: 
A1.1. Operationalising the direction of labour market reforms 
The taxonomy presented in this Appendix serves the purpose of identifying labour market reforms that 
are ex-ante likely to increase employment either by raising labour demand, raising labour supply, or 
improving the matching between the demand and the supply of labour.  
This taxonomy has no normative implications and should not be understood as reflecting the 
recommendations of the European Commission in the field of employment and social policies. 
If the measures present the characteristics listed below, a negative score, arbitrarily normalised to -1 is 
assigned, if the effects of the measure go in the opposite direction, score 1 is assigned. In a few cases, if 
                                                          
(1) Sources used to compile LABREF include ILO databases, information published by EIRO (European Industrial Relations 
Observatory of the Dublin Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions), country reports by the OECD 
and IMF, National Action Plans for Employment annually set-up in the framework of the Employment Strategy, National 
Reform Programmes under the Lisbon Strategy, national legislation and other information available from the websites of the 
EU Ministries for Employment and Social Affairs. 
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the direction of the reform is ambiguous or not easily classifiable on the basis of the above criteria, score 
0 is assigned. The algebraic sum of the direction scores in a given domain or field, in a given country, in a 
given year, provides a synthetic gauge of the reform stance. 
Labour Taxation 
• Social security contributions (SSCs): enacted measures decrease SSCs for employers and/or for 
employees. 
• Level of labour income taxation: enacted measures decrease the rate of labour income taxation and its 
coverage. 
• Progressivity of labour income taxation: enacted measures make labour income taxation less 
progressive. 
Unemployment Benefits 
• Unemployment insurance: enacted measures decrease the generosity (replacement rate, coverage, 
duration) of the unemployment insurance benefits or tighten eligibility conditions/job availability 
requirements. 
• Unemployment assistance: enacted measures decrease the generosity (replacement rate, coverage, 
duration) of the unemployment assistance benefits or tighten eligibility conditions/job availability 
requirements. 
Other benefits 
• In-work benefits: enacted measures decrease the generosity (level, coverage, duration) of in-work 
benefits, tighten the eligibility, remove or decrease the possibility to cumulate them with other 
benefits or wages. 
• Other benefits (means-tested benefits, sickness, and family-related schemes): enacted measures 
decrease the generosity (level, coverage, duration) or tighten the eligibility conditions for other 
benefits. 
Active Labour Market Policies 
• Public employment services (PESs): enacted measures enhance the effectiveness of PESs and its 
services. 
• Direct job creation and employment subsidies: enacted measures increase the availability of direct job 
creation schemes and the generosity of the incentives to hire vulnerable groups. 
• Training and Special Schemes: enacted measures enhance the quality and frequency of the provided 
training. 
Employment Protection Legislation 
• Permanent contracts: enacted measures loosen the definition of/conditions for dismissals, decrease the 
notice period duration and the level of severance payments, increase the trial period, or reduce the 
procedural requirements for dismissals under permanent contracts. 
  
v 
• Temporary contracts: enacted measures increase the maximum cumulated duration of fixed-term and 
temporary contracts and the maximum number of renewals, or loosen the definition of the cases where 
fixed-term and temporary contracts can be used. 
Pensions, Early retirement, and disability schemes 
• Contributions: enacted measures decrease the level of contributions for the pension/disability 
schemes. 
• Eligibility conditions: enacted measures decrease the coverage or tighten the eligibility conditions for 
pension/early retirement/ disability benefits. 
• Pensions - Retirement age: enacted measures increase retirement age and penalties/age for early 
retirement schemes. 
• Pensions – Entitlements: enacted measures decrease the amount of pension benefits and allowances, 
or increase the taxation of pension benefits. 
Wage Bargaining Framework 
• Statutory and contractual minimum wages and collective minimum via tripartite agreements: enacted 
measures decrease statutory and contractual minimum wages/ tripartite agreements decrease the 
indicative wage threshold for lower level wage negotiations beyond past records, or remove/decrease 
non-wage emoluments. 
• Government interventions or tripartite agreements decrease the bargaining coverage (e.g., by revising 
the modalities and conditions for the extension of collective agreements to non-signatory parties) or 
decentralise the bargaining system (e.g., by introducing/extending the possibility to derogate from 
higher level agreements or to negotiate firm-level agreements). 
• Performance-related pay: enacted measures increase the share of the variable component (dependent 
on workers' productivity/performance) on employees' wage or the share of firm's profits and bonus. 
Working Time Organization 
• Flexible working time arrangements: enacted measures reduce constraints on minimum working time, 
decrease the payment of extra hours, make working hours more flexible, introduce or extend schemes 
of banks of hours/hours off instead of overtime pay, or encourage the use of part-time contracts. 
• Participation-friendly schemes: enacted measures extend training, sabbatical or educational leaves, 
allow for longer/more generous maternity/paternity/parental leave or leave for employees that have a 
sick relative, improve reconciliation of family and work life, or promote the creation of kindergarten 
and taking hours off to take care of the children. 
Immigration and Labour-Mobility Policies 
• Immigration: enacted measures reduce barriers to immigration, the quotas for immigrants with 
specific professional background, or improve the immigrants' integration through education and initial 
support. 
• Labour mobility: enacted measures increase support for geographical labour mobility within the 
country. 

CONTENTS 
 
vii 
Summary and main findings 1 
Part I: Labour market developments 5 
1. General labour market conditions in the euro area and the EU 6 
1.1. Introduction 6 
1.2. Setting the scene: the EU labour market in an international perspective 6 
1.3. Employment and unemployment 10 
1.4. Wages and labour costs 13 
1.5. Labour market matching and long-term unemployment 15 
1.6. Conclusions 17 
2. Labour market developments at country level 19 
2.1. Introduction 19 
2.2. Unemployment rates 19 
2.3. Employment, participation rates hours worked 21 
2.4. Job market flows 24 
2.5. Labour Market Status of different groups 25 
2.6. Conclusions 31 
3. Recent wage and labour cost developments 32 
3.1. Introduction 32 
3.2. Trends in wages and unit labour costs 32 
3.3. Price competitiveness developments 39 
3.4. Conclusion 42 
4. EU labour market outlook 43 
5. Policy developments 46 
5.1. Introduction 46 
5.2. Policy trends 46 
5.3. Policy action since 2011 49 
5.4. Policy priorities and plans looking forward 52 
5.5. Conclusions 60 
Part II: Thematic chapters 63 
1. A decade of labour market reforms in the EU: trends, main 
features, outcomes 64 
1.1. Introduction 64 
1.2. Measuring labour market reforms: methodological aspects 64 
1.3. EU labour market reforms 2000-2010: stylized facts 69 
1.4. Searching for the determinants of labour market reforms 73 
1.5. Assessing the impact of reforms: Some prima-facie evidence 76 
1.6. Conclusions 79 
2. Macroeconomic implications of Employment Protection Legislation 80 
2.1. Introduction 80 
2.2. Key concepts about EPL 80 
2.3. EPL regimes in EU countries 83 
2.4. EPL and economic outcomes 88 
2.5. Improving the design of EPL 93 
2.6. Conclusions 97 
  
viii 
References 99 
A.1. A decade of labour market reforms in the EU 103 
A1.1. Operationalising the direction of labour market reforms 103 
A1.2. Directions of reforms by policy domain and country 105 
A.2. Macroeconomic implications of EPL 107 
Statistical annex 119 
A.1. Labour market data 120 
A.2. Policy variables 149 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
I.1.1. GDP growth and unemployment in selected countries 6 
I.1.2. Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area 
and European Union 7 
I.1.3. Employment and value added in sectors 10 
I.1.4. Labour costs by sector 15 
I.2.1. Activity rates, employment rates unemployment rates 21 
I.2.2. Employment growth in different sectors: 2008-2011 (%) 23 
I.2.3. Employment rates by country and gender 26 
I.2.4. Risks of unemployment for the young: ratio between the unemployment rates of 
the young and the adults 27 
I.2.5. Employment, participation and unemployment rate by education 27 
I.2.6. Unemployment rates of the low skilled by country 29 
I.2.7. Share of temporary employees, by age 30 
I.2.8. Part-time and full-time employment, EU-27 31 
I.2.9. Distribution of contract types among the employed in % by country 31 
I.3.1. Decomposition of unit labour costs, y-o-y % change, 2011 37 
I.3.2. Contributions to the final demand deflator, y-o-y % change, 2011 38 
I.3.3. Decomposition of the tax wedge 39 
I.4.1. Employment growth and unemployment rate forecasts by EU Commission (DG 
ECFIN), OECD and IMF 44 
I.5.1. Country-Specific Recommendations 2012-2013 by country and labour market 
field 53 
II.1.1. Reform intensity and country characteristics: cross-country correlations 74 
II.1.2. Determinants of labour market reforms 76 
II.1.3. Reform effects on selected outcome variables 77 
II.2.1. EPL reforms for permanent and fixed term contracts 2008-2010, an overview 84 
II.2.2. Correlation among OECD EPL sub-indices 85 
II.2.3. Correlation coefficients between EPL indicators and measures of labour market 
performance, 18 EU Member States, 1999-2007 90 
II.2.4. EPL and labour market performance 18 EU countries, 1999-2007 91 
II.2.5. Share of temporary contracts and EPL reforms 18 EU countries, 1983-2008 92 
II.2.6. Employment shift from non-tradables to tradables and EPL Insights from 
regressions analysis (6 EU countries, 1985-2008) 93 
II.A2.1. Notice periods and severance pay for individual dismissals at three lengths of 
service, 2008 113 
II.A2.2. Conditions under which individual dismissals are fair or unfair, 2008 114 
II.A2.3. Trial period, 2008 115 
  
ix 
II.A2.4. Compensation pay and related provisions following unjustified dismissal, 2008 116 
II.A2.5. Effects of EPL on labour market performance: evidence from existing literature 117 
 
LIST OF GRAPHS 
I.1.1. Employment and GDP growth in the EU 7 
I.1.2. Employment in high and low leverage countries (2007=100) 7 
I.1.3. Employment and fiscal consolidation (2007=100) 9 
I.1.4. Unemployment rates in the EU and the US 9 
I.1.5. Unemployment rate in the euro area and the United States: actual and Okun 
law predictions 10 
I.1.6. Real wages and productivity growth in the euro area and selected advanced 
countries 10 
I.1.7. United States cumulative decline in GDP, number of employees and average 
hours worked per employee 12 
I.1.8. Euro-area cumulative decline in GDP, number of employees and average hours 
worked per employee 12 
I.1.9. Employment, unemployment and participation rates in the EU and the euro 
area 13 
I.1.10. Phillips curve for the euro area 2000-2011: growth of negotiated wages 13 
I.1.11. Phillips curve of the euro area 2000-2011: growth of compensation per 
employee 14 
I.1.12. Compensation per employee and unit labour costs in the euro area 14 
I.1.13. Euro area competitiveness indicators 15 
I.1.14. Job finding and job separation rates in the euro area 16 
I.1.15. Job finding rate by duration of unemployment, euro area 16 
I.1.16. Percentage of the labour force jobless for 1 year or more 16 
I.1.17. Beveridge curve for the euro-area, 1995q1-2011q1 17 
I.1.18. Shifts in the euro-area Beveridge curve and NAWRU (cumulated changes since 
1996) 17 
I.2.1. Evolution of distribution of unemployment rates in the EU in recent years 19 
I.2.2. Unemployment rates in the EU Member States: 2008-2011 (15-74 years, as % of 
labour force) 19 
I.2.3. Unemployment rates: actual and prediction from Okun’s law 20 
I.2.4. Distribution of unemployment across EU: percentage share of total EU 
unemployment in 2011 20 
I.2.5. Unemployment in the EU: contributions for the increase in unemployment 
between 2008 and 2011 (in % of the total EU change) 20 
I.2.6. Participation rate: actual and predicted on the basis of GDP and common 
trend 22 
I.2.7. Change in total hours worked (cumulative changes since 2008Q1) 23 
I.2.8. Job finding rates 24 
I.2.9. Unemployment duration in months 24 
I.2.10. Job separation rates 24 
I.2.11. Beveridge curve for Spain, 1996Q1-2012Q1 25 
I.2.12. Shifts in the Spanish Beveridge curve and NAWRU (cumulated changes since 
1996) 25 
I.2.13. Men: employment, participation and unemployment rates, EU 27 25 
I.2.14. Women: employment, participation and unemployment rates, EU 27 26 
I.2.15. Employment rate change by 5-year age group, EU-27 26 
I.2.16. Youth unemployment rates by country (age 15-24) 27 
  
x 
I.2.17. Employment growth by nationality, EU-27 30 
I.2.18. Net migration rates (% of population) 30 
I.2.19. Employment growth by contract type, EU-27 30 
I.3.2. Compensation per employee, y-o-y % change 33 
I.3.3. Compensation per employee, y-o-y % change vs level of compensation in PPS, 
2011 33 
I.3.4. Real product and consumption wages, HICP and GDP deflator, y-o-y % 
change, 2011 34 
I.3.5. Real compensation per employee and productivity, average growth rates 2009-
2011 35 
I.3.6. RULC, y-o-y % change 2011 and unemployment rate in 2010 35 
I.3.7. Compensation per employee by sector, y-o-y % change 2011 36 
I.3.8. Compensation per employee in private and public sector, y-o-y % change, 
2011 37 
I.3.9. Unit labour costs in deficit and surplus countries, euro-area groups weighted 
averages, y-o-y % change 38 
I.3.10. REERs based on ULC deflator, y-o-y % change 40 
I.3.11. REERs based on ULC deflator, GDP deflator and export prices deflator, % 
change, 2011 y-o-y and over the 2008-2011 period. 41 
I.3.12. REERs based on ULC, y-o-y % change, and relative output gap 2011 41 
I.3.13. REERs based on ULC, y-o-y % change 2011 and current account balance 2010 42 
I.4.1. Employment expectations by the EU businesses and actual employment growth 43 
I.4.2. Nominal compensation per employee in EU Member States (% change) 45 
I.4.3. Nominal unit labour costs in the EU Member States (% change) 45 
I.5.2. Percentage change in labour market policy measures expenditure 2007-2010 48 
I.5.3. Percentage change in out-of-work income maintenance and support 2007-
2010 48 
I.5.4. Total number of planned reforms by domain in the EU, 2011- 2012 57 
II.1.1. Number of reforms by domain and country group 69 
II.1.2. Distribution of reforms across policy domains 70 
II.1.3. Fraction of major and targeted reforms 70 
II.1.4. Fraction of reforms aimed at new entrants and incumbents 70 
II.1.5. Direction of reforms by policy domain (average yearly frequency across the EU) 71 
II.1.6. Direction of reforms in the unemployment benefit domain (average yearly 
frequency across the EU) 72 
II.1.7. Direction of reforms in the job protection domain (average yearly frequency 
across the EU) 72 
II.1.8. Government intervention in wage setting (average yearly frequency across the 
EU) 72 
II.1.9. Number of reforms and the unemployment rate 73 
II.1.10. Average number of reforms and unemployment rate, 2000-2010 74 
II.2.1. Evolution of OECD EPL indicators in EU countries 84 
II.2.2. Job finding rate and strictness of overall employment protection legislation, 
2003-2007 89 
II.2.3. Share of temporary workers in total unemployment and strictness of overall 
employment protection legislation, 2003-2007 89 
II.A1.1. Direction of active labour market policy reforms by country (average yearly 
frequency over the 2000-2010 period) 105 
II.A1.2. Direction of early withdrawal reforms by country (average yearly frequency 
over the 2000-2010 period) 105 
II.A1.3. Direction of job protection reforms by country (average yearly frequency over 
the 2000-2010 period) 105 
  
xi 
II.A1.4. Direction labour taxation reforms by country (average yearly frequency over 
the 2000-2010 period) 105 
II.A1.5. Direction of other welfare benefit reforms by country (average yearly frequency 
over the 2000-2010 period) 106 
II.A1.6. Direction of unemployment benefit reforms by country (average yearly 
frequency over the 2000-2010 period) 106 
II.A1.7. Direction of wage setting reforms by country(average yearly frequency over 
the 2000-2010 period) 106 
II.A1.8. Direction of working time reforms by country (average yearly frequency over 
the 2000-2010 period) 106 
II.A2.1. Benchmarking employment protection regulation, main EPL sub-indicators 107 
II.A2.1. Benchmarking employment protection regulation, main EPL sub-indicators - 
continued 108 
II.A2.1. Benchmarking employment protection regulation, main EPL sub-indicators - 
continued 109 
II.A2.2. Benchmarking employment protection regulation for individual dismissals, EPL 
sub-indicators for regular employment 110 
II.A2.2. Benchmarking employment protection regulation for individual dismissals, EPL 
sub-indicators for regular employment, continued 111 
II.A2.2. Benchmarking employment protection regulation for individual dismissals, EPL 
sub-indicators for regular employment, continued 112 
 
LIST OF BOXES 
I.1.1. Assessing the impact of fiscal consolidation on unemployment 8 
I.1.2. The impact of uncertainty on unemployment 11 
I.5.1. The effectiveness of Active labour market policies: evidence 47 
I.5.2. Labour market reforms in selected countries 54 
I.5.3. Effect of reforms of employment protection legislation 58 
II.1.1. Overview of the LABREF database 67 
II.1.2. Investigating the determinants of labour market reforms with count data 75 
II.1.3. Assessing the impact of reforms from the LABREF database on aggregate 
variables 78 
II.2.1. The construction of OECD EPL indicators 83 
II.2.2. EU directives on collective dismissals and on fixed-term labour 87 
 
 
 

SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS 
 
1 
 
The EU labour market in 2011 was marked by a sudden interruption of the 
timid recovery in employment. Employment started falling in the mid of 
2011 amid a reduction of job finding rates and a new process of job shedding 
concerning most of the EU, with job separations surging in a few countries, 
notably Greece and Portugal.  
The EU is the only major world region where unemployment is not falling. 
The overall unemployment rate of the EU is currently heading towards nearly 
10.5%, that of the euro area is about 11%, the highest rate since the start of 
EMU. Since the start of the crisis in 2008, the number of jobs lost totalled 
about 5 million in the EU, 3 million in the euro area.  
The current weakening of the labour market is mostly the result of worsening 
economic activity linked to the aggravation of the sovereign crisis. In some 
countries, tackling the debt crisis required a resolute fiscal adjustment, which 
had an impact on output and employment. The impact of the debt crisis was 
compounded by the tightening of financial conditions linked to the ongoing 
deleveraging process. The reduced room for adjusting working hours, which 
have stabilised below pre-crisis levels, and the increased uncertainty on the 
economic outlook, further contributed to a strongly negative response of 
employment to the deceleration of economic activity. In light of the 
widespread uncertainty, a growing share of employment is on temporary 
contracts.  
Aggregate EU unemployment data conceal record-high differences between 
countries. The dispersion of unemployment rates within the euro area has 
reached an unprecedented level. It has been growing since 2008 and is mostly 
explained by worsening unemployment in the countries most concerned by 
the sovereign crisis and external imbalances; a process that mirrored a 
parallel tendency for a number of euro-area surplus countries, notably 
Germany, to record strong employment growth. About 40% of the growth in 
unemployment for the overall EU since 2008 is due to the massive increase 
in Spanish unemployment. In 2011, however, some noteworthy elements of 
convergence at EU level were observed: the high unemployment rates in the 
Baltics started falling at a fast pace.  
The unemployment divergence within the EU is partly the result of 
differences in developments in economic activity and partly the outcome of 
different responses of unemployment to growth. In 2011, the effect of the 
deterioration in economic activity on employment was much stronger than 
expected on the basis of "Okun law" estimates in the countries with persistent 
or worsening debt crises, notably Greece, Spain, Portugal. By contrast, the 
reduction in unemployment was stronger than expected in the countries well-
advanced in the correction of their external imbalances and with stabilising 
financial markets, notably the Baltics. 
Despite these large differences in unemployment within the EU, migration 
flows have not so far provided a substantial contribution to the reduction of 
the pool of the unemployed except in a few countries, notably Latvia and 
Ireland. 
The  employment 
recovery was 
interrupted  in the 
course of 2011  amid 
growing uncertainty 
on the resolution of 
the sovereign crisis; a 
new process of job 
shedding has started 
The growing 
divergence of 
unemployment rates 
largely reflects 
deleveraging needs 
for the private and 
public sector  
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Four years after the start of the financial crisis job finding rates remain low in 
most Member States and further worsening in some countries, notably Spain. 
As a result of the persistent low rate of job creation, the duration of 
unemployment has been rising in most Member States, with the biggest 
increases recorded in Ireland, Slovakia, Spain, the Baltics. Youth 
unemployment rates increased dramatically in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and 
remained worryingly high in a number of other countries, notably the Baltics. 
The evidence indicates that unemployment is becoming increasingly 
structural. The "Beveridge curve" for the euro area has clearly been shifting 
outward since 2010: the same amount of job vacancies coexist with higher 
unemployment, an indication of worsening labour market matching. Job 
shedding in the past years concerned especially the low-skilled, which are 
often characterised by a relatively low capacity to re-convert to different 
activities and tasks, and whose employability tends to fall with the duration 
of the unemployment spell. The NAWRU, the concept of structural 
unemployment consistent with a constant wage growth, is also on the rise in 
most EU countries, and a remarkable co-movement is observed between the 
shift in the Beveridge curve and the NAWRU.  
Although activity rates remained resilient in most countries despite the 
persistent labour market slack, looking forward there is a risk that 
marginally-attached workers could start leaving the labour force. 
In 2011, the dynamics of nominal compensation per employee started 
reflecting more clearly the different needs to reduce unemployment and 
rebalance external positions.  
Within the euro area, while Germany, Belgium, Austria, France and Finland 
recorded growth rates above 2.5%, compensation per employee declined in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and grew at rates below 1% in Spain. A 
recently concluded collective agreement in Germany in the metal and 
electrical engineering sector sets wage growth above 4%. The reduction in 
private wages in high-unemployment, external deficit countries, was mostly 
linked to the re-negotiation of individual contracts and firm-level contracts, 
but lately also sectoral collective contracts started setting lower wage 
conditions (Greece).  
After growing above productivity in 2009, real compensation per employee 
in 2011 expanded at a rate below that of productivity, confirming the trend 
initiated in 2010. This wage moderation, much needed for adjusting labour 
markets in high-unemployment countries, is often stronger than suggested by 
aggregated data in light of rising skill-intensity of employment. Not in all 
countries, however, the speed and breath of downward adjustment in real 
wages seems proportionate to the unemployment challenges. 
Also unit labour cost developments are increasingly following patterns 
supportive of external re-balancing, with dynamics becoming increasingly 
evident in countries with current account surpluses and reductions in a 
number of euro-area countries in the process of correcting past or current 
deficits (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia). 
Price competitiveness developments, however, appear somehow delinked 
from those in labour cost competitiveness, with gains not yet visible in most 
Persistently low job 
finding rates are at the 
root of rising youth 
and long-term 
unemployment and 
contribute to 
worsening labour 
market matching  
On the positive side, 
developments in 
wages and labour 
costs started following 
a path that is 
supportive for the 
adjustment of external 
imbalances and 
unemployment 
divergences… 
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countries with high current account deficits. While improvements in cost 
competitiveness are per-se helpful to external rebalancing, adjustment in 
relative prices are needed not only to support export demand via reduced 
export prices but also to induce the necessary shift from the non-tradable 
sector. In the latter respect, a role could be played by structural reforms 
contributing to reduce mark-ups in the non-tradable sector. 
Since the start of the crisis, most EU countries have taken an active reform 
stance, and managed in some cases to pass ambitious reform plans. Not only 
the number of reforms was on the rise, but the orientation of measures taken 
was more clearly in the sense of creation of more favourable conditions for 
employment.  
Recent reform activity appears to be largely in line with the priorities set at 
European level, notably measures that help to mobilise labour, make labour 
markets more dynamic, reduce precariousness, and improve competitiveness. 
Some countries with high unemployment and large external imbalances have 
taken up the challenge of improving the responsiveness of wages and their 
labour market adjustment capacity, by thoroughly reforming their job 
protection and wage setting systems. Activation and job assistance policies 
have been adapted to the growing labour market challenges, as well as 
targeted employment incentives. In some countries, a substantial revision of 
the unemployment benefit system has taken place. 
 
One of the thematic chapters in the report digs deeper on the main features, 
determinants and effects of labour market reforms carried out in the EU over 
the past decade. The analysis is based on an updated version of the LABREF 
database on labour market reforms developed by DG ECFIN of the European 
Commission in cooperation with the Economic Policy Committee of the 
ECOFIN Council.  
The evidence reveals that most reforms were generally carried out in 
response to worsening labour market outcomes. The analysis also supports 
the view that reforms carried out in the EU in the last decade brought fruits, 
although with some lags, notably in terms of participation and unemployment 
rates.  
Unemployment is becoming a very serious issue in a number of EU 
countries, with increasingly visible economic, social and political 
implications. Eventually, reducing substantially unemployment rates requires 
creating the conditions for renewed confidence and resumed labour demand 
on a stable basis. Nonetheless, the immediate challenge is that of managing 
high and protracted jobless rates, and the associated risk of hysteresis, under 
subdued growth conditions and, in some countries, against the background of 
ongoing processes of deleveraging and external rebalancing. 
In light of the much differentiated labour market conditions across Europe, 
and of the important policy spillovers, notably in the euro-area, the policy 
response needs to be differentiated and coordinated. In this respect, EU 
surveillance will continue to play a key role.  
…and the recent 
intensification of 
reform activity across 
the EU will start 
bringing fruits… 
…as confirmed by the 
analysis of past labour 
market reforms in the 
EU contained in the 
report 
Looking forward, EU 
labour market 
challenges will remain 
high on the policy 
agenda, which 
require a 
comprehensive, 
differentiated, and 
coordinated response  
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2012 
 
4 
In this context, reforms pertaining to the functioning of the labour market 
will continue to play an essential role down the road, particularly to address 
labour-market related structural bottlenecks to growth and to foster 
macroeconomic rebalancing.  
As shown in the analysis presented in one of the thematic chapters of this 
report, strict EPL is linked to reduced dynamism of the labour market and 
precarious jobs. Moreover, by hampering the inter-sectoral re-allocation of 
labour, rigid EPL may hamper the process of macroeconomic rebalancing. 
EPL reforms, eventually linked to a revision of unemployment income 
support systems, appear as a key driver for reviving job creation in sclerotic 
labour markets while tackling segmentation and adjustment at the same time. 
Reforms promoting wage adjustment are also key to absorb effectively 
unemployment while favouring the price competitiveness gains that are 
needed for the correction of current account deficits. 
In several countries, these reforms, usually politically costly, were recently 
carried out within the framework of structural adjustment programmes or 
amid pressures coming from bond markets.  
Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, took measures that were broad and far-
reaching. Looking forward, in light of the seriousness of the challenges that 
these countries are facing, and of their relevance from an EU-wide 
perspective, it is key that the reforms recently enacted in these countries are 
successfully implemented, monitored, and followed by additional measures if 
necessary.  
The momentum observed in a number of Member States in recent years 
towards policy action to keep participation rates high should also be kept. In 
countries with less pressing fiscal consolidation needs, tax reforms, possibly 
targeted, could create the conditions for better mobilising labour supply and 
demand. 
There are growing signs of worsening labour market matching across Europe. 
To prevent joblessness becoming entrenched and jobseekers leaving the 
labour force, policy frameworks to improve labour market matching and 
maintain the long-term unemployed in the labour force need to be stepped up, 
and adequate resources mobilised, to ensure in particular that the scale of 
activation programmes and the capacity of Public Employment Services are 
proportionate to the growing pool of unemployed. In the countries concerned 
by high youth unemployment, policies should also focus on easing the 
school-work transition, including via an effective use of apprenticeship 
systems. To promote hiring of the long-term unemployed or the youth, 
temporary social security cuts or job subsidy schemes for the new hires could 
be considered, provided they are well targeted and designed. These policies 
would help avoiding hysteresis effects once economic growth resumes. 
Surging unemployment and falling disposable incomes are at the root of 
growing poverty and social exclusion in some countries. The enhancement of 
income support systems along the adequacy, sustainability, and incentives 
dimension would help tackling the social consequences of the crisis and 
making current macroeconomic and structural policy strategies politically 
sustainable.  
The recent 
momentum towards 
ambitious structural 
reforms favouring 
adjustment needs to 
be maintained in 
countries with major 
labour market 
challenges 
Adequate responses 
need to be put in 
places to prevent 
unemployment 
becoming 
entrenched and to 
tackle the social 
consequences of the 
crisis 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION  
Following the escalation of the sovereign debt 
crisis in the euro area, uncertainty dominated the 
economic outlook since the second half of 2011, 
influencing investments and consumption 
decisions. Output growth in most EU countries 
decelerated, including in light of further headwinds 
linked, inter-alia, to a slowing growth in emerging 
economies.  
Employment was hardly hit. The timid recovery 
started at mid-2011 was interrupted and job losses 
prevailed. Repercussions were felt not only in 
terms of reduced job finding rates, but also in 
terms of a renewed process of job shedding. 
Unemployment in the EU as a whole grew, in 
contrast with other world regions. 
The unemployment rate in the euro area is 
currently at the highest level since the start of the 
monetary union, and the degree of diversity in the 
unemployment performance remains at 
unprecedented levels.  
Against this background, this chapter analyses the 
anatomy of the current labour market adjustment 
by looking at aggregate developments in the EU 
and the euro area. In doing so, it compares the EU 
labour market performance with that of other 
world macro-regions and assesses the role of 
cyclical and structural factors in unemployment 
dynamics and the role played by the relevant 
adjustment margins, including working hours and 
labour costs.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as 
follows. The next section compares aggregate 
labour market developments in the euro area and 
the EU with those taking place in other world 
areas. Section 1.3 analyses employment and 
unemployment dynamics, while section 1.4 
reviews latest trends in wages and labour costs. 
Section 1.5 focuses on salient aspects of European 
unemployment, analysing job market flows, long-
term unemployment and labour market matching. 
A concluding section follows.  
1.2. SETTING THE SCENE: THE EU LABOUR 
MARKET IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE  
1.2.1. Recent EU-level developments 
Immediately after the 2008 recession, employment 
proved particularly resilient in the EU, notably in 
light of a prompt adjustment in working hours 
(European Commission, 2010, 2011, 2011a). 
However, the 2010 EU recovery turned out to be 
short-lived, as the sovereign crisis escalated and 
the economic outlook worsened.  
The deceleration of GDP growth in the second half 
of 2011 put a lid on an already hesitant process of 
job creation: employment growth in the EU and 
notably the euro-area decelerated in the second 
half of 2011 while the timidly started decline in the 
unemployment rate came to a halt (Table I.1.2). In 
fact, the unemployment rate kept rising at a fast 
pace at the end of the year to reach in April 2012, 
11 and 10%, respectively, in the euro area and in 
the EU.  
 
Table I.1.1: GDP growth and unemployment in selected 
countries 
2000-2007 2010 2011 2000-2007 2010 2011
EA17 2.2 2.0 1.5 8.6 10.2 10.2
EU 2.5 2.1 1.5 8.6 9.7 9.7
CAN 2.9 3.2 2.4 6.9 8.0 7.5
JPN 1.5 4.4 -0.7 4.7 5.1 4.6
USA 2.6 3.0 1.7 5.0 9.6 9.0
OECD 2.5 3.0 1.6 6.4 8.3 8.0
BRIC: 8.0 8.7 6.9 : : :
BRA 3.5 7.5 2.7 11.1 6.8 6.0
RUS 7.2 4.0 4.3 8.1 7.5 6.6
IND 7.1 8.4 6.9 : : :
CHN 10.5 10.3 9.2 3.9 4.1 :
GDP growth Unemployment rate
 
Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
 
The number of unemployed in April 2012 was 
17.4 million for the euro area, almost 25 million in 
the EU. The number of job losses since 2008 
amounts to about 5 million for the EU; 3 million 
for the euro area.  
Although the youth unemployment rate (age 15-
24) for the overall EU was increasing relative to 
that of other age groups until 2008 and falling 
from January 2009, in some countries the number 
of young unemployed reached recently record 
highs (see Chapter 2). 
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Aggregate unemployment data conceals major 
differences at country level. In particular, it is 
remarkable the large and rising dispersion of 
unemployment rates within the euro area after the 
2008 recession, which is expected to increase 
further until 2013, according to the Commission 
Spring Forecast (Graph I.1.1). A large fraction of 
the increase in total euro-area unemployment is 
mainly driven by developments in a few countries, 
notably in Spain.  
Graph I.1.1: Employment and GDP growth in the EU 
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Source: Eurostat and DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
Diverging labour market conditions since the 2008 
recession reflect not only the asymmetric effect of 
the crisis (notably, on the banking the housing 
sector), but also different institutional settings and 
policy responses, and different constraints for the 
financial sector and fiscal policy.  
In particular, the different need for private and 
government sector deleveraging explains the 
protracted divergence in the labour market 
performance. Graph I.1.2 shows that employment 
has been declining more in euro-area countries 
with a rapid increase in households' indebtedness 
before the crisis.  Highly-leveraged financial 
systems are at the current juncture characterised by 
higher risk premia and tigher credit conditions, 
which put a brake on domestic demand for 
investment and consumption. (2) 
Graph I.1.2: Employment in high and low leverage 
countries (2007=100) 
90.0
92.5
95.0
97.5
100.0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Countries with high leverage Countries with low leverage
 
(1) Countries with high leverage include EU countries with 
an increase between 2004 and 2007 of households' debt to 
income ratio higher than the third quartile: Denmark, 
Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia and the Netherlands. 
Source: Commission services. 
Similarly, Graph I.1.3 shows that employment 
growth fell especially in those euro-area countries 
having carried out more substantial fiscal 
consolidation since the outburst of the crisis.  
The evidence shows indeed that fiscal 
consolidation has a significant impact on 
unemployment (see Box I.1.1). This impact is 
mostly temporary and in the order of 0.1% 
additional unemployment for a fiscal impulse of 
1% of GDP.  
 
                                                          
(2) A cross-section regression for the 27 countries between 
employment growth during the period 2008-2011 and the 
percentage point change in the household debt to income 
ratio over the period 2004-2007 turns out negative and 
strong, implying that one standard deviation increase in the 
change of debt income ratio before the crisis is associated 
to a decline of employment growth since 2008 of 0.7%. 
 
Table I.1.2: Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and European Union 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2011Q1 2011Q2 2011Q3 2011Q4 2012Q1 2011Q1 2011Q2 2011Q3 2011Q4 2012Q1
EA 9.6 10.1 10.2 11.0 10.4 9.8 9.9 10.6 11.5 0.3 -0.6 0.1 0.7 0.9
EU 9.0 9.7 9.7 10.3 10.0 9.4 9.5 10.0 10.7 0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.5 0.7
EA 28.8 6.0 1.6 -0.9 -0.9 -1.4 2.5 6.5 10.5 3.6 -5.7 1.5 7.3 7.5
EU 28.2 7.7 0.6 -0.9 -2.3 -1.8 1.7 4.9 8.2 3.3 -4.7 1.4 5.1 6.5
EA 1.8 1.8 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.6
EU -0.9 3.5 2.2 3.0 2.8 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.5 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.7 1.3
EA -4.4 2.0 1.5 -0.3 2.6 1.8 1.3 0.3 0.3 -3.1 2.7 -0.6 1.5 -3.2
EU -4.4 2.1 1.5 0.0 2.3 2.0 1.3 0.6 0.3 -4.3 2.8 -0.1 2.4 -4.5
EA -1.9 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.3 -0.6 -0.2 1.1 0.0 -0.5 -1.2
EU -1.8 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 1.1 0.2 -0.6 -1.1
Quarter over quarter same year
Unemployment rate
Unemployment 
growth
Growth of nominal 
compensation per 
employee
Employment growth
GDP growth
Quarter over quarter of previous year
 
(1) The changes in unemployment rate are in pps; for the other variables the change are in per cent. 
Source: Eurostat and DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
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Box I.1.1: Assessing the impact of fiscal consolidation on unemployment
This box presents result from empirical analysis on the impact of fiscal policy on unemployment using an 
action-based fiscal consolidation variable (Devries et al, 2011), which have the double advantage of not 
including cyclical elements and being largely exogenous (available for the period 1978-2009 for 13 EU 
countries). The impact of consolidations is assessed on cyclical unemployment (source: AMECO database), 
in light of its stationarity properties. The specification regression framework is an augmented AR2 model, 
which reproduces the broadly regular oscillations of cyclical unemployment around its mean (zero): 
titititititi FCuuu ,,2,1,, εηθγβα +++++= −−      (1) 
where i, t denote country and year respectively, u is cyclical unemployment, FC is a consolidation variable, 
θ and η are, respectively, country and year fixed effects, while ε is a standard white-noise error. The 
unemployment impact multiplier of the overall budgetary consolidation variable is positive but not large, 
amounting to less than 1/10 of a percentage point of unemployment for each GDP point of consolidation. 
While the impact of government revenue is non-significant, that of government expenditure is negative and 
higher in absolute value and of a higher order of significance that that for the overall budget balance. The 
estimated unemployment impact multipliers are broadly in line with existing estimates of GDP fiscal 
multipliers (for instance, the estimated 0.16 unemployment multiplier for government expenditure would 
imply a GDP fiscal multiplier of about 0.5 assuming a standard Okun coefficient of 0.3). 
 
Due to the auto-regressive process of unemployment, the peak multiplier is above the impact multiplier, as 
the adjustment of unemployment to the fiscal shock takes time. As shown in the graph above, the peak effect 
materializes after one year (reaching almost 0.1 per cent for the overall budget and about -0.18 for 
expenditure cuts) and effects decay to zero with oscillations after about 5 years. 
 
 
 
Part I 
Labour market developments 
 
9 
Nonetheless, substantial budgetary cuts, protracted 
over a number of years as in the case of few euro-
area countries, could by themselves explain a quite 
relevant fraction of the increased unemployment 
since the crisis. 
Graph I.1.3: Employment and fiscal consolidation 
(2007=100) 
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(1) Countries with strong consolidation include EU countries 
with a cumulated change in the structural deficit since 2011 
above the third quartile:  Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal and Romania.  
Source: Commission Services. 
1.2.2. Recent labour market developments in 
major world regions 
Four years after the Great Recession, the labour 
market outlook remains weak in most 
industrialised countries. However, while between 
2010 and 2011 the unemployment rate fell in most 
major world macro-regions, this was not the case 
for the EU. In 2011, the euro area was the world 
region with the highest unemployment rate (Table 
I.1.1). 
Since second half of 2011, unemployment 
developments in industrialised countries have 
started to diverge, mainly as a consequence of a 
more sustained recovery in the US and Canada 
compared with the EU and Japan (Graph I.1.4). 
Sovereign debt concerns in the EU, the different 
stage of debt deleveraging, access to credit and 
developments of consumers' confidence partly 
explain the uneven cyclical positions across the 
two sides of the Atlantic. (3) Other relevant factors 
comprise the extent of adjustment of working 
hours at the beginning of the recession which 
delayed labour market response in the EU, 
different responses of real wages, the behaviour of 
                                                          
(3) E.g., OECD (2012). 
labour supply and the importance of sectoral 
reallocation and its effects on the matching 
efficiency of labour (see next sections). 
In the US, employment growth accelerated while 
unemployment continued to trend downward, 
albeit from historically high levels. Employment 
growth was supported by job creation in the 
service-providing industries (e.g., professional and 
business services, education and leisure and 
hospitality) while it was sluggish in the goods 
producing industries (in particular construction).  
As opposed to Europe, in the US a proportion of 
the population exited the labour force as a 
consequence of the crisis: as of May 2012 the 
participation rate of the population above 15 years 
in the US is at 63.8%, the lowest rate since the 
early 1980s. (4) 
Graph I.1.4: Unemployment rates in the EU and the US 
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Source: OECD. 
In Japan, GDP growth turned out negative 
following weak external demand and the supply 
chain disruptions related to the March 2011 
earthquake and the November flooding in 
Thailand. The mild decline in employment that 
followed the contraction in economic activity 
coincided with a drop in labour productivity, after 
a sizeable increase of 2010. Conversely, in many 
other industrialised countries, most notably 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 
unemployment remains above the pre-crisis 
average in spite of the recovery. 
                                                          
(4) Participation was flat-to-rising during the 1973-75, 1981-
82, and 1990-91 recessions. This pattern is driven by 
falling participation of married and highly educated women 
during expansions (Albanesi and Prados, 2012). 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2012 
 
10 
Looking at developments in real wages, there is 
evidence of different adjustment patterns across 
the most advanced economies (Graph I.1.6). In the 
euro area, while the productivity decline of 2008-
2009 was accompanied by a limited adjustment of 
real wages, in 2011 real wages were broadly in line 
with productivity developments. In the United 
States, relatively stable real wages were associated 
with sluggish job creation amid strong recovery of 
productivity growth. In Japan, the limited 
adjustment in head-count employment during the 
2011 contraction coincided with a substantial 
increase in real wages, mostly attributable to price 
deflation. Conversely, in Canada, in spite of 
productivity gains, real wages declined 
substantially, eroded by inflation. 
Graph I.1.6: Real wages and productivity growth in the 
euro area and selected advanced countries 
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Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
1.3. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Employment expansion lost pace in the second half 
of 2011. In spite of the economic recovery in the 
export oriented industries driven by the strong 
dynamics of global growth in the first half of the 
year, the demand for labour in these industries 
continued to be lacklustre. Employment expanded 
at a moderate pace in manufacturing and more 
strongly in wholesale and retail trade; for a third 
year in a row, job destruction prevailed in 
construction (Table I.1.3). 
 
Table I.1.3: Employment and value added in sectors 
2009 2010 2011
All NACE activities 1.0 -1.8 -0.5 0.2
Industry (except construction) -0.8 -5.7 -3.2 0.3
Manufacturing -0.7 -6.3 -3.5 0.2
Construction 2.2 -5.4 -4.1 -3.0
Wholesale, retail trade; hotels and restaurants; 1.4 -1.7 -0.6 0.5
Financial intermediation; real estate 3.2 0.1 -1.4 0.0
Public administration, community services; activities of 
households 1.4 1.6 1.0 -0.3
Services 1.3 -0.1 0.1 0.1
All NACE activities 2.3 -4.3 2.1 1.6
Industry (except construction) 2.0 -12.1 6.5 3.2
Manufacturing 2.3 -14.3 7.6 4.7
Construction 1.9 -7.7 -2.1 0.3
Wholesale, retail trade; hotels and restaurants; 2.5 -5.7 2.4 1.9
Financial intermediation; real estate 3.9 1.1 -0.5 -0.3
Public administration, community services; activities of 
households 1.5 1.7 0.9 0.7
Services 2.3 -1.7 1.3 1.1
Employment growth
Value added growth
2000-2007
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
How the jobless rate has responded to GDP 
developments in 2011 can be gauged from Okun's 
law estimates, linking the percentage point shift in 
the unemployment rate to the percentage point 
change in output.  
After a limited response of unemployment in 
2008-2009, departures from the Okun law in 2010-
2011 were small relative to changes in the 
observed unemployment (Graph I.1.5).  
Graph I.1.5: Unemployment rate in the euro area and the United States: actual and Okun law predictions 
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(1) Predicted unemployment rate is an out of sample prediction of an Okun's law estimate on the period starting with 1996q1 
and ending with the last quarter of before the start of the recession. For the euro area (United States), 68% (43%) of the 
change in unemployment is explained by contemporaneous changes in GDP. 
Source: Commission Services. 
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Box I.1.2: The impact of uncertainty on unemployment
It could be expected that an uncertain environment leads not only to delay not only investment, but also 
hiring, having this way both a direct effect on employment and an indirect one, via economic activity. The 
present analysis develops a VAR model aimed at isolating and measuring these effects. 
Uncertainty is measured by the index developed in Baker et al. (2012, 2012a) for the EU aggregate and the 
US. The index is obtained by combining information on the frequency of newspapers articles that containing 
the terms uncertain or uncertainty and the terms economic or economy and policy relevant words such as 
taxes, policy, spending, regulation etc.  
The dynamic interactions between uncertainty, GDP and the unemployment rate are captured fitting a VAR 
over the period 1996Q1-2011Q4 separately for the euro area aggregate and the US. Shocks are identified by 
means of a Cholesky decomposition imposing that uncertainty is a forward-looking variable. For the euro 
area, a VAR has been fit also on uncertainty, GDP, the job finding and separation rates over the same 
period. The charts below depict the impulse responses to output and uncertainty shocks.  
The main findings are as follows:  
• Unemployment responds both to GDP and uncertainty shocks. This means that falling GDP coupled 
with much increased uncertainty implies unemployment rising more than predicted by a standard Okun 
relation. Following a one standard deviation shock to uncertainty, unemployment rate rises for 2 years 
before reverting back to the pre-shock level.  
• In line with existing evidence (e.g., OECD, 2012), the response of unemployment to a GDP shock is 
stronger in the U.S. than in the euro area. The response of unemployment to an uncertainty shock is 
stronger and more rapid in the U.S. than in the euro area. 
• GDP shocks account for about 60% of the variability of unemployment in the euro area; after one year 
uncertainty shocks account for 30% of unemployment fluctuations. Shocks to uncertainty account for a 
larger proportion of unemployment changes in the U.S. than in the euro area. Shock to GDP account for 
less than 50% of unemployment variability in the euro area.  
• The response of the separation rate and job finding rate to a transitory GDP shock are of the same 
magnitude as the responses to a shock to uncertainty. Within a one-year horizon, shocks to GDP account 
for 50% of fluctuations of the separation rates, while shocks to uncertainty account for about 30% of 
overall fluctuations of the separation rate; shocks to GDP and uncertainty account for about 40% of total 
variability of the job finding rate.  
Unemployment response to GDP and uncertainty shocks: euro area, US 
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For the euro area the state of the labour market in 
2011 is explained well by the historical 
relationship between economic activity and 
unemployment. This contrasts with developments 
in the United States, where, from the end of 2008 
through all 2009, unemployment was considerably 
higher than what implied by Okun's law. (5)  
Different factors may influence the changing 
response of unemployment to economic activity. 
Graph I.1.7: United States cumulative decline in GDP, 
number of employees and average hours 
worked per employee 
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
20
07
Q4
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q2
20
08
Q3
20
08
Q4
20
09
Q1
20
09
Q2
20
09
Q3
20
09
Q4
20
10
Q1
20
10
Q2
20
10
Q3
20
10
Q4
20
11
Q1
20
11
Q2
20
11
Q3
20
11
Q4
20
12
Q1
US - GDP US - Hours per worker US - Employees
 
Source: Eurostat, U.S. Department of Labour. 
First, unemployment may be less responsive to 
GDP growth due to adjustment of working hours 
(at the intensive margin). Graph I.1.7 and I.1.8 
show that the US and the euro area experienced 
different adjustment patterns in the components of 
the labour input during the recent cyclical phase.  
                                                          
(5) See OECD (2012), Bernanke (2012), and Elsby et al. 
(2011). A decline in unemployment stronger than predicted 
by Okun's law is typical of recent US expansions.   
Graph I.1.8: Euro-area cumulative decline in GDP, number 
of employees and average hours worked per 
employee 
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Source: Eurostat, National Accounts. 
The decline in head-count employment was milder 
during the recession in the euro area, while in the 
United States the labour market adjustment took 
place largely at the "extensive margin" (i.e. the 
hours per worker declined more than employment 
in the euro area relative to the US). Currently, the 
margin for a downward adjustment of working 
hours to cater for a temporary output loss appear 
lower in the EU, as the average hours worked have 
stabilised at a level below that prevailing in the 
pre-crisis period. 
The second element that may explain the sluggish 
employment growth in the euro area is related to 
heightened uncertainty, notably linked to the 
sovereign-debt crisis on its implications on the 
banking sector. (6) After improving until the first 
                                                          
(6) Other events increasing the uncertainty about the economic 
policy environment were the public finance concerns in the 
US, the disruption of the supply chains after the flooding in 
Thailand, the increases in the oil prices and the geopolitical 
Box (continued) 
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quarter of 2011, EU business and consumer 
confidence have been substantially weakening 
since April. Facing a more uncertain outlook and 
sluggish economic growth, businesses may have 
been more reluctant to hire and more prone to shed 
jobs. (7) Increased uncertainty further helps 
explaining the increased sensitivity of employment 
dynamics to output deceleration in 2011. As shown 
in Box I.1.2, uncertainty shocks impact not only on 
output but directly to employment decisions, with 
a deterioration of both the job finding and 
separation rates and a rather persistent increase in 
unemployment. 
The third factor affecting the reaction of 
unemployment to economic activity is the 
behaviour of labour force participation. Activity 
rates in Europe were generally highly resilient 
during the recession (chapter 2). As shown in 
Graph I.1.9, during 2008-2010 the proportion of 
active working-age population increased, and 
remained mainly unchanged in 2011. 
Graph I.1.9: Employment, unemployment and 
participation rates in the EU and the euro area 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
This development reflects to some extent 
composition effects: a steep increase in female 
participation (with a broadly unchanged male 
participation); a growing participation by older 
                                                                                   
tensions in the middle-east; see European Commission 
(2012), Spring Forecast. 
(7) The uncertainty on the resolution of the sovereign debt 
crisis and its effects on the cost of private capital may have 
curbed hiring intentions worsening labour market prospects 
with negative feedbacks on short-term interest rates, 
economic prospects and solvency risks (Manasse and 
Trigilia, 2011). 
workers, in line with pre-crisis trends; falling 
participation for young adults. (8) Overall, the 
interpretation of the resilient labour force 
participation in the EU immediately after the crisis 
is linked to the so-called "added worker effect", 
namely, increased activity notably by second 
earners to cope with reduced income household 
income prospects (European Commission, 2011, 
2011a).  
1.4. WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS 
Expectations about the incoming recovery in 2010 
were followed in 2011 by a moderate pick up of 
negotiated wages in the euro area, which were 
expanding on an annual basis at 2% (against 1.7% 
of the previous year). However, persistent labour 
market slack was already incorporated in the first 
quarter of 2012 in the dynamics of the variable 
components of wages, which almost offset the 
moderate increase stipulated by the collective 
bargaining agreements. 
Graph I.1.10: Phillips curve for the euro area 2000-2011: 
growth of negotiated wages 
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Source: Commission Services. 
For the euro area as a whole, the labour market 
weakness has been only gradually incorporated in 
collectively agreed wages, as shown by the Phillips 
curve based on the period 2000-2008 period 
(Graph I.1.10): the increase in unemployment  
after the 2008 recession was followed by a 
deceleration of negotiated wages with lags, and 
only starting from 2010 and 2011 the dynamics of 
negotiated wages are broadly in line with what 
                                                          
(8) In 2011 the US participation rate dropped by ½ p.p. Among 
various age groups, participation is increasing only among 
the young adults (20-24).  
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predicted on the basis of the Phillips curve-type 
relation.  
The dampening effect of unemployment on wage 
growth was instead fully reflected already in 2009 
when measured in terms of compensation per 
employee, which include the variable component 
of wages and employers' social security 
contributions (Graph I.1.11). This evidence 
suggests that the variable component of wages 
adjusted faster to labour market slack than the 
negotiated component.  
Graph I.1.11: Phillips curve of the euro area 2000-2011: 
growth of compensation per employee 
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Source: Commission Services. 
The reading of dynamics in aggregate wage figures 
needs also to take into account of the changing 
composition of employment by skill. The 
substantial decline in low-skilled employment 
since the crisis may partly explain the lags in the 
wage response to increased unemployment in the 
euro area and may indicate that, taking into 
account composition effects, the actual wage 
response is stronger than revealed by referring to 
unadjusted aggregate figures. 
Regarding euro-area dynamics in real product 
wages (i.e. nominal compensations per employee 
deflated with product prices; the definition of real 
wage relevant for firms' hiring decisions), it 
appears that they may have somehow contributed 
to accommodate the slack in the labour market. 
After growing at 1.4% in 2008, the real 
compensation per employee based on the GDP 
deflator decelerated to 0.9% in 2009-2011. 
More importantly, looking at cross-country 
patterns, it appears that real wage adjustment is 
increasingly linked to labour market slack. In fact, 
Graph I.1.5 (panel b) shows that until 2009 real 
wage dynamics were actually stronger in countries 
with worse unemployment outcomes, and that this 
pattern has inverted only in 2010. 
As for developments in productivity and unit 
labour costs, the slowdown of labour productivity 
growth in 2011 combined with unchanged growth 
of compensation per employee implies a recovery 
in unit labour costs in the EU and in the euro area 
(Graph I.1.12). These developments compensate 
partly for the opposite trend observed in 2008 and 
2009, caused by widespread labour hoarding. 
Graph I.1.12: Compensation per employee and unit labour 
costs in the euro area 
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(1) For 2012 and 2013 Commission Spring forecast. 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
The dynamics of real labour costs mirrors changes 
in the wage share and in its complement the profit 
share. Between 2007 and 2009, labour hoarding 
and the limited wage adjustment were 
accompanied by an increase in the labour share. 
With adjustment of wages taking place, and with 
limited room for labour hoarding opportunities in 
countries where hours worked remain below the 
pre-crisis average, the wage share started to revert 
towards its pre-crisis level. In 2011 the average 
profit share in the EU stood at about 57%, well 
above the share prevailing before the crisis (55%). 
In spite of this recovery in the profit share and its 
implications for the availability of internal funds, 
investment has not resumed due to substantial 
uncertainty on demand prospects.  
The fact that the largest increase in compensations 
per employee was recorded in manufacturing 
reflects the shift in the composition of employment 
towards higher wage categories as well as the 
recovery of the export sector (Table I.1.4). Despite 
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the increase in compensation per employee, unit 
labour costs continued through 2011 the downward 
path started in 2010 owing to productivity gains 
linked to labour inputs growing at a slower pace 
compared with value added. In construction, a 
recovery in unit labour costs was visible in 2011 in 
non-euro-area countries, linked to an incipient 
recovery in value added. Conversely, in market 
services, notably financial services, unit labour 
costs have been rising on aggregate amid a 
deceleration of value added compared with 2010. 
 
Graph I.1.13: Euro area competitiveness indicators 
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(1) Real effective exchange rates against 36 trading 
partners.  
Source: Commission Services. 
For the EU and the euro area, these developments 
have led to an evolution of relative unit labour 
costs consistent with a gradual improvement of the 
competitiveness of export-oriented sectors as also 
evident from the evolution of the competitiveness 
indicators based on unit labour costs (Graph 
I.1.13). 
1.5. LABOUR MARKET MATCHING AND LONG-
TERM UNEMPLOYMENT 
Unemployment dynamics are the result of a 
continuous process of job creation and job 
separation. The separate analysis of job flows 
helps assessing the underlying factors driving the 
evolution of unemployment and its characterstics, 
notably in terms of duration. 
Graph I.1.14 shows the evolution of job separation 
and job finding rates for the euro area 
aggregate.  The job finding rate dropped in 2009, 
remaining persistently low in 2010 and declining 
further in 2011, contributing in this way to a 
growing unemployment rate and an increased 
duration. (9) Less obviously, the weakening of the 
labour market in 2011 did not manifest itself only 
in reduced job openings, but also in a renewed 
process of job shedding. After the substantial drop 
in separation rates from the peak of early 2009, job 
separation rates are rising again starting from 
2011. As discussed in Chapter 2, this new process 
of job destruction is concentrated in few countries.  
                                                          
(9) See Arpaia and Curci (2010) for the methodology.  
 
Table I.1.4: Labour costs by sector 
Value added           Total hours worked           Unit Labour Costs 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
EU27 -0.9 3.5 2.2 -4.3 2.1 1.6 -3.1 -0.1 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.8
Euro-area 1.8 1.8 2.2 -4.4 2.1 1.5 -1.9 0.2 1.0 4.2 -0.9 0.8
US 2.1 2.7 3.2 -2.6 3.0 1.7 -5.5 0.0 : 0.5 -0.9 2.0
Japan -3.8 0.2 1.0 -7.5 4.5 -0.7 -4.7 0.7 : 0.4 -4.4 1.5
Canada 1.5 2.6 3.2 -3.1 3.2 2.2 -3.3 1.9 : 2.8 0.8 2.4
EU27 -2.4 5.6 3.1 -12.1 6.5 3.2 -8.2 -1.0 0.9 4.6 -4.0 0.2
Euro-area -2.2 3.7 3.0 -13.2 6.7 3.4 -6.9 -0.5 1.6 8.7 -5.9 -0.1
US 3.4 2.7 : -5.5 : : -1.9 -6.0
EU27 -3.0 5.5 3.1 -14.3 7.6 4.7 -9.0 -1.1 1.0 6.1 -5.4 -1.3
Euro-area -2.6 3.8 3.1 -15.7 7.6 4.6 -7.8 -0.6 1.8 10.9 -6.8 -1.1
US 3.6 2.9 : -9.2 : : 0.9 -8.3
EU27 0.5 3.8 2.4 -7.7 -2.1 0.3 -7.2 -4.0 -2.6 3.1 1.7 -0.9
Euro-area 4.4 1.1 3.0 -6.9 -4.2 -1.0 -7.7 -4.4 -3.6 5.7 1.6 0.2
US 3.5 1.8 : -15.8 : : -0.2 -1.5
EU27 -1.7 3.1 2.0 -5.7 2.4 1.9 -2.4 0.1 0.7 2.5 0.1 0.7
Euro-area -0.1 1.7 1.7 -5.7 2.6 2.0 -0.9 -0.3 1.3 5.3 -1.5 0.5
US 1.3 2.3 : -2.9 : : 3.3 -4.2
EU27 -0.3 4.9 2.1 1.1 -0.5 -0.3 -1.4 -0.9 0.5 -1.3 4.0 2.4
Euro-area 0.2 2.0 1.2 3.9 1.3 0.5 -0.3 -0.7 0.7 -2.7 -0.3 0.8
US 0.9 3.8 : -1.2 : : -3.5 2.3
Compensation per employee
Financial and insurance activities
Wholesale and retail trade, transport, accomodation and food service activities
Construction
Manufacturing 
Industry (except construction)
Total Economy
 
(1) Unit Labour Cost data by sector for the EU and EA are own calculations. 
Source: Eurostat, DG ECFIN AMECO database, OECD, Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
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Graph I.1.14: Job finding and job separation rates in the 
euro area 
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Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat data. 
The deterioration of the job finding rate is common 
at all unemployment durations (Graph I.1.15). This 
is indicative that the main driver of the reduced job 
creation is mostly a shortfall of labour demand, 
because in the opposite case of structural factors 
playing a major role, the job finding probability 
would have fallen mostly for the long-term 
unemployed. (10) 
Graph I.1.15: Job finding rate by duration of unemployment, 
euro area 
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Source: Commission services on Eurostat data. 
Looking forward, there are risks that persistently 
high unemployment rates would also imply that 
unemployment will become increasingly of a 
structural nature. As low rates of job creation 
persist, a growing share of unemployment will be 
fall on long durations. At the onset of the crisis, 
about 3% of the labour force was looking for a job 
for more than 12 months (Graph I.1.16). After an 
                                                          
(10) Similar evidence is found for the US; see: Bernanke (2012)  
initial fall in this ratio linked to job shedding, the 
ratio has continuously kept rising in the euro area 
and EU. (11)  
Graph I.1.16: Percentage of the labour force jobless for 1 
year or more 
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Source: Eurostat and BLS. 
Since, as shown in Graph I.1.15, long-term 
unemployed are less likely to find easily a job (due, 
inter alia, loss of skill, stigma, or reduced search 
effort) the increased unemployment duration will 
contribute to a worsened matching process, thereby 
keeping job finding rates low and unemployment 
persistently high. 
The composition of unemployment by duration is 
not the only factor affecting matching in the labour 
market. A broad assessment of the efficiency of the 
matching process can be gauged by the Beveridge 
curve, putting in relation unemployment and job 
vacancies. Movements along the curve are 
associated to changing labour demand; shifts of the 
curve are related to changes in the efficiency of the 
matching process.  
Graph I.1.17 shows that the euro-area Beveridge 
curve is negatively sloped as expected. It also 
reveals two prominent inward shifts occurring in 
the late 1990s and at mid-2000s, which are 
suggestive of improvements in the efficiency of 
the matching process. The curve also reveals that 
the crisis led first to a major drop in labour demand 
without major consequences in terms of matching 
until 2010 (compare 2008q1 with the 2010q1 and 
                                                          
(11) This tendency contrasts that in the US: after an initial surge 
in the share of long-term unemployment in 2008, the ratio 
has been falling since 2010, reflecting mostly a turnaround 
in job finding rates. 
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the other green square labels), and then a gradual 
deterioration in the matching process. In the first 
quarter of 2012, the combination of unemployment 
and vacancies lies well above the historical 
relation. 
Graph I.1.17: Beveridge curve for the euro-area, 1995q1-
2011q1 
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(1) Job vacancies are approximated with the survey based 
indicator of labour shortages. 
Source: Commission Services. 
The recent movements in the Beveridge curve 
point to a possible substantial deterioration in the 
matching process in the euro-area labour market. 
However, this interpretation is subject to a number 
of caveats. First, movements of vacancies and 
unemployment can be a sign of frictions in the 
adjustment of labour input rather than a 
deterioration of the labour market matching 
process (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond, 1989). 
Second, movements in the unemployment rate do 
not account for labour market slackness resulting 
into workers dropping from the labour force. 
Finally, vacancies and unemployment may co-
move due to factors not linked to matching 
efficiency (e.g., wage setting conditions,…). 
Shifts in the Beveridge curve may be temporary or 
may signal instead a long-lasting transformation in 
the labour market. The extent to which Beveridge 
curve shifts are linked to permanent 
transformations in the labour market can be 
gauged by comparing the shifts in the location of 
the curve, representing changes in unemployment 
rate due to changes in match efficiency, and the 
NAWRU. (12)  
                                                          
(12) The Graph is based on an estimate of a Beveridge curve for 
the euro area on the period 1996Q1-2011Q4 with constant 
equal to 3.9 and the coefficient of the vacancies squared 
Graph I.1.18: Shifts in the euro-area Beveridge curve and 
NAWRU (cumulated changes since 1996) 
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(1) For 2012 the shift refer to first quarter, NAWRU to 2012 
Spring forecasts.  
Source: Commission services. 
As shown in Graph I.1.18, the two curves exhibit a 
remarkable degree of co-movement, which is 
particularly evident in recent years. Until 2008, 
both series points toward declining structural 
unemployment. After 2008, the NAWRU and the 
mismatch-related unemployment shot up 
considerably. This evidence suggests that, if not 
reversed, the worsening labour mismatch may 
imply that a structural and long-lasting increase of 
unemployment. 
1.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The EU labour market in 2011 was marked by a 
sudden interruption of the timid recovery in 
employment. Employment started falling in the 
mid of 2011 amid a reduction of job finding rates 
and a renewed process of job shedding. The EU 
was the only world macro region where 
unemployment did not fall in 2011. The euro-area 
unemployment rate is currently close to 11%, the 
highest rate since the start of monetary union, and 
unemployment divergences have reached a record 
high. 
The labour market weakness was mostly the 
results of worsening economic activity linked to 
the deterioration of the sovereign crisis. The 
reduced room for adjusting working hours, which 
                                                                                   
that equals -0.13 both significant at 99%; R2=0.99. For the 
methodology and a review of the Beveridge curve see 
"Labour market developments in Europe" report of last 
year.  
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have stabilised at a level below the one prevailing 
before the crisis, and the increased uncertainty on 
the economic outlook hampering labour hoarding, 
further contributed to a response of employment to 
the deceleration of economic activity that was 
much stronger compared with the onset of the 
crisis, albeit in line with Okun's law estimates.  
Dynamics in negotiated wages remained fairly 
moderate in 2011 and unit labour costs improved 
as a result of productivity gains. Moreover, 
aggregate data on wage dynamics may mask 
composition effects linked to a falling share of 
low-skilled employment which, if taken into 
account, would reveal a more substantial wage 
adjustment. In light of the lagged response of 
bargained wages and the slackness in the labour 
market of 2011, sustained wage moderation might 
be expected looking forward. Most importantly, as 
stressed in the next chapters, wage dynamics at 
country level started increasingly reflecting 
differences in unemployment performance and 
external rebalancing needs. 
The evidence indicates that the persistence of high 
unemployment rates is creating the conditions for 
unemployment becoming increasingly structural in 
the euro area. The share of long-term unemployed 
has risen continuously since 2009. The Beveridge 
curve for the euro area has clearly been shifting 
outward since 2010, an indication of worsening 
labour market matching.   
 
2. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AT COUNTRY LEVEL 
 
Graph I.2.2: Unemployment rates in the EU Member States: 2008-2011 (15-74 years, as % of labour force) 
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(1) Countries are ranked in descending order of unemployment in 2011. 
Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Labour market developments at country level 
followed diversified paths in 2011. Employment 
growth was strong in the countries with the 
economic recovery on more stable footings (the 
Baltics, Germany and the Benelux, Austria, 
Hungary, Poland and Sweden). Conversely, 
employment sharply declined in Member States 
with falling or stagnating GDP such as Greece, 
Slovenia, Ireland, Spain or Portugal. Also in 
Romania, and especially Bulgaria, employment 
shrunk despite the upswing in economic activity. 
Overall, the unemployment rate was the lowest in 
Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (all 
below 5%) and the highest in Spain, Greece and 
Latvia (annual averages ranging between almost 
22% in the former and 16% in the latter).  
This chapter digs deeper in the main features of 
employment developments at EU country level. It 
provides also an analysis of job market flows and a 
disaggregated overview of employment dynamics 
by age, gender, national origin, and type of 
contract (temporary versus permanent, part-time 
versus full-time).  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 2.2 describes the recent 
developments in the unemployment and the labour 
input. Section 2.3 looks into employment and 
participation rates developments and flashes 
employment developments per sector of activity. 
Section 2.4 provides country evidence on the risk 
of unemployment persistence and the build-up of 
long-term unemployment. The labour market 
outcomes for specific employment groups are 
presented in Section 2.5. 
2.2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
In 2011, barring Germany and Luxembourg, the 
unemployment rate stood above pre-crisis levels in 
the rest of the EU (Graph I.2.1). Compared to 
2010, unemployment rates in 2011 declined in a 
minority of countries, most notably the Baltics, 
and to a lesser extent, Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic. The major increases in the 
unemployment rate were recorded in Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Cyprus.  
Graph I.2.1: Evolution of distribution of unemployment 
rates in the EU in recent years 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
Overall, unemployment dispersion has increased 
markedly with increasing cross-country differences 
since the start of the economic and financial crisis. 
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A large share of unemployment is concentrated in 
relatively few countries. Spain alone, with almost 
5 million unemployed, accounted for over one fifth 
of the total unemployment in the EU in 2011 
(Graph I.2.4) (more than one third in the euro area 
alone). Because of their size, other large Member 
States such as France, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, accounted also for an important even if 
visibly smaller share of unemployment in the EU.  
 
Graph I.2.4: Distribution of unemployment across EU: 
percentage share of total EU unemployment 
in 2011 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
In incremental terms, the jump in the Spanish 
unemployement represented almost 40% of the 
EU-wide increase in unemployment since 2008 
(Graph I.2.5), going well beyond the share of other 
large Member States. Also France, Italy, Poland 
and Greece contributed with more than 10% to the 
rise in total jobless persons in the EU since the 
start of the crisis. Conversely, Germany gave the 
strongest negative contribution to overall EU 
unemployment. 
The different evolution of unemployment could be 
linked either to different output developments or to 
a different employment response to economic 
activity. Graph I.2.3 reports the observed change in 
the unemployment rate (2008Q1-2011Q4) and that 
predicted on the basis of country-level Okun's law 
estimates. (13) It appears that for more than half of 
the EU countries the increase in unemployment 
since the crisis is lower than predicted by the Okun 
law (e.g., Luxembourg, Romania, Germany or 
Austria). This confirms the relevant role played by 
adjustment of working hours during the recession in 
a number of EU countries. However, in some 
Member States, most notably Spain, Lithuania, and 
Bulgaria, unemployment was more reactive than 
what predicted by the change in GDP alone.  
Graph I.2.5: Unemployment in the EU: contributions for the 
increase in unemployment between 2008 and 
2011 (in % of the total EU change) 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
Comparing the Okun law prediction with actual 
unemployment changes for year 2011 only, it 
appears that discrepancies are substantial only in 
some countries and follow a quite clear pattern. 
The Okun law does not hold on the one hand in 
countries characterised by a protracted or 
worsening sovereign and financial crisis (Greece, 
Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Italy, with 
                                                          
(13) The Okun's Law has been estimated with OLS and robust 
variances on a panel of the 27 Member States over the 
period 1997Q1-2011Q4 controlling for country specific 
fixed effects and period effects; the panel is unbalanced 
due to data availability. 
Graph I.2.3: Unemployment rates: actual and prediction from Okun’s law 
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(1) Predicted values are out-of-sample forecast based on an Okun's law estimated on a panel of 27 countries for the period 
1997q1-2008q1. Country and period fixed effects are included. The Okun's coefficient is 0.28 In panel a) countries are ranked 
in ascending order of GDP growth. 
Source: Commission Services. 
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unemployment growth above prediction), on the 
other hand in countries in the verge of completing 
their rebalancing process and with stabilising 
financial systems (the Baltics, with unemployment 
reduction above prediction). All in all, this 
confirms the point made in Chapter I that 
uncertainty and risk premia, and private and public 
sector deleveraging are playing a key role in 
explaining diverging employment developments 
across Europe. 
2.3. EMPLOYMENT, PARTICIPATION RATES 
HOURS WORKED  
2.3.1. Employment and participation rates 
As stressed in Chapter 1, for the EU as a whole, 
the drop in employment was accompanied by an 
increase in participation over the crisis period. 
While the employment rate has increased only in 
very few countries, the activity rate remained 
above or at its pre-crisis level in a most Member 
States, most notably Poland, Germany, Lithuania 
and Malta (Table I.2.1). However, drops in activity 
rates were recorded in Ireland, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Slovenia, Latvia and Finland.  
 
Table I.2.1: Activity rates, employment rates 
unemployment rates 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
EU27 70,9 71,0 71,2 64,5 64,1 64,3 9,0 9,7 9,7
EA 71,4 71,4 71,5 64,5 64,2 64,2 9,5 10,1 10,2
BE 66,9 67,7 66,7 61,6 62,0 61,9 8,0 8,4 7,2
BG 67,2 66,5 66,0 62,6 59,7 58,5 6,9 10,3 11,3
CZ 70,1 70,2 70,5 65,4 65,0 65,7 6,8 7,4 6,8
DK 80,2 79,4 79,3 75,3 73,3 73,1 6,1 7,6 7,7
DE 76,3 76,6 77,2 70,3 71,1 72,5 7,9 7,2 6,0
EE 74,0 73,8 74,7 63,5 61,0 65,1 14,1 17,3 12,8
IE 70,8 69,8 69,4 62,2 60,1 59,2 12,0 13,9 14,7
EL 67,8 68,2 67,7 61,2 59,6 55,6 9,6 12,7 17,9
ES 73,0 73,4 73,7 59,8 58,6 57,7 18,1 20,2 21,8
FR 70,5 70,5 70,4 64,0 63,8 63,8 9,2 9,4 9,3
IT 62,4 62,2 62,2 57,5 56,9 56,9 7,9 8,5 8,5
CY 74,0 74,4 74,0 69,9 69,7 68,1 5,4 6,4 7,9
LV 73,9 73,2 73,3 60,9 59,3 61,8 17,5 19,0 15,6
LT 69,8 70,5 72,0 60,1 57,8 60,7 13,9 18,0 15,6
LU 68,7 68,2 67,9 65,2 65,2 64,6 5,2 4,4 4,9
HU 61,6 62,4 62,7 55,4 55,4 55,8 10,1 11,2 11,0
MT 59,1 60,3 61,6 55,0 56,1 57,6 7,0 7,0 6,5
NL 79,7 78,2 78,4 77,0 74,7 74,9 3,4 4,5 4,4
AT 75,3 75,1 75,3 71,6 71,7 72,1 4,9 4,5 4,2
PL 64,7 65,6 66,1 59,3 59,3 59,7 8,3 9,7 9,8
PT 73,7 74,0 74,1 66,3 65,6 64,2 10,0 11,4 13,4
RO 63,1 63,6 63,3 58,6 58,8 58,5 7,2 7,6 7,7
SI 71,8 71,5 70,3 67,5 66,2 64,4 6,0 7,4 8,3
SK 68,4 68,7 68,9 60,2 58,8 59,5 12,1 14,4 13,6
FI 75,0 74,5 74,9 68,7 68,1 69,0 8,4 8,5 7,9
SE 78,9 79,5 80,2 72,2 72,7 74,1 8,5 8,6 7,7
UK 75,7 75,5 75,7 69,9 69,5 69,5 7,7 7,9 8,2
Unemployment ratesEmployment ratesActivity rates
 
Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
 
In countries with the largest increase in 
unemployment, the increase in the number of 
jobless people was offset by a decline in 
participation only in Latvia and Ireland. 
Conversely, the unemployment rate could have 
been lower in Lithuania, Spain and Greece had the 
participation rate not increased. Finally, in 
countries with a relatively strong labour market 
performance such as Germany, Poland or the 
Netherlands, employment and participation rates 
have evolved in tandem, consistently with the 
"discouraged worker" effect.  
Overall, participation rates after the 2008 recession 
behaved differently compared with previous 
recessions (notably the recessions recorded in the 
early 1990s), where a substantial amount of 
younger and older workers exited from the labour 
force in several EU countries. 
A comparison between actual participation rates 
and those predicted on the basis of GDP (Graph 
I.2.6) reveals also that participation rates were in 
general more resilient than expected in the 
aftermath of the recession started in 2008. It is 
worth noting, however, that this phenomenon was 
particularly accentuated in large EU countries 
(Germany, France, Spain, Italy), while in other 
countries the response was in line or below 
prediction (e.g., Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands). This partly contributes to explain the 
strong resilience for the EU on aggregate. 
Demography could be one factor driving the 
resilient behaviour of participation rates. However, 
the data rather reveal that for the EU as a whole 
demography effects have played rather in the 
opposite direction.  
As a result of ageing, between 2007 and 2011, the 
share of prime-age workers in the labour force 
declined by less than 1 percentage point, while that 
of older workers increased by 1.2 percentage 
points. The shift of the labour force towards age 
groups with participation rates below average led 
to a decline of the total participation rate by about 
0.5 percentage points, which was however offset 
by an increase in participation for all age groups, 
except young adults (age 20-24). This evidence 
corroborates the view that the "added-worker 
effect" taking place notably in a number of large 
EU countries was a main driver for the exceptional 
resilience of labour force participation in Europe 
since the crisis. 
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Despite the current resilience, looking forward, 
one may express concerns about the sustainability 
of high participation rates by jobless people with 
low labour market attachment if labour market 
prospects remain poor and in absence of adequate 
policy frameworks. 
2.3.2. The adjustment of hours worked  
Although all countries have recorded a fall in 
hours worked per person, in some the reduction in 
the average hours worked per worker during the 
2008-2009 crisis was an effective tool to adjust the 
labour input and avoid massive job losses (Graph 
I.2.7).  
In 2011, the average hours worked per worker did 
not get back to pre-crisis levels in almost every 
Member State. This helped preserving jobs. In 
contrast, in some high-unemployment countries, 
notably Spain and Portugal, the average number of 
hours worked has increased since the onset of the 
2008-2009 recession. While such a development 
would help reducing unit labour costs and 
restoring competitiveness, did not help containing 
the massive process of labour shedding in these 
countries.  
On the opposite, falling hours per worker are 
associated with a recent increase in the number of 
employees in Belgium, Austria, Germany and 
Poland. The behaviour of total labour input in 
Germany reflects the sustained recovery, with a 
rapid return of average hours to pre-crisis levels, 
an increase in headcount employment above pre-
crisis levels, and signs of labour market tightening.  
2.3.3. Employment developments at sectoral 
level 
While manufacturing and construction have driven 
the fall in employment, job creation in services, 
namely non-market services, mitigated these big 
drags on employment in a large number of 
countries (Table I.2.2). After two years of negative 
growth, job creation resumed in 2011 in industry 
and construction in most Member States. 
Graph I.2.6: Participation rate: actual and predicted on the basis of GDP and common trend 
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(1) The predicted values are the outcome of out of sample prediction from a regression estimated on the period 1993-2007 of 
the activity rate on a common trend and GDP, where the effect of GDP is allowed to vary across countries; country fixed 
effects are included in the estimate.  
Source:  Commission services based on Eurostat, LFS. 
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Table I.2.2: Employment growth in different sectors: 2008-
2011 (%) 
Total Agriculture Industry Construction Market 
services
Non-market 
services
LU 5.6 6.1 1.1 2.1 4.7 11.8
MT 4.4 7.1 -9.0 -6.1 8.5 7.2
BE 2.1 -8.7 -7.7 3.3 3.2 5.0
DE 1.9 -0.9 -2.9 3.5 3.0 3.2
PL 1.9 -7.5 -5.3 5.9 7.4 6.1
AT 1.5 -1.2 -2.3 0.4 2.1 3.8
SE 0.8 -0.1 -9.2 8.2 3.4 1.3
CY 0.0 8.0 -7.1 -14.6 -1.5 9.4
NL -0.7 -8.7 -5.6 -6.0 -2.5 5.3
FR -0.9 -8.2 -7.7 -2.1 0.1 1.2
UK -0.9
SK -1.7 -12.7 -11.3 -0.3 4.3 0.2
IT -2.0 -3.2 -7.4 -6.6 -0.5 1.3
HU -2.1 -0.7 -3.4 -12.9 0.5 -2.1
CZ -2.6 -14.4 -10.1 -1.6 2.3 0.4
FI -2.6 -6.9 -11.9 -2.6 -3.1 3.8
RO -3.0 6.9 -15.5 -5.5 -3.2 -1.0
PT -5.6 -8.1 -10.5 -16.5 -3.8 1.1
DK -5.8 -2.7 -16.6 -16.4 -6.2 1.0
SI -5.9 -6.0 -15.2 -21.4 -1.6 5.0
EE -8.3 4.8 -8.1 -36.9 -5.9 -1.2
EL -8.7 -3.4 -17.3 -34.0 -6.6 -2.9
LT -9.8 -2.4 -18.8 -43.7 -1.2 -2.7
ES -10.9 -6.4 -20.3 -43.1 -6.5 0.4
BG -11.1 -8.0 -16.5 -31.8 -5.3 -9.3
IE(***) -13.8 -26.2 -16.0 -48.1 -9.3 1.0
LV -14.5 2.1 -13.0 -46.1 -11.8 -10.6
 
(1) (*) sector detail excludes Ireland and United Kingdom; 
(**) sector detail excludes Ireland; (***) 2008-2010 for the 
case of IE. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
In some countries, the construction sector has also 
been a major drag on employment and in fact the 
sector that recorded the most dramatic 
consolidation. The number of employed in 
construction nearly halved in Ireland, Spain and 
the Baltic countries over the latest number of 
years, with construction alone amounting to 
around half of the total job losses in these Member 
States. Even in other Member States with much 
milder employment reductions, construction jobs 
have fallen by large margins. Only in a minority of 
countries, employment in the sector has actually 
risen and almost always by small margins.  
Declining jobs in industry have contributed the 
most to rising unemployment. For the EU as 
whole, the sector accounted for slightly more than 
half of the net job destruction. In fact, jobs in 
industry have declined in every single Member 
State barring Luxembourg (where it has little 
weight on employment) since the beginning of the 
crisis; cumulated job falls close to or beyond the 
double digit mark were recorded in half of the 
Member States, most severely in Spain, Lithuania 
and Greece. However, in many industrialised 
countries employment in manufacturing has been 
declining since well before the 2008-2009 
recession as a consequence of shifts of production 
toward developing countries. 
Market services had a mixed employment 
performance, with around half of the Member 
States recording net employment growth (notably, 
Poland, Malta and Germany) and the other half net 
employment losses (e.g., Latvia, Ireland and 
Greece).  
Graph I.2.7: Change in total hours worked (cumulative changes since 2008Q1) 
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Source: Eurostat, National accounts. 
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Non-market services, notably the public 
administration, was the only sector where net 
employment gains were recorded in most countries 
(major net losses only in Latvia and Bulgaria). 
Unlike other sectors, employment in non-market 
services lost momentum in 2011, reflecting public 
finances consolidation dynamics also over the 
government wage bill. 
2.4. JOB MARKET FLOWS 
The analysis of labour market flows provides 
indication on the sources of unemployment 
fluctuations, notably whether changes in 
unemployment rates are mostly related to 
fluctuations in separation, job finding rates or both. 
Graph I.2.8: Job finding rates 
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Source: Commission services' calculations on Eurostat LFS. 
Four years since Great Recession, job finding rates 
remain low or are further dropping in most 
countries (Graph I.2.8). Since the onset of the 
crisis, the most substantial drops in the job finding 
rates were observed in Spain and in countries with 
relatively dynamic labour markets (United 
Kingdom, the Baltics and Ireland).  
Graph I.2.9: Unemployment duration in months 
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Source: Commission services. 
At the end of 2011, the probability of finding a job 
fell considerably in Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland and Romania. This reduced exit rate 
from unemployment coincided with an increase in 
unemployment duration (I.2.9). By contrast, 
Germany, Romania, the Netherlands and Poland 
recorded increased job finding rates and a 
declining duration of unemployment in 2011. In 
terms of levels, unemployment duration in 2011 
appears particularly high in Ireland, Slovakia, the 
Baltics, Portugal, Italy and Hungary. 
As a result of the crisis, job separation rates 
increased in almost all countries (Graph I.2.10), 
with few exceptions (notably Germany). 
Particularly large increases were recorded in the 
Baltics, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Denmark. In 
spite of a separation rate increase not among the 
highest after the crisis, Spain recorded the largest 
job separation rate in levels. In 2011, job 
separation rates increased substantially in Portugal, 
Greece, Cyprus, to a lesser extent in a number of 
other countries (including Italy, Slovenia, the 
Netherlands, Hungary) and further raised also in 
Spain. Conversely, reduced job separation rates 
compared with pre-crisis average were recorded in 
2011 in Germany, the Baltics, France. 
Graph I.2.10: Job separation rates 
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Source: Commission services' calculations on Eurostat LFS. 
All in all, in 2011 the pattern of persistently 
reduced job finding rates in crisis-prone countries 
appears confirmed, with a noteworthy worsening 
situation in Spain, while a new, enhanced process 
of job destruction was set in motion in a number of 
countries, notably those same countries that 
recorded the increases in unemployment much 
above what predicted on the basis of output 
recessions (Greece, Portugal, Cyprus). 
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In light of the major relevance of the Spanish 
unemployment situation from a EU perspective, a 
focus on the analysis of labour market matching 
and structural unemployment for this country is 
deserved. 
Graph I.2.11 reports the Beveridge curve for Spain 
for the period 1996Q1-2012Q1. The curve appears 
to be shifting rightward since 2010, a sign of 
deterioration of the labour market matching 
process. In 2011, vacancies fell and unemployment 
raised, reflecting the slowdown of the second half 
of the year.  
Graph I.2.11: Beveridge curve for Spain, 1996Q1-2012Q1 
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(1) Job vacancies are approximated with the survey based 
indicator of labour shortages. 
Source: European Commission. 
Graph I.2.12 depicts the NAWRU and the shifts in 
the Beveridge curve. (14) The Beveridge curve shift 
is estimated also allowing for a possible permanent 
change in the relation between vacancies and 
unemployment after the crisis. The estimates 
reveal an improvement in job matching at mid- 
1990s, taking place together with a reduction in the 
NAWRU. (15) After 2008, there is instead evidence 
of an outward shift of the curve (i.e., a higher 
unemployment at a given level of vacancies), 
which mirrors the increase in the NAWRU.  
Overall, the analysis points to the relevance of 
mismatch in the Spanish labour market for the 
extent to which unemployment becomes structural 
and therefore for the market response of wages 
associated to a given level of unemployment.  
                                                          
(14) See Chapter 1 for the methodology. 
(15) This is consistent with evidence that the drop in the 
Spanish NAWRU was partly driven by substantial wage 
moderation triggered by the immigration boom (Bentolila 
et al., 2008) and the related expansion of the construction 
sector (European Commission, 2011a). 
Graph I.2.12: Shifts in the Spanish Beveridge curve and 
NAWRU (cumulated changes since 1996) 
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Source: European Commission. 
2.5. LABOUR MARKET STATUS OF DIFFERENT 
GROUPS 
2.5.1. Gender 
The large difference between employment 
developments for males and females observed 
during the 2008-2009 recession narrowed down in 
2011 (Graphs I.2.13 and I.2.14): the big decline in 
male employment rates, coupled by a much 
smaller decline in the female employment rate 
came to a standstill, without however being 
reversed. 
Graph I.2.13: Men: employment, participation and 
unemployment rates, EU 27 
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Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64. 
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Graph I.2.14: Women: employment, participation and 
unemployment rates, EU 27 
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Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64. 
The gender gap in employment rates narrowed in 
the majority of countries (Table I.2.3), in particular 
in Greece and Bulgaria owing to the strong decline 
in men's employment rate (-5.1 pps and -2.5 pps 
respectively). By contrast, in the Baltics the gender 
gap in employment rates increased considerably 
due to the strong rebound in male employment. 
This illustrates the higher sensitivity of male 
employment to the business cycle compared to 
female employment. In spite of the overall trend, 
in some Member States the gender gap in 
employment rates remains substantial. 
 
Table I.2.3: Employment rates by country and gender 
2011 2010-11 2011 2010-11
MT 78.8 1.0 43.4 1.8
IT 72.6 -0.2 49.9 0.4
EL 71.1 -5.1 48.6 -3.1
CZ 79.9 0.3 61.7 0.8
LU 78.1 -1.1 61.9 -0.1
SK 72.7 0.8 57.6 0.2
PL 72.2 0.6 57.6 -0.1
RO 69.9 -0.9 55.7 -0.2
CY 80.4 -2.1 67.3 -1.2
EA 17 75.0 -0.2 61.9 0.2
EU 27 75.0 -0.1 62.3 0.2
ES 67.6 -1.5 55.5 -0.3
HU 66.8 0.8 54.9 -0.1
BE 73.0 -0.5 61.5 -0.1
UK 79.4 0.1 67.9 0.0
AT 80.8 0.6 69.6 0.0
NL 82.6 -0.2 71.4 0.6
DE 81.4 1.3 71.1 1.5
FR 73.8 0.1 64.6 -0.1
IE 68.6 -0.9 59.7 -0.8
PT 73.4 -2.0 64.8 -0.8
SI 71.8 -2.2 64.8 -1.7
DK 79.0 0.4 72.4 -0.6
EE 73.5 5.8 67.6 1.9
SE 82.8 1.1 77.2 1.5
BG 66.6 -2.5 61.2 -0.5
FI 75.6 1.1 71.9 0.4
LV 68.7 3.6 65.8 0.9
LT 67.7 4.1 66.7 1.6
Men Women
 
(1) Countries are sorted in descending order of the gap 
between male and female employment rates. 
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64. 
 
Turning to labour force participation rates, in 2011 
the participation of women continued to increase, 
while that of men remained mainly unchanged. 
The peculiar feature observed during the recession 
of no withdrawal from the labour market is 
confirmed also in 2011. As a consequence of the 
worse employment performance of men during the 
recession, the gender gap in unemployment rates 
has become insignificant. 
2.5.2. Age 
The young are a vulnerable group for several 
reasons. They have little or no work experience, 
are more likely to be hired with an unstable 
contractual relationship, and their short tenure 
usually implies limited access to unemployment 
benefits; the transition from education to work is 
often difficult (see Box I.2.1).  
All this is reflected in a youth unemployment rate 
which has reached 21.3% in the EU, although the 
increase in 2011 has been moderate (0.4 
percentage points).  
Graph I.2.15: Employment rate change by 5-year age 
group, EU-27 
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Source:  
Graph I.2.15 shows the change in employment 
rates by age groups since the beginning of the 
crisis. There is a positive relationship between age 
and the employment rate developments: older 
cohorts tend to perform better than younger 
generations.  
By 2011Q4, persons below 25 years of age in 11 
Member States experienced unemployment rates 
of about 28 per cent or higher (Graph I.2.16). In 
contrast, jobless rate of adults range from 9 to 22 
per cent in these countries. Even in countries with 
relatively low youth unemployment (i.e. Germany, 
Netherland and Austria), jobless rate were at the 
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end of 2011 between 1.4 to 2.5 times the adult 
levels. The situation differs starkly between 
countries, with strong increases in youth 
unemployment in Greece and Portugal; youth 
unemployment rates are rapidly falling in Estonia 
and Latvia from the high peaks of 2010. 
 
 
Table I.2.4: Risks of unemployment for the young: ratio 
between the unemployment rates of the 
young and the adults 
1983 1993 2000 2007 2011
AT : : 1,4 2,4 2,4
BE 2,6 2,7 2,7 3,0 3,1
BG : : 2,3 2,5 2,7
CY : : 2,4 3,1 3,5
CZ : : 2,3 2,2 3,1
DE 2,0 1,0 1,1 1,5 1,5
DK 2,5 1,5 1,6 2,3 2,3
EE : : 2,0 2,5 2,0
EL 4,4 4,5 3,3 3,2 2,8
ES : 2,4 2,1 2,6 2,4
EU : 2,3 2,2 2,5 2,6
FR 3,6 2,7 2,3 2,9 2,8
FI : : 3,6 3,1 3,3
HU : : 2,2 2,8 2,7
IT 7,2 4,5 3,8 4,1 4,2
IE 1,7 1,9 1,7 2,4 2,3
LT : : 2,0 2,1 2,4
LUX 3,0 2,2 3,2 4,6 4,1
LV : : 1,6 2,0 2,1
MT : : 2,5 2,9 2,7
NL 2,2 1,9 2,4 2,3 2,0
PL : : 2,6 2,7 3,2
PT : 3,0 2,6 2,3 2,6
RO : : 3,2 4,1 4,1
SE : : 1,9 4,5 4,4
SI : : 2,9 2,4 2,1
SK : : 2,4 2,0 2,8
UK 2,4 2,0 2,7 4,0 3,6
 
Source: Commission Services. 
 
In spite of constantly higher unemployment rates, 
in a number of Member States the risk of 
unemployment did not change substantially during 
the 2008-2009 recession. As shown by Table I.2.4, 
the unemployment of the young relative to the 
adults remains mainly unchanged or increase only 
marginally compared to the pre-crisis level in nine 
Member States, including Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France and Italy (16). The ratio declines 
in 12 Member States, most notably Estonia, 
Greece, Spain, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. It increases in the remaining seven 
Member States most notably in Cyprus, the Czech 
republic, Poland, Portugal, Lithuania and Finland.  
2.5.3. Education 
In 2011, the employment rates of the low- and the 
high-skilled continued to decline, albeit at a slower 
pace than in 2010, while that of the medium-
skilled remained unchanged (Table I.2.5). For the 
low skilled, there is a considerable difference in 
the behaviour of the employment rate by gender, 
with low-skilled men doing much worse than low 
skilled women.  
 
Table I.2.5: Employment, participation and 
unemployment rate by education 
Education Low Medium High
ISCED 1-2 3-4 5-6
Employment rate 2011 53.0 69.9 82.1
change 2010-2011 -0.4 0.0 -0.3
change 2009-2010 -1.0 -0.5 -0.6
Participation rate 2011 63.1 76.5 87.0
change 2010-2011 0.0 0.0 -0.1
change 2009-2010 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Unemployment rate 2011 16.0 8.6 5.6
change 2010-2011 0.6 -0.1 0.2
change 2009-2010 1.3 0.6 0.4
 
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64. 
 
 
                                                          
(16) In Italy the relative unemployment of the young is U 
shaped declining until early 2000s and increasing 
continuously since then.  
Graph I.2.16: Youth unemployment rates by country (age 15-24) 
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(1) Countries are sorted by youth unemployment in 2011. 
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
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Box I.2.1: Youth unemployment during the crisis
The unemployment risk of young people is usually 
higher than that of adults, and younger cohorts have 
on average higher unemployment. This is a result of 
various factors including lower work experience, 
relatively short or unfinished education and more 
unstable contractual relationship, less job-search 
contacts. Since the average time spent in education is 
slightly above 17 years, those who enter the labour 
market between the age of 15 and 24 years leave 
education early and are at higher risk of job 
instability.  Staying longer in education or training, 
investing more in human capital could be a valid 
answer to lack of job opportunities. However, there is 
little evidence that during the crisis at the EU-level 
that this happened. The proportion of young that are 
neither in education, nor in employment or training 
(the so-called "NEETs") has increased in the EU since 
the onset of the crisis, more in countries where their 
level was already high (e.g. BG, ES, IE, IT, EL where 
20% of the young population are NEETs).  
Being neither in education, nor in employment or 
training is a route towards marginalisation, especially 
in countries such as Italy and Greece where young 
people experience a long period or repeated spells of 
being out of work and education (Quintini and Martin, 
2006). Leaving school early is related to social 
disadvantages like coming from a deprived family or 
entering into a cycle of material deprivation, social 
exclusion and poverty. Young workers entering the 
labour market with fixed-term contracts are often 
trapped in jobs with limited prospects of acceding 
permanent positions, in particular in countries where 
partial labour market reforms have reduced the 
employment protection of temporary contract with no major changes for permanent contract workers, thus 
creating a gap in the employment protection for these two kinds of contracts.  
Unemployment creates big individual and social burdens. Job losses entail large and persistent earning 
losses for the affected (Wachter and Davis, 2012). These costs can be even higher for the young low-skilled 
who have left education early. The relevance of the long-term consequences of early unemployment (so-
called scarring effects) depend on a series of factors including the loss of skills and work experience, 
employers' belief that spells of early unemployment signal low commitment to work and/or low 
productivity. Scarring effects are generally less persistent in less regulated markets such as the United 
Kingdom or the United States; on the contrary they tend to persist up to 15 years of labour market entry in 
Spain, France or Germany (OECD 2010). Being out of work or education also entail lost public revenues; 
estimates for 21 EU countries suggest that NEETs cost €100 billion, about 1% of their aggregated GDP - 
€94 billion of foregone earnings and €7 billion of excess transfers. (Eurofound, 2011). 
While youth unemployment is everywhere higher than overall unemployment, there are important 
differences across countries. These differences underline the role of education and particularly vocational 
education and apprenticeship schemes in helping the young to make smooth transitions from school to work. 
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Table I.2.6: Unemployment rates of the low skilled by 
country 
2011 10-11 09-10 2011 10-11 09-10
NL 5.7 -0.5 1.7 SI 14.7 2.1 3.6
CY 7.7 0.4 0.9 EU 27 16.0 0.6 1.3
LU 7.8 2.5 -1.9 EA 17 16.6 0.6 1.4
MT 7.8 -0.2 0.4 EL 18.1 5.5 3.2
RO 8.1 1.4 -1.3 PL 19.0 0.8 3.0
AT 8.2 0.0 -1.2 CZ 23.1 -0.9 0.7
DK 9.6 0.0 1.7 IE 23.3 2.3 4.2
IT 10.3 0.3 0.9 HU 24.5 -0.2 2.1
UK 12.5 0.5 1 EE 25.9 -4.3 3.4
SE 12.7 -0.8 1 BG 26.5 3.8 7.5
FI 13.0 0.0 1.8 LV 26.7 -3.5 1.2
BE 13.4 -1.3 1.5 ES 28.2 1.9 2.8
PT 14.0 1.8 1.6 LT 38.7 -1.1 10.8
DE 14.1 -1.9 -0.9 SK 41.1 -1.9 2.9
FR 14.5 -0.1 1.1
 
(1) Countries are ranked in ascending order of the 
unemployment rate in 2011. 
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64. 
 
The participation rate of all three skill groups was 
virtually unchanged. The developments of the 
employment and participation rates resulted in an 
increase in the unemployment rate for the low 
skilled (+0.6 percentage points) and the high 
skilled (+0.2 percentage points) and a slight 
decline in the rate of the medium skilled (-0.1 
percentage points). 
There are remarkable cross-countries differences 
in the labour market outcomes for the low-skilled 
(Table I.2.6). Two countries, Lithuania and 
Slovakia, are struggling with low skilled 
unemployment rates as high as 40%; however, in 
both countries the rate has declined slightly. On 
the other hand, seven countries have low skilled 
unemployment rates below 10%. The fastest 
increase was recorded in in Greece (+5.5 
percentage points), reaching 18.1%. 
2.5.4. Nationality 
In 2011 the employment rate of foreigners 
increased, while that of nationals (EU citizens 
working in their home country) stagnated. The 
employment of EU-foreigners (EU citizens 
working in a country other than their home 
country) gathered further pace, increasing by 5%. 
The employment of non-EU foreigners (who hold 
no EU citizenship) also increased, but – similarly 
to 2009 and 2010, at a smaller pace, growing by 
2%. On the whole, intra-EU labour migration 
continued strongly despite the crisis. – while in 
2005 4.2 million EU citizens were working abroad, 
Box (continued) 
 
However, other factors include the role of the public sector as employer of last resort (Alesina et al 2000), 
the level and limited differentiation of minimum wage (e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 2004),  the effectiveness 
of active labour market policies (ALMPs). 
The prevalence of high youth unemployment rates 
points to a dysfunctional labour market. However, the 
large majority of the young are still studying (about 
67% in the EU) and as such are not considered in the 
pool of those that are actively engaged in the labour 
market (either working or looking for a job). For 
example, in Spain only about 41% of the young aged 
between 15 and 24 years were active in 2011 and of 
these 46.4% were unemployed. This meant that 19% 
of the young population were looking for jobs in vain 
–outrageously high, but far from the “every second 
youngsters cannot find a job” misinterpretation that is 
so widespread.  
Governments have adopted various instruments to support young people during the crisis, including 
promotion of apprenticeships, training and work experience programmes; development of education systems 
to improve their skills, tax incentives and employment hiring and training subsidies. A comprehensive 
solution, "Youth guarantees" seem to becoming more popular. Youth guarantees promote rapid action for 
NEETs - e.g. in Finland anyone aged 16–25 and enrolled with the public employment service for at least 
three months is entitled to take part in the job guarantee, i.e.: either find a job or enrol in the regular 
education system more quickly. (Räisänen et al, 2012; Eurofound, 2012). 
 
 
 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2012 
 
30 
in 2011 this amounted to 6.3 million, an increase 
of 300 thousand last year.  
Germany with her favourable labour market 
continued to attract foreigners, and added 110 
thousand EU-foreigner and 70 thousand non-EU 
foreigner to its employed labour force – having 
now over 1.5 million EU-foreigner and over 2 
million non-EU foreigner. By contrast, in crisis-
stricken Spain, Greece and Portugal, the 
employment of foreign workers shrunk at a higher 
pace than that recorded for the employment of 
natives. 
Graph I.2.17: Employment growth by nationality, EU-27 
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Source: Eurostat LFS. 
Net migration flows reveal that migration has 
contributed to labour market adjustment at a high 
extent in a few countries (Graph I.2.18). In Latvia 
and Ireland, outward net migration has contributed 
to absorb the large pool of unemployed. Net 
migration has become negative only in 2011 in 
Spain, despite the high unemployment rate. For 
Luxemburg, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, 
Finland, net inward migration flows are consistent 
with relatively strong employment dynamics.  
Graph I.2.18: Net migration rates (% of population) 
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Source: Eurostat 
2.5.1. Contract Type 
Temporary employment took much of the brunt of 
the recession (Graph I.2.19). With growth 
resuming, albeit in an uncertain environment, 
temporary employment returned to increase in 
2010 and continued to grow in 2011. Permanent 
employment in contrast started to contract later but 
also returned to modest growth only in 2011. Self-
employment in 2011 lost much of the gain made in 
2010. 
Graph I.2.19: Employment growth by contract type, EU-27 
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Source: Eurostat LFS. 
The young were the most impacted by the decline 
in temporary employment as 42.5% of the young 
have fixed-term contracts (Table I.2.7), against 
12.4% for those aged between 25 and 49 and less 
than 7% for those in the 50-64 age bracket. 
 
Table I.2.7: Share of temporary employees, by age 
Age 2006-2009 2010 2011
15-24 40.6 42.1 42.5
25-49 12.1 12.1 12.4
50-64 6.8 6.8 6.7
 
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
 
Part-time employment continued to increase, albeit 
modestly (Table I.2.8), while full-time 
employment remained stable. This evidence 
corroborates the view that part-time is mostly 
counter-cyclical, so that it expected to grow faster 
when unemployment is high as in the current 
juncture. The share of part-time employment in the 
labour force increased most in Slovenia, Slovakia 
and Malta, while the major reduction was recorded 
in Greece. 
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Table I.2.8: Part-time and full-time employment, EU-27 
2010 2011
Full-time employment (Millions) 173.0 173.0
Part-time employment (Millions) 39.4 40.0
Share of part-time for men 7.8 8.1
Share of part-time for women 31.4 31.6
 
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 15-64. 
 
The distribution of employment between 
permanent employment, temporary employment 
and self-employment differs considerable across 
EU (Table I.2.9), with the Mediterranean countries 
as well as Poland characterised by strong 
segmentation. At EU level, the share of permanent 
employment was almost unchanged in 2011, but 
relatively strong increases took place in some 
countries, particularly Romania and in Portugal, as 
the share of self-employment declined. 
 
Table I.2.9: Distribution of contract types among the 
employed in % by country 
2011 chg 2011 chg 2011 chg
LT 88.4 -0.2 2.5 0.4 9.1 -0.2
EE 87.8 -0.8 4.1 0.7 8.1 0.1
LU 85.7 -0.5 6.6 0.0 7.7 0.5
BG 85.3 0.9 3.6 -0.2 11.0 -0.6
LV 83.9 0.0 5.8 -0.3 10.3 0.3
DK 83.5 -0.3 8.2 0.4 8.4 0.0
UK 81.6 -0.1 5.2 0.0 13.2 0.1
MT 81.3 -0.1 5.7 0.8 13.0 -0.7
HU 80.7 1.0 7.9 -0.6 11.4 -0.4
AT 80.0 -0.3 8.5 0.3 11.5 0.1
BE 79.3 -0.5 7.7 0.7 12.9 -0.2
SK 78.7 -0.8 5.5 0.8 15.8 0.0
RO 78.5 1.5 1.2 0.3 20.3 -1.8
IE 76.5 -0.2 8.4 0.5 15.1 -0.3
DE 76.2 -0.1 13.2 0.1 10.6 0.0
SE 76.2 -0.1 14.4 0.5 9.4 -0.4
CZ 76.1 -0.2 6.6 -0.2 17.3 0.4
FR 75.5 -0.4 13.5 0.2 10.9 0.1
FI 74.1 -0.1 13.6 0.1 12.3 0.0
EU 27 73.4 0.1 12.0 0.1 14.6 -0.2
CY 73.1 0.3 11.6 0.1 15.3 -0.4
EA 17 72.0 -0.1 13.5 0.2 14.5 -0.1
SI 71.9 -1.0 15.8 0.8 12.3 0.2
NL 70.5 0.1 15.7 -0.1 13.8 -0.1
IT 66.8 -0.3 10.3 0.5 22.8 -0.2
PT 64.9 1.5 18.5 -0.4 16.6 -1.0
ES 63.0 -0.2 21.4 0.4 15.6 -0.2
EL 60.1 -0.1 7.9 -0.6 32.0 0.7
PL 59.1 0.3 21.7 -0.2 19.2 0.0
Permanent Temporary  Self   
contract contract employed
 
(1) Countries are ranked by share of permanent contracts. 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat LFS. 
 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
Labour market conditions kept diverging across 
the EU in 2011, not only because of different paths 
of economic activity but also because of a different 
response of employment to growth. The increase 
unemployment was much above that predicted by 
the Okun law in the countries with persistent or 
aggravating sovereign crises (Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, Cyprus), while drops in unemployment 
stronger than predicted in countries on the verge of 
rebalancing and with financial conditions 
stabilising (the Baltics).  
Activity rates were resilient in most countries, 
more than expected on the basis of historical 
regularities, with some noteworthy exceptions 
(e.g., Ireland). Hours worked resumed, but 
stabilised below pre-crisis levels in a majority of 
countries. In a few countries (Spain, Portugal) the 
increase in the average hours worked would help 
reducing labour costs looking forward, but did not 
help containing the substantial labour shedding. 
Four years after the start of the crisis job finding 
rates remained low in most Member States and are 
further worsening in some countries, notably 
Spain. Job separation rates increased in a majority 
of countries, with very substantial increases in the 
same countries exhibiting a major divergence of 
the employment response to the current recession 
(Greece, Portugal).  
As a result of the persistent low rate of job 
creation, the duration of unemployment has risen 
in most Member States, with the biggest increases 
recorded in Ireland, Slovakia, Spain, the Baltics. In 
light of the sheer size of the Spanish 
unemployment problem, avoiding that longer 
unemployment duration translates into worsened 
labour market mismatch in this country is a 
priority to prevent that a high share of the euro-
area unemployment becomes structural. 
In light of widespread uncertainty of the 
sustainability of the recovery, the share of 
temporary employment in the euro area has further 
increased. The share of low-skilled employment is 
falling in most countries, while the gap in terms of 
worsening employment rates for males compared 
with females is coming to an end. Youth 
unemployment rates increased dramatically in 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and remained worryingly 
high in other countries, notably the Baltics.  
Outward migration from Latvia and Ireland is 
becoming a relevant margin of absorption of the 
high pool of unemployed in these countries. By 
contrast, in Spain net migration became negative 
only in 2011.  
3. RECENT WAGE AND LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Graph I.3.1: Nominal compensation per employee, y-o-y % change 
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(1) Countries are displayed in ascending order of the unemployment rate in 2010. 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, nominal compensation per employee in 
the euro area accelerated somewhat on aggregate, 
but with very heterogeneous patterns across 
countries. While Germany, Belgium, Austria, 
France and Finland recorded growth rates above 
2.5%, compensation per employee declined in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and grew at rates 
below 1% in Malta, Spain and Slovakia. In the 
non-euro area countries, compensation per 
employee grew moderately in Sweden, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark and the United Kingdom; it 
accelerated in Poland, and became positive after 
years of negative growth in Latvia, Lithuania and 
Hungary. 
This chapter reviews wage and unit labour costs 
developments at country level, with a view to 
highlight patterns of wage adjustment. Aggregate 
wage dynamics are disentangled in such a way to 
analyse the contribution of different sectors of the 
economy and of the government. Unit labour cost 
dynamics are distinguished along the main 
components of wages, social security 
contributions, productivity. Developments in price 
competitiveness indicators based on unit labour 
costs are discussed in relation to euro-area 
adjustment dynamics and external re-balancing.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as 
follows. The next section describes the main trends 
in wages and unit labour costs. Section 3.3 looks at 
the evolution of REERs and external adjustment. 
Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2. TRENDS IN WAGES AND UNIT LABOUR 
COSTS 
The dynamics of compensation per employee 
across the EU remained highly heterogeneous in 
2011, ranging between growth rates around 3% in 
Germany and a similar rate of negative growth in 
Greece (Graph I.3.1). Ireland and Portugal are 
together with Greece the euro area countries 
recording negative growth rates in compensation 
per employee in 2011. Malta, Spain and Slovakia 
registered growth rates in compensation per 
employee below 1%, while Germany, Belgium, 
Austria, France and Finland recorded the highest 
growth rates. 
In the non-euro area countries, developments in 
compensation per employee were also uneven.  
While the growth rate in compensation per 
employee ranges from around 3.5% in Lithuania to 
above 7% in Bulgaria, that in Sweden, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark and the United Kingdom, was 
below 2%. 
Graph I.3.3 shows the relation between the 
variation in compensation per employee and its 
level measured in Purchasing Power Standards 
(PPS). It is expected that catching-up countries, on 
average, will display higher growth rates in 
compensation per employee. Indeed, in 2011, 
countries with lower levels of compensation per 
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employee measured in PPS recorded on average 
higher growth rates. This was particularly the case 
of Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. 
Turning to the quarterly profile of wage 
developments, the overall picture varies markedly 
across countries (Graph I.3.2). This reflects 
different conditions and exposures to the recession, 
need of rebalancing in some countries and 
underlying labour market institutions. For the euro 
area as a whole the growth rate in compensation 
per employee reached the lowest level in the third 
quarter of 2009 and recovered thereafter, 
stabilising at a rate slightly above two per cent at 
the end of 2011. 
Graph I.3.3: Compensation per employee, y-o-y % 
change vs level of compensation in PPS, 2011 
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Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
Graph I.3.2: Compensation per employee, y-o-y % change 
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(1) For Bulgaria Hourly Labour Cost Index is used instead of compensation per employee. Countries are grouped according 
to the level of variation in compensation per employee to facilitate a better reading of the changes. 
Source: Commission services, based on Eurostat data. 
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Germany, after having recorded negative growth 
rates in compensation per employee in the last 
three quarters of 2009, recorded a robust growth 
thereafter with growth rates peaking at 3.5% in the 
second quarter of 2011. The conclusion of a 
collective agreement in May 2012 granting wage 
increases above 4% in the metal and electrical 
engineering sector preludes to sustained wage 
growth looking forward. 
In France and Belgium, the growth rate in 
compensation per employee accelerated strongly 
during 2011. In Austria, after the drop in the last 
quarter of 2009 the growth rate in compensation 
per employee has been increasing steadily. 
The adjustment of wages was in general sharpest 
in the euro area countries facing stronger 
adjustment and rebalancing needs. In Portugal, the 
growth rate in compensation per employee has 
been declining steadily and recorded negative 
growth rates in the last three quarters of 2011. 
Much of the wage reduction comes from dynamics 
in the public sector, as shown in the remainder of 
the chapter.  
In Italy, after a strong rebound in 2010, the growth 
rate in compensation per employee decelerated 
sharply in the last two quarters of 2011. In Spain, 
there was a strong deceleration in the growth rate 
in compensations in 2010, that however recovered 
slightly in 2011.  
In Greece, the growth rate in compensation per 
employee is recording negative values for seven 
consecutive quarters. Wage reductions in this 
country come both from the public and the private 
sector. Most of the wage reduction are linked to re-
negotiations of individual and firm-level contracts. 
Early signs of wage reductions as a result of 
renegotiations of collective contracts are also 
becoming visible. 
In the coming years, wage moderation in the 
private sector in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece 
could be linked, inter-alia, to recently adopted 
reforms in the wage setting system (see Chapter 4). 
In Ireland, growth rates returned to positive 
territory after 6 consecutive quarters of decline in 
compensation. 
In the non-euro area countries, Latvia and 
Lithuania, after sharp declines in compensation per 
employee during 2009 and 2010, saw the growth 
rates in compensation per employee growing at 
robust rates in 2011. In Lithuania, compensation 
per employee grew above 7% in the fourth quarter 
of 2011. In Hungary, compensation also grew at a 
robust rate after several quarters of negative 
growth rates. The Czech Republic, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, after a relative strong growth in 
compensation per employee in 2010, registered a 
relative moderate growth in compensation in 2011. 
3.2.1. Real consumption and production 
wages 
Developments in the GDP deflator and the HICP 
influence the growth rate of real product wages 
Graph I.3.4: Real product and consumption wages, HICP and GDP deflator, y-o-y % change, 2011 
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Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
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and real consumption wages. The relevant wage 
variable for firms is the real product wage, which 
is the price of labour relative to the value added 
deflator. For consumers, the variable of interest is 
the real consumption wage, which is their take-
home pay relative to the price of goods and 
services they purchase. 
Real product wages declined in 15 Member States. 
Greek employers benefited from the sharpest 
decline in the cost of labour, with the real product 
wage declining by 4.7%. By contrast, real product 
wages increased at a rate above 2% in Bulgaria, 
Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Real 
consumption wages declined in 21 Member States 
in 2011. The Greek and Portuguese workers 
suffered the sharpest declines in purchasing power 
following a drop in real consumption wages of 6% 
and 4%. In Estonia, Slovakia, Ireland, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom, the decline in purchasing 
power was above 2%. Bulgaria saw the real 
consumption wages growing at 3.4%, the fastest 
rate in the EU. 
3.2.2. Real compensation per employee 
productivity and unemployment 
Real wage growth aligned with productivity is a 
condition for wage growth consistent with labour 
demand. Graph I.3.5 shows the average growth 
rate in real compensation per employee and the 
average growth rate in productivity over the period 
2009-2011. During this period the average growth 
in real compensation per employee was marginally 
faster than the growth in productivity. The average 
is strongly influenced by the sharp fall in 
productivity in 2009. Over the last two years, on 
average, productivity grew faster than 
compensation. In 2011, real compensation per 
employee grew by 0.7%, while labour productivity 
grew by 1.4%. 
The cumulative difference between real 
compensation per employee and productivity is 
above 1 percentage point in Luxembourg, Cyprus, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria. On the contrary, 
it is significantly negative in the Baltic countries 
and Ireland. Hungary, Romania, Spain, Greece and 
Poland registered a cumulative negative difference 
above 1 percentage point. In spite of the 
differences in the order of magnitude between 
average growth rates in these two variables, there 
is a clear positive correlation between the average 
growth rates in real compensation per employee 
and average growth rates in labour productivity 
over the past three years. 
Graph I.3.5: Real compensation per employee and 
productivity, average growth rates 2009-2011 
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Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
Graph I.3.6 plots the growth rate in real unit labour 
costs in 2011 against the unemployment rate in 
2010. There is a negative relationship between the 
levels of unemployment in 2011 and the evolution 
of real unit labour costs in 2011. The adjustment 
seems conducive to convergence in unemployment 
rates.  
Graph I.3.6: RULC, y-o-y % change 2011 and 
unemployment rate in 2010 
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Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
However, the degree of adjustment varies 
markedly across Member States. Romania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland and Lithuania, recorded 
lower unemployment rates than Spain but saw a 
stronger downward adjustment in real unit labour 
costs. The downward adjustment in real unit labour 
costs in Portugal was similar to that of Poland, 
Sweden, Malta and Luxembourg, while these 
countries have a lower unemployment rate. In 
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Hungary and France real unit labour costs 
increased, while a number of countries with lower 
unemployment rates recorded a decline in real unit 
labour costs. 
3.2.3. Compensation per employee at 
sectoral level 
The sectoral breakdown of the compensation per 
employee shows that the growth rate in 
compensation per employee was somewhat 
stronger in the industry in most countries (Graph 
I.3.7). This pattern relates to the rebound in 
industry after the collapse of manufacture output at 
the onset of the crisis.  However, compensation per 
employee in industry is in general more moderate 
in 2011 compared with the previous year, while 
broadly similar growth rates are observed in the 
other sectors. Overall, the recovery in labour 
remunerations in manufacturing helps shifting 
resources towards tradable activities and 
contributes to the re-balancing. Wage growth in 
industry (and tradable services, notably "trade, 
transport and communication") is particularly 
visible in countries having undertaken a successful 
re-balancing process like Latvia and Romania. In 
this countries, it is also visible a recovery in wages 
in the construction sector.  
Conversely, declines in compensation per 
employee in the construction sector are very strong 
in Greece, a country in the middle of a major 
rebalancing process, while Bulgaria records a 
strong absolute growth of wages in this sector. 
3.2.4. Compensation per employee in private 
and public sector 
The growth rate of compensation per employee in 
the public sector was on average lower than in the 
private sector in 2011 (see Graph I.3.8). Ireland, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Spain recorded a 
contraction in compensation per employee in the 
public sector. In Ireland and Spain, compensation 
per employee in the public sector is falling, 
respectively, for the third and second consecutive 
years. The reduction results from measures taken 
by governments to reduce their fiscal deficits. In 
Ireland, the government imposed a pension levy 
that came into effect in 2009, followed by further 
pay cuts in the general public sector (inversely 
related to income levels) between 5 and 8% in 
2010. In Spain the government imposed an average 
5% cut in 2010 followed by a pay freeze in 2011. 
The decrease in compensation per employee in 
Portugal was a consequence of an average 5% cut 
on public employees earning above 1500 Euros a 
month. In Slovakia, the decline in compensation 
per employee resulted from cuts to reduce the total 
wage bill. In Italy, the growth rate in compensation 
per employee in the public sector was below 1%, 
which resulted from pay freezes and cuts of 5 and 
10% for annual salaries above 90,000 and 150,000 
Euros. 
Graph I.3.7: Compensation per employee by sector, y-o-y % change 2011 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
BE BG CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU MT NL AT RO SI SK FI SE
Industry Building and construction
Trade transport and communication Finance and business services
 
(1) Remaining EU countries not included because of missing data. 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
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Public sector wages grew significantly above 
wages in private sector in Denmark, Hungary, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. In Hungary, the growth 
rate in public sector wages was particularly high 
despite plans to freeze the total wage bill in the 
public sector. While the total wage bill increased 
by less than 1% the number of total employees was 
reduced by 5%. In the United Kingdom the total 
wage bill declined by more than 1%, while the 
number of employee declined by more than 5%. 
3.2.5. Decomposition of unit labour costs 
Nominal unit labour costs grew moderately in the 
euro area and the EU in 2011 (Table I.3.1). This 
follows the record lows registered in 2010 when 
nominal unit labour costs declined. The evolution 
of unit labour cost in 2011 was marked by a 
relative moderate increase in nominal 
compensation per employee and an increase in 
productivity at a rate above 1%. Productivity 
growth declined substantially as compared to 
2010. However, the strong rebound in productivity 
in 2010 benefitted from a base effect related to the 
number of hours worked which declined markedly 
in 2009 and pushed productivity down. 
Nominal unit labour costs registered the sharpest 
decline in Ireland, which recorded the second 
consecutive decline above 4%. Greece and Spain 
also registered a significant decline in unit labour 
costs. Portugal and Slovakia were the other euro 
area countries to register a decline in unit labour 
costs, though of a smaller dimension than the other 
three countries. In the euro area nominal unit 
labour costs accelerated the most in Cyprus and 
Luxembourg, as both countries recorded negative 
productivity growth, while the growth rate in 
compensation per employee was about 2%. The 
evolution of nominal unit labour costs in Ireland and 
Spain benefitted especially from the highest and 
second highest productivity growth in the euro area. 
 
Table I.3.1: Decomposition of unit labour costs, y-o-y % 
change, 2011 
NULC Compensation per employee
Labour 
productivity
GDP 
deflator RULC
BE 2.5 3.0 0.5 1.9 0.6
BG 1.1 7.3 6.1 5.0 -3.7
CZ 0.2 1.6 1.4 -0.7 0.9
DK 0.3 1.7 1.5 0.8 -0.5
DE 1.4 3.0 1.6 0.8 0.6
EE 0.8 1.4 0.6 3.7 -2.8
IE -4.1 -1.4 2.8 -0.4 -3.7
EL -3.0 -3.2 -0.2 1.6 -4.5
ES -1.9 0.8 2.8 1.4 -3.2
FR 1.6 2.8 1.2 1.3 0.3
IT 1.0 1.4 0.3 1.3 -0.3
CY 2.0 2.0 -0.1 2.0 0.0
LV 2.1 4.2 2.0 5.4 -3.1
LT -0.2 3.6 3.8 5.3 -5.2
LU 3.2 2.0 -1.1 4.7 -1.4
HU 4.4 5.8 1.4 3.5 0.8
MT 0.8 0.4 -0.3 2.3 -1.5
NL 0.7 1.7 1.0 1.1 -0.4
AT 1.3 3.0 1.6 2.1 -0.8
PL 1.8 5.1 3.3 3.2 -1.4
PT -0.8 -0.8 -0.1 0.7 -1.4
RO 1.7 3.7 2.0 8.1 -5.9
SI 0.4 2.0 1.6 0.8 -0.4
SK -0.6 0.9 1.5 1.6 -2.2
FI 1.0 2.7 1.7 3.6 -2.5
SE -0.8 0.8 1.7 0.9 -1.7
UK 1.6 1.9 0.2 2.3 -0.7
 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
 
In the non-euro area countries nominal unit labour 
costs registered small declines in Sweden and 
Lithuania. In contrast, nominal unit labour costs 
increased at a rate above 4% in Hungary, the 
fastest rate in the EU. 
Real unit labour costs declined for the second 
consecutive year in the euro area and the EU. This 
follows the sharp increase of 2009. Romania and 
Graph I.3.8: Compensation per employee in private and public sector, y-o-y % change, 2011 
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(1) Remaining EU countries not included because of missing data. 
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Lithuania recorded the sharpest declines in the EU, 
while Hungary and the Czech Republic recorded a 
positive growth. In the euro area the sharpest 
decline was registered by Greece, followed by 
Ireland and Spain. 
Graph I.3.9: Unit labour costs in deficit and surplus 
countries, euro-area groups weighted 
averages, y-o-y % change 
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Surplus countries are BE, DE, LU, NL, AT and FI. 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database and Spring 2012 
European Commission Forecast. 
Overall, the evolution of unit labour costs in 2011 
is contributing to the rebalancing of external 
positions in euro-area countries. Until 2008, unit 
labour costs grew on average at a slower pace in 
countries with current account surplus than in 
deficit countries in the euro area. This pattern 
reverted in 2009, but in 2010 ULC growth rates 
were roughly equal in surplus and deficit countries. 
In 2011, ULCs are again growing at slower rate in 
deficit countries, and this process is expected to 
accelerate in 2012 according to the European 
Commission Spring 2012 Economic Forecast.  
3.2.6. Contributions to the final demand 
deflator 
Table I.3.2 presents the growth rate in the final 
deflator as well as the contribution of its different 
components. The growth rate in the final demand 
deflator ranges from about 0.5% in Sweden to 
about 8.5% in Lithuania. The contribution of unit 
labour costs to the increase in the final demand 
deflator is relatively modest and much lower than 
the historic average before 2009. In the euro area, 
the contribution of nominal unit labour costs to the 
final demand deflator was negative in Greece, 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Slovakia. In the non-
euro area countries, the contribution of nominal 
unit labour costs to the final demand deflator was 
negative in Sweden, while it was the highest in 
Hungary yet just above 1%. 
The other components of the final demand deflator 
show that import prices contributed the most to the 
overall domestic inflationary pressures in 2011. In 
the euro area, the contribution of import prices was 
highest in Belgium, Estonia, Slovakia and 
Luxembourg. In the non-euro area countries, the 
contribution of import prices to domestic 
inflationary pressures was stronger in Lithuania 
and Bulgaria. The contribution of gross operating 
surplus was the most important component to the 
increase in final demand deflator in Spain, Latvia, 
Greece and Romania. Finally, net indirect taxes 
were the lowest contributor to the increase in the 
final demand deflator in most Member States, 
though the size is relatively large in Romania. 
 
Table I.3.2: Contributions to the final demand deflator, y-
o-y % change, 2011 
BE 3.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 4.1
BG 3.4 0.4 0.6 2.2 6.6
CZ 1.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.6
DK 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.7
DE 1.5 0.6 0.3 -0.3 2.0
EE 2.7 0.2 0.5 1.5 3.8
IE 1.7 -1.2 0.1 0.8 0.6
EL 1.6 -1.2 0.2 2.3 2.8
ES 1.8 -0.8 -0.2 2.0 2.8
FR 1.2 0.7 0.6 -0.3 2.3
IT 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.3 2.6
CY 1.2 0.8 -0.3 0.9 2.5
LV 1.9 0.7 0.8 2.1 5.3
LT 5.3 -0.1 0.3 2.9 8.5
LU 2.4 0.7 0.3 1.0 4.4
HU 2.2 1.2 0.0 0.8 4.2
MT 2.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 3.4
NL 1.8 0.3 -0.2 0.6 2.5
AT 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.7 3.0
PL 2.3 0.6 0.4 1.2 4.5
PT 2.2 -0.3 0.2 0.6 2.7
RO 2.1 0.7 2.1 2.9 7.8
SI 2.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 2.8
SK 2.4 -0.2 0.1 1.0 3.2
FI 2.1 0.4 0.9 1.3 4.2
SE -0.1 -0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5
UK 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.2 3.4
F. demand 
deflator
Import 
prices NULC
Indirect 
taxes
G. oper. 
surplus
 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
 
3.2.7. Unit labour costs and the tax wedge 
Taxes and social security contributions drive a 
wedge between the cost for the employer and the 
net compensation received by the employee. Table 
I.3.3 shows the breakdown of the total tax wedge 
and its evolution over the period 2001-2011. 
Belgium, Germany, France and Hungary display 
the highest tax wedge. Belgium has the second 
highest rate on personal income tax, Germany has 
the second highest rate on employees' social 
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security contributions and France has the highest 
rate on employer's social security contributions. 
Over the period 2001-2011, the tax wedge 
decreased in most countries. Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Sweden, Lithuania and Denmark 
recorded the sharpest reductions. In the euro area, 
beyond Cyprus, the tax wedge decreased the most 
in Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Germany. 
Between 2010 and 2011, Bulgaria recorded the 
highest reduction on the back of reduction in 
employers and employees' social security 
contribution. On the contrary Portugal, 
Luxembourg, Latvia and Hungary recorded the 
most significant increases in the tax wedge. 
3.3. PRICE COMPETITIVENESS DEVELOPMENTS 
Cost competitiveness relative to a group of 35 
industrialised nations improved in most of the EU 
Member States over the period 2009-2011 in light 
of the productivity rebound and widespread 
moderation in wage dynamics (Graph I.3.10). 
Developments were however quite uneven.  
Within the euro area, Ireland recorded the 
strongest adjustment, with an 18% cumulative 
decline in the REER over the period. Spain and 
Estonia also recorded a decline in REERs of about 
8%. In Portugal, Malta and Greece REERs had a 
cumulative depreciation of about 3%. Slovakia and 
Slovenia recorded instead an appreciation above 
4% in REERs during this three year period.  
Among non-euro area countries, Latvia, Poland, 
Lithuania and Hungary recorded the sharpest 
depreciation in REERs in the period 2009-2011. In 
Latvia and Lithuania the developments in REERs 
were driven by strong downward adjustment in 
unit labour costs, while in Poland and Hungary the 
depreciation was mostly related to depreciations in 
nominal exchange rates. Nominal exchange rates 
also contribute to explain the variations in REERs 
in the Czech Republic, Romania, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Table I.3.3: Decomposition of the tax wedge 
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Security 
Contributions 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
AT 48.4 11.9 14.0 22.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 -0.1
BE 55.5 21.7 10.8 23.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.9
BG* 32.5 7.5 10.3 14.7 -1.3 0.1 -0.7 -0.8 -7.9 -1.1 4.1 -10.9
CY** 13.9 2.1 5.9 5.9 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -6.9 -2.3 0.3 -5.0
CZ 42.5 8.9 8.2 25.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1 1.5 -1.1 -0.6
DE 49.8 15.9 17.4 16.5 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.3 -2.1 -1.9 0.4 -0.6
DK 38.4 28.0 10.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -5.0 -4.5 -0.1 0.0
EE 40.1 12.5 2.1 25.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -3.7 2.1 0.8
EL 38.0 3.0 12.8 22.2 -0.2 -0.8 0.3 0.3 3.3 2.5 0.4 0.4
ES 39.9 12.0 4.9 23.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.4 0.0 -0.4
FI 42.7 18.5 5.8 18.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 -3.6 -2.6 0.6 -1.6
FR 49.4 10.0 9.6 29.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -1.0 0.1 0.5
HU 49.4 13.6 13.6 22.2 2.8 2.4 0.4 0.0 -6.4 -5.0 4.7 -6.1
IE 26.8 13.5 3.6 9.7 0.9 3.8 -2.9 0.0 0.9 2.7 -0.8 -1.0
IT 47.6 16.1 7.2 24.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.7 0.3 -1.0
LT* 40.7 10.0 6.9 23.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -9.6 4.6 0.0
LU 36.0 13.3 11.7 11.0 1.7 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.4 1.4 -0.8
LV* 44.2 17.6 7.3 19.4 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.1 0.1 -1.3
MT* 22.4 9.2 6.6 6.6 0.1 0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
NL 37.8 14.5 14.0 9.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.4 4.8 -3.9 -0.5
PL 34.3 5.9 15.5 12.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -3.7 0.5 -2.8 -1.5
PT 39.0 10.9 8.9 19.2 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.0
RO* 44.3 9.5 12.9 21.9 -0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.4 -3.6 1.4 3.9 -8.9
SE 42.8 13.6 5.3 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -6.3 -5.5 0.1 -0.8
SI 42.5 9.6 19.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.7 -1.5 0.6 -2.7
SK 38.9 7.5 10.6 20.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -3.6 1.8 1.3 -6.8
UK 32.5 14.1 8.5 9.9 -0.1 -0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 -1.6 1.0 0.9
Difference 2001 - 2011
Total Tax 
Wedge 
2011
Of which Difference 2010 - 2011
 
(1) Single person without children, 100% of average wage. 
Source: OECD, Taxing wages report. **2007 data *2010 data. 
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Different measures of REERs evolved in opposite 
directions in a number of countries. Graph I.3.11 
shows the year-on-year evolution of REERs based 
on ULC deflator, GDP deflator and export price 
deflator. This allows a distinction between broad 
and narrow measures of REERs. While REERs 
based on ULC and GDP cover the entire economy, 
export prices deflator concerns prices of exports 
only. Over relatively long time horizons, broad 
REERs indicators convey similar information 
regarding competitiveness positions. But in the 
short-term they may differ substantially in light of 
short-term variations in profit margins and indirect 
taxation. Differences may also exist between broad 
and narrow measures of REERs. This may be 
indicative of different price dynamics in tradable 
and non-tradable sectors and composition of 
exports. Graph I.3.11 shows that REERs based on 
the different deflators display conflicting signals in 
a number of countries. 
REERs based on ULC depreciated more in the 
euro area countries under more need to adjust. In 
Ireland the depreciation was about 5%, in Spain 
and Greece about 3% and in Portugal about 1%. In 
Germany and Austria REERs appreciated by about 
0.5%. Belgium and Cyprus were the only euro area 
countries where REERs based on ULC appreciated 
by more than 1%. Of the non-euro area countries 
Sweden, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic recorded the sharpest appreciations. On 
the contrary, Poland recorded the highest 
depreciation. In Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Sweden the movement in REERs in 2011 seems to 
be more related to movements in exchange rates 
than in nominal unit labour costs. 
The countries with the sharpest depreciation in 
REERs based on ULC have not seen the same 
adjustment in REERs based on the GDP deflator. 
In Ireland, the depreciation of REERs based on the 
GDP deflator was below 2% while in Spain and 
Greece appreciated slightly. In Portugal REERs 
based on GDP deflator depreciated but less than 
the REER based on unit labour costs. In some 
countries (e.g., Romania, Latvia, Bulgaria) price 
competitiveness based in terms of GDP deflator 
worsened much more markedly than ULC cost 
competitiveness. Conversely, in some countries 
(Germany , Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Hungary) labour cost competitiveness losses 
outpaced price competitiveness losses. 
REERs deflated by the export prices deflator 
evolved differently from REERs based on broad 
measures. Lithuania recorded the largest difference 
between the REER based on ULC and the REER 
based on the export deflator. In Germany, France, 
Cyprus the Czech Republic and Hungary the 
REERs based on the export deflator depreciated 
more than REERs based on ULC. This suggests 
that export firms in these countries have tried to 
offset the increase in cost competitiveness through 
a drop in profit margins, or the unit labour cost in 
export sectors varied considerably from those for 
the whole economy. 
Overall, in 2011 countries having to rebalance 
external positions while reducing high 
Graph I.3.10: REERs based on ULC deflator, y-o-y % change 
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(1) Belgium also includes Luxembourg. 
Source: DG ECGIN AMECO database. 
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unemployment recorded in general a stronger 
adjustment in labour cost competitiveness than in 
price competitiveness. A similar stronger 
adjustment of competitiveness in terms of labour 
costs rather than in relative prices for deficit 
countries is observable over a longer time frame, 
namely, since the start of the crisis (the 2008-2011 
period), as reported in Graph I.3.11. While 
improvements in cost competitiveness are per se 
helpful to external rebalancing, adjustment in 
relative prices are needed not only to support 
export demand via reduced export prices but also 
to induce the necessary shift from the non-tradable 
sector. In the latter respect, a role in fostering price 
competitiveness adjustment could be played by 
structural reforms more effectively contributing to 
reduce mark-ups in the non-tradable sector. 
3.3.1. Competitiveness and adjustment in the 
euro area 
In monetary unions, nominal unit labour costs are 
expected to adjust to differences in business cycle 
developments. Hence, in the presence of positive 
(negative) asymmetric shock, unit labour costs in a 
euro-area country should increase faster (slower) 
than in the rest of the area. This adjustment in turn 
favours the rebalancing of cyclical competitiveness 
positions via changes in net exports. 
Graph I.3.12 shows the year-on-year changes in 
REERs based on ULC and the relative output gap, 
calculated as the difference between the output gap 
of each individual country with that of the euro area. 
Graph I.3.12: REERs based on ULC, y-o-y % change, and 
relative output gap 2011 
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Note: Belgium also includes Luxembourg. 
Source: Commission services, based on DG ECFIN AMECO 
database. 
As expected, there is a positive relation between 
the relative output gap position and changes in 
REERs: countries with the largest cyclical slack 
tend to be those exhibiting stronger cost 
competitiveness gains. (17) Changes in REERs 
varied considerably across countries in similar 
cyclical positions. Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal recorded an economic performance 
relatively worse than that of the euro area and all 
saw their REERs depreciating, though the 
depreciation recorded by Ireland was the largest. 
Germany recorded the best economic performance 
in relation to the euro area while France performed 
relatively worse, but France recorded an 
                                                          
(17) This result is confirmed in empirical work on larger 
samples (e.g., Biroli, Mourre, and Turrini, 2010). 
Graph I.3.11: REERs based on ULC deflator, GDP deflator and export prices deflator, % change, 2011 y-o-y and over the 2008-
2011 period. 
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(1) Belgium also includes Luxembourg. 
Source: DG ECGIN AMECO database. 
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appreciation of REER higher than that of 
Germany. 
Graph I.3.13: REERs based on ULC, y-o-y % change 2011 
and current account balance 2010 
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Note: Belgium also includes Luxembourg. 
Source: Commission services, based on DG ECFIN AMECO 
database. 
Apart from contributing to the absorption of 
cyclical divergences, competitiveness adjustment 
is also key for the external rebalancing of the 
economies. Graph I.3.13 plots the current account 
balance in proportion of GDP in 2010 against 
changes in REERs based on ULC in 2011. The 
correlation between the variation in REERs and 
the current account is roughly positive, suggesting 
that the REER tends to appreciate more (less) in 
countries with a current account surplus (deficit).   
3.4. CONCLUSION 
In 2011, the dynamics of nominal compensation 
per employee started exhibiting an increasingly 
clear differentiation between countries with 
stronger needs to reduce unemployment and 
rebalance external positions and countries with a 
more sustained recovery and current account 
surpluses.  
Real compensation per employee declined in about 
half of the Member States. After growing above 
productivity in 2009, real compensation per 
employee in 2011 expanded at a rate below that of 
productivity, confirming the trend initiated in 2010 
of a declining wage share. The moderation in real 
wages is needed for containing unemployment and 
is probably under-estimated by aggregated data in 
light of rising skill-intensity of employment. Not in 
all countries, however, the speed and breath of 
downward adjustment in real wages seems 
proportionate to the unemployment challenges. 
The growth of compensation per employee in the 
public sector was on average lower than in the 
private sector. As part of their fiscal consolidation 
efforts, several governments imposed wage cuts 
and wage freezes in the public sector; wage cuts in 
the public sector were enacted in Ireland, Portugal, 
Slovakia and Spain; in Italy compensation per 
employee in the public sector grew below 1%.  
Looking at the sectoral breakdown, the growth of 
compensation per employee was more evenly 
distributed across sectors than in 2010. It was on 
average stronger in industry (excluding 
construction) and closely followed by the growth 
rate of compensation per employee in the 
construction sector, in trade, transport and 
communication and in finance and business 
services. The cross-country pattern of wage growth 
in manufacturing appears consistent  with external 
rebalancing, with labour demand and wages more 
sustained in the tradable sector in countries having 
clearly started or nearly completed a process of 
correction of current account deficits. 
Also unit labour cost developments are 
increasingly following patterns supportive of 
external re-balancing, with dynamics becoming 
increasingly sustained in surplus countries and 
more muted in deficit countries. Price 
competitiveness developments, however, appear 
somehow delinked to those in labour cost 
competitiveness, with gains still having to fully 
materialise in most deficit countries. 
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After two years of continued economic expansion 
following the Great Recession, the European 
economy is again losing momentum and an 
expansion of economic activity is not expected 
before 2013.  
Renewed tensions in sovereign bond markets, 
protracted fiscal consolidation to ensure public 
debt sustainability, concerns regarding credit 
supply amidst a process of gradual deleveraging, 
and some moderation in growth in emerging 
economies, mark the uncertain background for the 
EU economy.  
Hard data have pointed to worsening activity and 
employment since late 2011 and the latest results 
from business surveys point to weakening 
employment prospects. This state of worsening 
expectations could signal an actual reduction in 
employment growth looking forward, as survey 
results turn out being a quite effective leading 
indicator in the past, as hinted by Graph I.4.1. 
Graph I.4.1: Employment expectations by the EU 
businesses and actual employment growth 
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Source: European Commission (DG ECFIN Business and 
Consumer Surveys) 
According to the European Commission services 
Spring 2012 Forecast, EU GDP is expected to 
stagnate in 2012 and to expand by 1.3% in 2013. 
In the euro area alone, economic activity is likely 
to recede by -0.3% in 2012 before edging up by 
1% in 2013.  
Patterns of economic activity are expected to be 
highly different across Member States in 2012, 
reflecting different challenges in terms of private 
and public sectors adjustment as well as different 
exposure to the international cycle. Poland, 
Lithuania and Latvia are all expected to register 
GDP growth in excess of 2% in 2012. Greece and 
Portugal are projected to record notorious 
recessions, while Spain, Italy, Slovenia, the 
Netherlands, Cyprus and Hungary are also 
expected to register GDP falls. In 2013, GDP 
growth is instead expected to gain momentum in 
essentially all the EU countries, yet at different 
speeds. 
The background for economic activity in the 
quarters ahead is marked by heightened 
uncertainty of financial and fiscal conditions on 
individuals and firms decisions. In all, this 
uncertainty about the pace of economic activity 
can induce a wait-and-see attitude on the part of 
firms and compound the effects of falling activity. 
The fact that job creation in 2010 and 2011 took 
place especially in terms of temporary and part-
time jobs surrogates the argument that uncertainty 
on the economic outlook has been playing a role. 
The falling momentum in economic activity amid 
increased uncertainty is therefore expected to have 
implications for employment. In the EU as a 
whole, employment is forecast to decline by 0.2% 
in 2012 and to recover by the same magnitude the 
following year. The outlook for the euro area alone 
is bleaker as employment is projected to decline by 
0.5% in 2012 and to stabilise in 2013. In 2012, the 
unemployment rates are expected to increase to 
10.3% and 11% in the EU and in the euro area 
respectively (from 9.7% and 10.2% in 2011) and to 
remain broadly unchanged in 2013.  
The high diversity of employment developments 
across EU countries observed in recent years is 
expected to persist (Table I.4.1). The prospects 
remain poor in a number of EU countries whose 
labour markets were strongly hit by the crisis. This 
is notably the case of Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Member States like Bulgaria, Slovenia, Cyprus or 
Italy are also forecast to experience a labour 
market deterioration. Employment rates are 
expected to increase in Luxembourg, Germany and 
Hungary, all by at least 1% in 2012. Employment 
growth increases are expected also in Austria, 
France, the Baltics and the UK. 
Regarding unemployment rates, they are likely to 
be on a downward trend only in a tiny minority of 
Member States in 2012 and 2013, notably 
Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia and Germany. Also in 
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the Baltic countries unemployment rates will 
continue to fall visibly, from rather elevated levels. 
By contrast, increases in the unemployment rate 
will approach or even exceed 2 percentage points 
in the cases of Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece. 
In the case of Spain, the unemployment is 
expected to grow substantially not only in 2012 but 
also in 2013.  
The differences in the forecast unemployment 
dynamics across countries are mostly linked to the 
multi-speed recovery. However, in some cases the 
unemployment response to growth is also forecast to 
differ considerably. Furthermore, in a number of 
countries, unemployment patterns are expected to 
be driven by substantial structural relocations 
needs: it is not only that labour demand for some 
skills will continue to decline, labour supply may 
not be offering the skills demanded in the areas 
that are most promising to pull stricken economies 
out of the recession. Indeed, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, and in Chapter 2 for the case of Spain, 
the recent shifts in the Beveridge curve suggest a 
worsening labour matching. 
Overall, in the absence of a resolution of factors 
underlying the weakness of economic activity, 
notably the uncertainties linked to the sovereign 
crisis and the associated feed-back loops to the 
financial and real sector, the process of absorption 
of unemployment is likely to be long-lasting.  
The speed at which unemployment will be re-
absorbed will also depend, among other factors, on 
the capacity of wages to adjust to prevailing labour 
market conditions. The growth rate of 
compensation per employee in the EU is expected 
to remain essentially unchanged in 2012 and 2013 
(at slightly over 2%), while for the euro area a 
small deceleration (to marginally below 2%) is 
forecast.  
On the positive side, the dynamics of 
compensation per employee are forecast to follow 
differentiated paths (Graph I.4.2). Nominal 
compensation is forecast to grow strongly not only 
in non-euro area countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Poland 
and Estonia) but also in surplus euro-area 
countries, including Germany, Austria, Finland. 
On the opposite, deficit countries like Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus are forecast to record 
falls in average nominal compensation. The 
reduction in nominal compensation per employee 
in Spain is expected to be rather marginal. 
Real wages are expected to decline somewhat in 
2012 but to recover those losses in 2013. 
Nevertheless, they are expected to grow always 
 
Table I.4.1: Employment growth and unemployment rate forecasts by EU Commission (DG ECFIN), OECD and IMF 
2011 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
BE 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.3 7.2 7.6 7.9 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.3
BG -4.2 -1.9 -0.2 11.3 12.1 12.0 12.5 12.0
CZ 1.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 6.7 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.4
DK -0.5 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 7.6 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 5.8 5.5
DE 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.2 5.9 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.6 5.5
EE 6.7 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.7 12.5 11.6 10.5 11.4 10.4 11.3 10.0
IE -2.2 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 0.3 -1.0 0.7 14.4 14.3 13.6 14.5 14.4 14.5 13.8
EL -6.7 -4.8 -0.2 -5.0 -1.1 -4.8 -0.3 17.7 19.7 19.6 21.2 21.6 19.4 19.4
ES -2.0 -3.7 -1.5 -4.1 -1.1 -3.2 0.1 21.7 24.4 25.1 24.5 25.3 24.2 23.9
FR 0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 9.7 10.2 10.3 9.8 10.0 9.9 10.1
IT 0.3 -0.8 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -1.1 0.1 8.4 9.5 9.7 9.4 9.9 9.5 9.7
CY 0.5 -1.5 0.6 -0.3 1.0 7.9 9.9 10.0 9.5 9.6
LV -8.4 0.7 1.2 16.2 14.9 13.3 15.5 14.6
LT 2.0 0.6 0.5 15.4 13.8 12.7 14.5 13.0
LU 2.3 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.8 4.9 5.3 6.0 6.3 6.6 6.0 6.0
HU 0.8 1.0 1.4 -0.1 0.1 10.9 10.6 9.6 12.0 12.2 11.5 11.0
MT 2.4 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.2 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.5
NL 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.6 0.7 4.4 5.7 6.2 5.3 5.7 # 5.5 5.5
AT 1.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.4 4.3
PL 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 9.7 9.8 9.6 10.3 10.6 9.4 9.1
PT -1.9 -3.3 0.2 -3.9 -1.2 -2.5 0.3 12.9 15.5 15.1 15.4 16.2 14.4 14.0
RO -0.9 0.4 1.1 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.1
SI -3.2 -1.7 -1.0 -3.3 -2.7 -2.0 -0.4 8.2 9.1 9.4 8.8 9.2 8.7 8.9
SK 1.5 0.5 0.7 -0.1 0.7 -0.3 0.8 13.6 13.3 12.8 14.0 13.5 13.8 13.6
FI 1.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.2 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.8
SE 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.1 3.0 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.7
UK 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 8.0 8.5 8.4 8.6 9.0 8.3 8.2
EA-17 0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.1 10.2 11.0 11.0 10.3 10.6 # 10.9 10.8
EU-27 0.2 -0.2 0.2 9.7 10.3 10.3 na na
US -0.6 1.8 0.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.6 8.9 8.2 8.0 8.1 7.6 8.2 7.9
JP -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 1.4 0.2 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4
Employment (annual percentage change) Unemployment (percentage of civilian labour force)
ECFIN OECD IMF ECFIN OECD IMF
 
Source: EU Commission spring 2012 forecast, IMF World Economic Outlook database April 2012, OECD Economic Outlook 
n°91 June 2012. For the euro area figures by OECD, 15 countries are considered (no data for Cyprus and Malta). 
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below productivity in the EU and in the euro area, 
especially in 2013 when a cyclical upswing in 
productivity is expected, following a recovery in 
activity. 
Graph I.4.2: Nominal compensation per employee in EU 
Member States (% change) 
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Source: Commission services spring 2012 forecasts 
With productivity losing steam in 2012 before 
picking up again in 2013, and with little changes in 
in compensation per employee in 2012 and 2013, 
nominal unit labour costs for the EU and the euro 
area are forecast to increase in 2012, and to 
decelerate in 2013 for the euro area (Graph I.4.3). 
Inside the euro area, the strongest upward 
dynamics are projected for Luxembourg, Estonia, 
Belgium and Germany. On the opposite side, unit 
labour costs are expected to decline in a number of 
countries, most notably, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, 
Spain and Cyprus. The combination of these 
patterns should help narrowing imbalances in 
external accounts. 
Graph I.4.3: Nominal unit labour costs in the EU Member 
States (% change) 
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Source: Commission services spring 2012 forecasts 
5. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Graph I.5.1: Number of labour market measures by domain, total EU 
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(1) * ALMP without training. 
Source: Commission services, DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have been characterised by an 
exceptionally intense reform activity, where the 
large fiscal stimulus launched all over the EU in 
the aftermath of the crisis has been subsequently 
followed by a wave of structural reforms without 
precedents in a number of countries. Largely due 
to growing disparities in economic performance 
and fiscal constraints, and to different institutional 
settings, reform patterns have indeed been diverse 
across the EU.  
This chapter provides an overview of recent 
reform trends in the EU. It first analyses the 
overall reform activity since when the crisis started 
to be felt in the real economy. It then looks more in 
detail into labour market measures adopted 
between 2011 and the first half of 2012. Major 
labour market reforms taking place in selected 
countries are illustrated in depth. An attempt is 
made to assess ex-ante the impact of recent major 
EPL reforms on job market flows. The chapter 
finally takes a forward-looking perspective 
discussing priorities for further reform action 
across the EU, policy recommendations within the 
EU Semester and Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure framework, and national policy plans 
looking forward.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as 
follows. In the next section recent policy trends 
across countries and policy areas are discussed. 
Section 3 reviews more in depth the measures 
passed in 2011 and in the first half of 2012 in a 
number of labour market policy fields. Section 4 
looks into policy priorities and plans looking 
forward. Section 5 concludes by identifying 
desirable reform strategies in the EU. 
5.2. POLICY TRENDS 
The wave of reforms started in the second half of 
2008 reflects the exceptional circumstances which 
have prevailed over the last four years, dominated 
by a deep economic crisis, followed by sluggish 
recovery or recession in some countries and 
uncertain global prospects looking forward. The 
overall reform intensity sharply increased from 
2008 compared to previous years, with a relative 
higher increase in the number of measures in the 
fields of training, social assistance and income 
support, and wage setting. 
At first, European countries responded with a large 
fiscal stimulus to contain the labour market effects 
of the economic slowdown and mitigate its social 
impact, in line with what recommended in the 
European Economic Recovery Plan of November 
2008. Main temporary measures included 
increased support for labour demand and job 
creation, the full working of automatic stabilizers 
and their reinforcement where necessary, enhanced 
mechanisms to support job search and labour 
reallocation, and financial support to companies in 
difficulties to keep their labour force in case of 
temporary shortfall of demand. 
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Box I.5.1: The effectiveness of Active labour market policies: evidence
While passive labour market policies are aimed at providing income support to the unemployed, active 
labour market policies (ALMPs) aim at improving the employability of job seekers and tackling the 
mismatch between the supply and demand of labour.  
ALMPs are carried out by means of a number of different instruments – including the provision of 
information to job seekers and firms, job counselling and activation, training, subsidized employment, direct 
job creation in the public sector. Offices providing ALMPs and managing the available instruments are 
above all the public employment services (often in cooperation with private employment services) and 
public and private training centres.  
The empirical assessment of ALMPs is generally based on a comparison of outcomes (job finding rates, 
unemployment duration, wage loss after re-employment…) before and after participation into an ALMP 
programme, and compared with individuals not participating in any programme, controlling for a series of 
other characteristics ("difference-in-difference quasi-experiments", see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1999).  
If effectively designed and managed, ALMPs help to improve and adapt work skills, maintain 
employability, promote more active search behaviour and also have a screening function as they are 
substitutes for work experience and reduce employer uncertainty about employability. If badly designed and 
organised, ALMPs may not only be of limited effectiveness, but could also have a stigma effect.  
Empirical analyses on the effectiveness of ALMPs point to widely different impacts. In some studies, the 
effect of ALMPs turn out being insignificant or slightly negative, in other cases effects can be quite sizable, 
for example with average annual job finding rates being increased by about 5 percentage points (e.g., 
Blundell et al., 2004). Estimated effects of ALMPs tend to be higher when measured over longer periods 
(Card et al, 2010). 
A key determinant of the effectiveness of ALMPs in achieving a given objective is the type of instrument 
considered (Kluve, 2010). However, also the design of the programme matters. For instance, there is 
evidence that early participation in activation policies is more effective than programmes started after long 
unemployment spells. Moreover, the effectiveness of ALMPs needs to be evaluated conditional on the 
specific population groups targeted and taking into account the interaction with other policy frameworks, 
notably income support policies (ECORYS, 2004, 2008). 
Turning to the estimated effects of specific ALMPs instruments: 
• Training is generally found to have a positive impact on the probability of re-employment and wage 
prospects, although the effects are often estimated to be quite small (e.g., Heckman et al, 1999). It is also 
found that training tends to be more effective if provided within-firm and in connection to counselling, 
start-up support, wage subsidies (e.g., Martin and Grubb, 2001).  
• The initial scepticism towards wage subsidies (e.g., Martin and Grubb, 2001; Boone and van Ours, 
2004) is increasingly replaced by more positive evaluations, possibly partly related to improved design 
of most recent schemes (Card et al., 2010; Estevão, 2007; Dauth et al., 2010).  
• Activation policies, including job search assistance are among the least costly ALMPs and a significant 
impact has been found on the job finding rate (e.g., Blundell et al., 2004) and on unemployment duration 
(Centeno et al., 2009). The effectiveness of this instrument can be enhanced by increased monitoring of 
job-search behaviour and enforcement of work tests (e.g., Martin and Grubb, 2001; Ende et al, 2012). 
• Public jobs programmes are widely considered to be the ALMP with the smallest increase in long term 
employment prospects (e.g., Heckman et al., 1999; Card et al, 2010) and are mostly targeted to hardly 
employable population groups. However, during periods of mass unemployment, temporary and targeted 
public job programmes contribute to mitigating the loss of income while maintaining the link to the 
labour market (e.g. Azam et al., 2012). 
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The majority of policy interventions were intended 
to increase the employability of those hit by the 
crisis, improve the matching process and 
ultimately facilitate labour market transitions. 
Reinforcing activation and supporting employment 
by cutting labour cost, thus stimulating labour 
demand while keeping high the incentives to 
remain in the labour market, were also high on the 
reform agenda on the aftermath of the crisis. 
Starting from 2010, growing fiscal constraints, the 
need to address longer-term labour market 
weaknesses and large cumulated imbalances in a 
number of countries, led to the rapid phasing-out 
of crisis-related measures and to an intense 
structural reform activity, centred on the need to 
ensure a smooth labour market functioning and 
improved adjustment capacity. 
Graph I.5.2: Percentage change in labour market policy 
measures expenditure 2007-2010 
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Source: Eurostat, LMP database, LMP categories 2-7 
These broad reform trends are largely captured in 
the LABREF database. (18) A simple count of 
measures by policy area shows a constant increase 
in the number of interventions in the field of active 
labour market policies (ALMPs). (19) On the other 
hand, the interventions in the field of 
unemployment and other welfare-related benefits, 
which had seen a pick in the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis, started to decline in 2010, while the 
intensity of reform activity in areas touching the 
inner functioning of labour market, such as 
employment protection legislation (EPL) and wage 
setting mechanisms, significantly increased in 
2010-2011. 
                                                          
(18) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators 
/labref/index_en.htm  
(19) Data for 2011 are still provisional. 
The vast majority of measures taken over the 
period 2008-2011 in the field of ALMPs aimed at 
supporting employability, improving matching and 
enhancing skills. Most active support focused on 
enhancing and expanding the training offer, 
devising new vocational training strategies, and 
improving school-to-work transition via 
strengthened apprenticeship and training schemes. 
Wage subsidies were reinforced in a limited number 
of countries and less attention was paid to direct job 
creation schemes, a shift that could reflect inter-alia 
growing evidence on the different effectiveness of 
ALMP instruments (see Box I.5.1). 
Graph I.5.3: Percentage change in out-of-work income 
maintenance and support 2007-2010 
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Source: Eurostat, LMP database, LMP categories 8-9 
Despite the noticeable reform activity in this field, 
public expenditure in ALMPs per job-seeker 
declined slightly on average over the period. This 
general trend hides huge disparities across Member 
States, with countries such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Romania, Ireland and Spain, most of them hit by 
record unemployment levels, registering a sharp 
reduction of resources per job seeker. This can be 
largely explained by the steady increase in the 
take-up of active labour market policies since the 
start of the crisis, coupled in some cases with 
capped or reduced funds or with the need for 
increased efficiency, to face growing budgetary 
constraints. 
By contrast, expenditure on out-of-work income 
maintenance and support increased almost 
everywhere in the EU, with a few picks both as a 
percentage of GDP and per person in countries 
with the highest unemployment surge, such as 
Ireland, Spain and Italy.  
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Reform intensity in the field of unemployment and 
other welfare-related benefits was overall stable 
over the period 2008-2011, yet with different 
policy priorities. While in 2008-2009 most 
measures were aimed at increasing the generosity 
and coverage of the system, in 2010 and 2011 they 
turned into reducing generosity and tightening 
eligibility conditions. Most interventions in means-
tested and other welfare-related benefits, aimed at 
reinforcing social assistance and other income 
support mechanisms, were indeed recorded in 
2008 and 2009.  
Short-time working schemes have emerged as a 
new feature to support companies faced with a 
shortfall in demand. In particular, newly designed 
schemes which had been introduced on a 
temporary basis in the aftermath of the crisis have 
become a permanent feature of labour market 
institutions in a number of countries (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Spain, Sweden and Belgium for white-
collars, following measures adopted in 2011). 
As compared to 2008-2009, significantly fewer 
measures were adopted in 2010 and 2011 in the 
field of labour taxation. This could be due to the 
high number of fiscal measures which had been 
enacted immediately after the crisis to sustain 
labour demand. EPL and wage setting reforms saw 
an unprecedented boost in 2010-2011, and were 
largely concentrated in countries with major labour 
market problems and macro-economic imbalances. 
Regarding cross-country patterns of reform, in 
countries with positive employment prospects but 
with structural labour market weaknesses, crisis-
related measures have been largely discontinued 
while reforms have started to be enacted in specific 
policy areas considered as bottleneck to higher 
employment. However, the reform process has 
been in some cases irregular, with more piecemeal 
and less incisive interventions. 
In contrast, comprehensive reform packages have 
been introduced in countries with serious fiscal 
and macroeconomic imbalances targeting several 
policy areas simultaneously to reap the benefits of 
reform complementarities. In particular, the 
accession of countries to multilateral financial 
assistance programmes has provided for ambitious 
structural labour market reforms. The scope for 
new measures or implementing announced 
measures has been to some extent affected by 
fiscal consolidation needs.  
5.3. POLICY ACTION SINCE 2011 
The overall policy trends which had emerged in 
2010 have been confirmed in 2011. Policies to 
sustain labour supply, encourage labour demand 
and facilitate transitions to work have remained a 
focal strategy to prevent unemployment from 
becoming entrenched. In addition, unprecedented 
measures in the area of employment protection 
legislation have come to the forefront to support 
labour market dynamics and reduce labour market 
segmentation. These reforms have been to some 
extent complemented with measures to enhance 
internal flexibility while bold reforms of wage 
setting mechanisms towards greater 
decentralisation and higher wage flexibility have 
mitigated the adjustment of labour input. New 
reforms of unemployment benefit systems have 
supported transitions back to work, primarily by 
adjusting the design of unemployment benefits 
over the unemployment spell and in some cases by 
strengthening job-search conditionalities. (20) 
Active Labour Market Policies 
Activation and job-search assistance policies have 
remained one of the most widely used instruments 
to fight unemployment. New strategies and action 
plans have been devised to improve matching, by 
focusing on reinforced individual support and an 
early activation (e.g. Finland, France, Spain, 
Portugal, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, 
Luxembourg), especially of the young and long-
term unemployed, and in some cases of workers 
from specific sectors particularly hit by the crisis 
(e.g. Spain).  
To improve efficiency, several countries have 
adapted the institutional network in place to 
support the unemployed, notably by reorganising 
the public employment services (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Belgium), 
increasing staff capacity (e.g. France, Sweden), 
setting-up a one-stop shop (e.g. Czech Republic, 
                                                          
(20) Information reported in this section are based on national 
sources, ECFIN staff, and various issues of European 
Employment Observatory, Quarterly Reports.  
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Hungary, Ireland), decentralising activation (e.g. 
Finland, Belgium) or outsourcing it to private 
employment agencies (e.g. Czech Republic, United 
Kingdom, Slovakia). Further measures include 
tighter conditionality of benefits with respect to 
accepting a job offer, public works or training (e.g. 
Ireland, Spain, Hungary and Czech Republic). 
Employment incentives have continued to be used 
extensively to support labour demand and 
recruitment of specific vulnerable groups. Newly 
introduced or scaled-up wage subsidies and tax 
incentives to employers have been decided in 
many countries (e.g. Cyprus, Spain, Belgium, 
France, Latvia, Greece, Sweden, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Luxembourg), often conditional upon 
new hires, and targeted at specific and less 
employable demographic groups such as young, 
long-term unemployed, older persons, ethnic 
minorities or foreign-born residents and mothers.  
In contrast, a few countries scaled back 
employment incentives for the unemployed (e.g. 
Denmark). Direct job creation schemes have been 
less important, except in some countries (e.g. 
Hungary, Latvia), while new measures emerged to 
support the unemployed to start to work as self-
employed (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
United Kingdom).  
Training and life-long learning 
A wide range of measures have been adopted to 
enhance the training offer, there including at the 
workplace, so as to better adapt the skills of 
workforce to labour market needs and facilitate 
labour adjustment. New training schemes for the 
unemployed have been introduced and existing 
ones have been adapted, by revising training needs 
and priority areas, extending the training coverage 
and increasing financial support (e.g. Greece, 
Lithuania, Sweden, Spain, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium and 
Germany). To ensure that the unemployed can 
better build a link with the labour market, many 
countries have announced or expanded existing 
work experience, internship and apprenticeship 
schemes in private, public, community or 
voluntary sectors (Sweden, France, Italy, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg, 
Spain and Denmark), targeting above all specific 
groups such as the young and the unemployed. 
Some measures have been also introduced to up-
skill employees, by strengthening their rights to 
training at work and taking leave from work for 
training purposes (e.g. Spain). 
Participation-friendly schemes 
Keeping labour market attachment of specific 
groups has remained high on the policy agenda. A 
variety of measures have addressed bottlenecks for 
women to participate in the labour market, by 
providing tax incentives on income from work 
(e.g. Italy, Malta, Hungary, Austria) and making 
childcare facilities more available (e.g. Austria, 
Malta, Hungary, Luxembourg). In contrast, a 
refund of childcare costs was reduced in the 
Netherlands. Targeted measures have been also 
introduced or announced to increase employment 
of the disabled (e.g. France, Slovenia, Denmark, 
Czech Republic) and to keep older persons either 
employed or attached to the labour market (e.g. 
Austria, Poland, Germany). 
Unemployment benefits 
A major overhaul of unemployment benefit 
systems has been decided in some countries, with 
the aim either to address insufficient incentives to 
take-up work while supporting fiscal consolidation 
plans, or to improve income stabilisation and 
income security. Incentive-friendly measures 
include reduction in the maximum level of benefits 
(Portugal, Slovenia), adaptation of the design of 
benefits over the unemployment spell (e.g. 
Portugal, Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, Finland), 
cuts in benefit duration (Portugal, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Finland), and stricter eligibility criteria 
(Czech Republic). In contrast, consumption-
stabilisation measures are extending benefit 
coverage to new groups of workers in Italy and 
Portugal, temporarily lengthen benefit duration in 
Denmark and increase benefit generosity as part of 
a comprehensive reform of the unemployment 
benefit system in Italy (as of 2017). The possibility 
of drawing unemployment benefits and income 
from work was introduced to support labour 
market integration of specific categories of 
unemployed in Belgium and France, while a 
similar scheme was abolished to limit its misuse in 
the Czech Republic.  
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Labour taxation 
The tax wedge has increased in most countries due 
to pressing needs to consolidate public finances, 
although targeted tax reductions helped to boost 
work incentives of specific groups. Around one 
half of Member States have changed personal 
income taxes since 2011. Personal income taxes 
have been increased in some countries, especially 
in the form of surcharges on high income earners 
and often only on a temporary basis (Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain), while in others they have been reduced 
(e.g. Hungary, Latvia, Finland, Germany), mainly 
to boost work incentives of specific vulnerable 
groups, notably of parents (Hungary, Malta, 
Germany) and of low to medium income earners 
(Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Hungary, the 
Netherlands). As a result, income tax progressivity 
has increased. Social security contributions have 
increased in many countries, mainly as a result of a 
hike in standard rates (Greece, Latvia, United 
Kingdom) or in rates for specific groups (Bulgaria, 
France, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Portugal), or on 
account of a broader tax base (Cyprus, Slovakia). 
Targeted cuts in social security contributions were 
decided in Spain and other countries to support the 
employment of young people and long-term 
unemployed. Germany reduced social security 
contributions across the board.  
Job protection  
The reform activity in the area of employment 
protection legislation has been sustained, notably 
in countries with strong need for facilitating labour 
market adjustment and with rigid employment 
protection legislation.  
A number of countries have introduced changes to 
individual and collective dismissals under the 
pressure of mass unemployment and a highly 
segmented labour market. Main reforms include 
increased probationary periods (e.g. Romania,  
Slovakia), eased dismissal rules (e.g. Italy, 
Portugal, Spain), clearer and broadened scope of 
justified dismissals (e.g. Spain, Portugal), reduced 
costs of dismissals and uncertainty related to both 
justified dismissals (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Greece, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, United Kingdom) and 
unjustified dismissals (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Italy). 
Additional flexibility was introduced also 
concerning "staff loans" between employers that 
allow companies facing cyclical difficulties to find 
other companies to take on some of their staff on a 
temporary basis (e.g. France).  
With regard to the regulation of temporary 
contracts, the purpose of reforms has been either 
to inject more flexibility on the labour market or to 
limit their abuse and thus contain problems related 
to labour market segmentation. Access to fixed-
term contracts has been facilitated, by extending 
their scope (e.g. Romania, Lithuania), their 
duration (e.g. Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic) 
and the number of allowed renewals (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Slovakia), by reducing costs of 
dismissals (e.g. Lithuania) and aligning them with 
those of permanent contracts (e.g. Portugal), and 
by easing the regulation of temporary work 
agencies (e.g. Romania, Malta, Lithuania, 
Slovakia). In contrast, the use and abuse of 
temporary contracts has been discouraged, on 
account of restrictions upon chaining fixed-term 
contracts (e.g. Italy), higher social security 
contributions (e.g. Italy) and limitations on the use 
of other a-typical contracts and non-dependant 
work (e.g. Italy, Malta).  
Collective bargaining  
Changes in collective bargaining structures and 
wage setting arrangements have been largely 
supportive of rendering wages more responsive to 
economic conditions at firm level. Measures taken 
towards decentralisation of collective bargaining 
include the ending of collective bargaining at 
national level (Romania), applying sectoral 
collective agreement to signatory parties only (e.g. 
Romania, Greece), the predominance of firm 
level/lower level collective agreements over higher 
levels (e.g. Spain, Greece), new criteria on trade 
union representativeness (Italy, Romania) and on 
the validity of company-level agreements (Italy), 
and the possibility of opting-out from law and 
national collective agreements (Italy). In addition, 
wage flexibility has been supported by temporary 
restrictions to the application of the wage 
indexation system in Luxembourg and Cyprus. 
Other relevant measures include a modification of 
the arbitration system in Greece, a cap on the 
extension of expired and not renewed contracts 
(e.g. Spain, Greece), changes in the system of 
consultation with social partners (e.g. Hungary, 
Romania) and revised legal provisions with regard 
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to collective bargaining in certain sectors with 
sizeable numbers of low-paid workers in Ireland.  
The climate for social dialogue was tense in some 
countries, leading to difficult negotiations for the 
renewal of cross-industry agreements over 
potential wage increases (e.g. Belgium) and on 
minimum wage rates (e.g. Slovakia). In Finland, a 
tripartite framework for a new centralised national 
agreement on wages and working conditions could 
be reached thanks to government's support via tax 
reliefs in exchange for moderate pay increases. 
Statutory minimum wages 
In countries with very large macroeconomic 
imbalances, the minimum wage has been cut 
(Greece), remained largely unchanged (Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Portugal, Ireland) or increased 
by a lower rate than previously agreed (Poland). 
Few countries decided an increase in the minimum 
wage as an instrument to combat poverty (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Luxembourg). The youth minimum wage 
has remained frozen in the United Kingdom while 
the other rates have increased by less than 
inflation. Germany has introduced the minimum 
wage for certain sectors (e.g. temporary agency 
work).  
Working time regulation 
Internal flexibility has been largely used as a tool 
to complement flexibility on the external margin 
and to increase employment among specific 
groups. Several countries introduced more flexible 
working time arrangements, by adapting the 
overtime regulation (e.g. Portugal, Romania, 
Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic), 
promoting part-time contracts (e.g. France), 
changing the regulation of short-time working 
schemes (e.g. Portugal, Italy), introducing working 
time accounts (e.g. Luxembourg, Slovakia), 
introducing job sharing (e.g. Slovakia) and giving 
more margins to employers to change working 
time arrangements (e.g. Spain, Romania). In some 
countries, more flexible working time 
arrangements have been decided, aimed at better 
reconciling work and family life (e.g. Italy, 
Hungary, United Kingdom).  
Early retirement 
Access to early retirement schemes has been 
restricted and measure adopted to support the 
employment of older persons. Early retirement 
schemes are to be either withdrawn (e.g. Hungary) 
or limited (e.g. Denmark, United Kingdom, 
Austria, Finland, Spain), depending in some cases 
on the sector (e.g. Belgium). Several measures 
increase the costs of early retirement, by making 
social security contributions dependant on the age 
of the beneficiary (e.g. Belgium) and cutting 
retirement benefits (e.g. the Netherlands, Austria). 
5.4. POLICY PRIORITIES AND PLANS LOOKING 
FORWARD 
Against the backdrop of persistently weak 
economic perspectives, large macroeconomic 
imbalances in a number of countries, worsening 
labour matching and sluggish net job creation, the 
emphasis of policy making is more than ever on 
structural measures supporting labour market 
adjustment and enhancing growth and 
competiveness.  
EU policy recommendations 
Along these lines, the Annual Growth Survey for 
2012 gives priority to reform measures that help 
mobilising labour while improving 
competitiveness and supporting structural change 
towards dynamic sectors. In order to counteract the 
effects of the crisis on the EU social tissue, action 
is also urged to sustain living standards and 
improve the effectiveness of social protection 
systems.  
In particular, policy measures should aim at:  
• Moving forward with the implementation of 
the agreed recommendations on revising wage-
setting mechanisms; 
• Prioritising growth-enhancing expenditure such 
as education and ensuring the efficiency of 
such spending. Further adapting education and 
training systems to better reflect labour market 
conditions;  
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• Promoting quality apprenticeships and 
traineeships, and paying particular attention to 
vocational training in tertiary education 
systems;  
• Increasing the effectiveness of activation 
policies, training and support schemes, and 
adapting unemployment benefit schemes where 
necessary;  
• Reforming employment protection legislation, 
so as to provide easier labour market access to 
those left outside, in particular young people;  
• Restricting access to early exit pathways while 
supporting longer working lives; 
• Enhancing labour mobility and promoting 
business creation and self-employment.  
The country-specific recommendations (CSRs) 
agreed for 2012-2013 within the EU Semester 
Framework (Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
and Employment Guidelines) and the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure largely 
reflect these broad policy guidelines. (21)  
Many recommendations deal with creating the 
conditions for higher levels of employment, 
increasing participation and keeping people in the 
                                                          
(21) The Country-Specific Recommendations 2012-2013 can be 
downloaded from: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-
it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm  
labour market. Belgium, Estonia, Italy and 
Slovakia have been recommended to pursue/ 
complete the reform of their unemployment and 
social benefit systems, while Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, France, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Sweden 
will have to step-up their activation and training 
policies and/ or to increase the coverage, quality 
and/or effectiveness of ALMPs. Progress in 
expanding affordable childcare and dependent care 
facilities, reducing pay gaps and improving the tax 
treatment of second earners has been considered 
insufficient to increase significantly the 
participation of women in the labour market in 
Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malta, the 
Netherlands and Slovakia (Table I.5.1).  
Particular focus is on fighting youth 
unemployment, with recommendations on reducing 
early school leaving and improving vocational 
education and training, developing 
apprenticeships and enhancing the effectiveness of 
ALMPs. Action in this field is considered 
insufficient and needs to be stepped up in Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Sweden, 
Slovakia and United Kingdom. From its part, 
Finland is asked to implement on-going measures. 
Austria, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and the 
United Kingdom have also been addressed a 
specific recommendation concerning young people 
neither in employment, education or training 
(NEET).  
 
Table I.5.1: Country-Specific Recommendations 2012-2013 by country and labour market field 
Wage 
setting
Tax on 
labour
Welfare-related 
benefits
Active labour market 
policies
Labour market 
participation
Early retirement and 
Pension systems Education EPL
Poverty and social 
exclusion
AT X X X X
BE X X X X X
BG X X X X X
CY X X X X X
CZ X X X X X
DE X X X X X
DK X X X
EE X X X X X
ES X X X X X X X X
FI X X X X
FR X X X X X X
HU X X X X X
IT X X X X X X X
LT X X X X X X
LU X X X X
LV X X X X X
MT X X X X
NL X X X X X
PL X X X X
SE X X
SI X X X X X
SK X X X X X X
UK X X X X
 Total 10 13 6 18 17 16 18 7 7
 
Source: Council Recommendations, OJ C219 (2012). 
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Box I.5.2: Labour market reforms in selected countries
Several countries have recently carried out comprehensive and unprecedented reforms of the employment 
protection legislation (EPL), the unemployment benefits system, the organisation of working time, wage 
bargaining, and active labour market policies. In some countries, these reforms were implemented in the 
context of financial assistance programme by the EC-IMF; in others governments introduced long-awaited 
reforms to enhance labour market functioning. 
Greece 
The reform of the EPL shortened notice periods for white collars, in particular for job tenure longer than 10 
years, and reduced severance payments. The probationary period has been increased from 2 to 12 months, 
the longest trial period in the EU with that of the UK and Ireland; with the new legislation, an open-ended 
contract can be terminated within the first 12-months of trial period without notice and dismissal pay. The 
maximum cumulated duration of temporary contracts has been increased from 24 to 36 months (the same 
duration as in Germany, Italy and Slovakia). The maximum period under temporary working agencies has 
been increased from 12 months to 3 years. The definition of collective dismissal has been changed by 
increasing the threshold number of employees that have to be made redundant to initiate a collective 
dismissal procedure. The reform of the collective bargaining has suspended the extension of occupational 
and sectoral collective agreements to non-signatory parties and favourability clauses of sectoral agreements 
over firm-level collective agreements have been suspended. Firm-level wage bargaining was further 
facilitated by allowing workers' representatives to negotiate firm-level collective agreements. Collective 
agreements can be concluded for a maximum duration of 3 years and the regime of "after effects" has been 
revised, so that expired agreements will remain de-facto in force for maximum of 3 months, after which 
some allowances will be suspended until a new contract is signed. The reform of the collective dispute 
resolution procedures ensure symmetric access of employers and employees' representatives to a board of 
mediation and arbitration freed by government influence. The minimum wages were reduced and sub-
minima wage was introduced for those younger than 25 years. Concerning working arrangements, overtime 
premium was reduced by 20% and more opportunities created for flexible working time arrangements.  
Spain 
Following the process initiated with the 2010 reform, the 2012 EPL reform has reduced the severance 
payment for unjustified dismissals from 45 to 33 days per year of service, up to a maximum of 24 months; 
limited workers' claim of back pay only when the employer opts for reinstatement; introduced a detailed 
specification of the conditions for justified dismissals stating that the dismissal is justified when the firm 
experiences or expects a reduction in the level of sales for 3 consecutive quarters; eliminated the "express 
dismissal"; introduced a new open-ended contract for SMEs with less than 50 employees, with hiring 
incentives for firms keeping the worker for at least 3 months and longer trial period (1 year); removed the 
prior administrative authorisation for collective dismissals. To tackle segmentation, chaining of temporary 
contracts will be limited to 24 months, as from 2013. Internal flexibility is also significantly increased, by 
giving more flexibility to the employer to modify the terms of the contract and re-assign the worker to 
different tasks if justified by technical, economic and organisational reasons. The wage bargaining system 
implemented was modified by giving more prevalence to firm-level collective agreements over higher level 
agreements, easing use of opt-out clauses, reducing the survival of collective agreements expired and not 
renewed to a maximum of one year. ALMPs are being revamped to increase their effectiveness and enhance 
workers' employability. Job search conditionality has been strengthened and access to apprenticeship 
contracts eased. Temporary work agencies will be allowed to compete with public services.  
Ireland 
The reform of the bargaining system tackled rigidities of the Employment Regulation Orders (sector-specific 
regulations issued by the Labour Court - EROs) and Registered Employment Agreements (collective 
agreements extended to non-signatory parties once registered with the Court - REAs), which set sectoral 
minimum wages and working conditions above national standards. The reform provides targeted abolition of 
some EROs and reduces greatly the number of minimum wages. EROs will no longer deal with terms of 
employment covered by existing legislation (e.g. compensation for working on Sundays); when setting 
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Box (continued) 
 
minimum wage rates, the Court will be required to consider economic conditions such as unemployment, 
wage trends, and international competitiveness. Regarding REAs, the aim is to establish a time-bound 
process by which its terms may be adapted to changing economic circumstances without consent of all 
parties and to clarify representativeness criteria to register a REA. Companies in financial distress will be 
able to deviate from EROs and REAs. A comprehensive reform aims at enhancing incentives to join the 
labour force and for job search activities. Key features of this reform include: more efficient administration 
of unemployment benefits, social assistance, ALMPs, and vocational training; enhanced conditionality on 
work and training availability; strengthened activation, via better identification of job seekers' needs, more 
effective monitoring and use of sanctions for beneficiaries not complying with job-search conditionalities. 
Italy 
Recent social partners' framework agreements and legislative acts have given more prominence to firm-level 
bargaining. Agreements allowed derogations from sectoral contracts at company level and set rules on the 
certification of representativeness for participation in industry-wide bargaining at national level and on the 
validity of company deals. In 2011, a Government act allowed derogations from labour law on various 
issues, including dismissal procedures. Tax burden on older workers was reduced and retirement age 
increased. A new Act on Apprenticeships aims at better regulating and simplifying apprenticeship contracts. 
In 2012, a comprehensive reform modified the legislation on individual and collective dismissals, introduced 
measures to fight labour market segmentation and reformed the social safety net. The EPL reform has 
reduced the notice period and eased the administrative procedures for individual notice;  reduced the scope 
of reinstatement in case of unfair dismissal and capped the back-payment of wages lost during the period of 
a labour trial; abolished the mobility lists, thereby reducing the monetary costs that firms had to incur when 
recurring to the collective dismissal procedure; reduced the opportunity of reinstatement in case of dismissal 
for procedural vices; discouraged the use of temporary and semi-dependent work contract through higher 
social security contributions and stricter conditions for the use of these contracts. The reform of the safety 
net has unified the fragmented system of unemployment benefits, extending the coverage and generosity of 
previous system and enhancing its insurance dimension; the wage supplementation scheme for financing 
short-term working schemes keeps its original role, but its coverage is extended while the scope is limited.  
Portugal 
The reform of the EPL has cut severance payments and eased the definition of individual dismissals. The 
maximum duration of unemployment benefits was cut from 38 to 26 months and a declining profile 
introduced with a 10% cut after 6 months of unemployment. The maximum benefit has been reduced. 
Concerning working arrangements, key measures include: reductions of overtime premium by 50% and the 
removal of the additional 25% time off granted per hour of overtime; the possibility of firms and workers to 
distribute 150 hours over the year by individual agreement; increase in the annual working hours with 
abolition of four national holidays and 3 annual leave days. In the area of collective bargaining, the scope for 
firm-level collective agreements was enlarged with the reduction of the threshold that allows works councils 
to negotiate directly with employers. The government has prepared a plan to reform the PES and implement 
a wage subsidy. Finally, a recent programme involving about 90000 young will create internships, reduce 
social security contributions and provide subsidies to firms. 
Romania 
The collective bargaining reform reduced the role of the national level as dominant bargaining level; 
abolished automatic erga-omnes extension at sectoral level. A threshold of 50% of the total number of 
employees in the sector was introduced for a labour contract to be registered and potentially extended to 
non-signatory parties. The reform tightened also the criteria for setting up union at firm level, increased the 
threshold for union representativeness and, in absence of representativeness, strengthened the role of work 
council. A reform of the EPL increased the trial period for permanent contracts, the maximum duration of 
fixed-term contracts and widened the cases admitted for their use. Working time regulation will ease the use 
of overtime. The Social Assistance Law streamlined social benefits and introduced measures to improve the 
efficiency of social protection expenditure (by means of new eligibility criteria to enhance targeting of social 
welfare support). 
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Addressing poor educational outcomes is indeed a 
major issue as concerns both the quality and labour 
market relevance of - and the access to - education 
and training systems in several countries (Austria, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Spain, Latvia). In this respect, many 
Member States are also advised to preserve public 
investment in growth-enhancing areas, there 
including education. 
A number of Member States are also 
recommended to ensure that their wage setting 
mechanisms appropriately reflect productivity 
developments, so as to boost competitiveness and 
support labour market adjustment and job creation. 
While some countries have introduced far-reaching 
reforms of their wage setting systems in this 
direction (e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal), limited 
progress has been made in others, where the 
functioning of certain wage setting and wage 
indexation systems has been identified as a 
possible threat to competitiveness (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta). In other 
countries, a balance needs to be struck between 
ensuring that minimum wage levels are not too 
high to discourage the recruitment of the young 
and low-skilled but not as low as to risk creating 
in-work poverty (Bulgaria, France and Slovenia). 
Whereas some Member States have started far-
reaching reforms of their EPL (Greece, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal), in others the reform process appears 
slow in comparison to the challenges they face in 
terms of labour market segmentation. 
Recommendations have been addressed to France 
and Italy (where a major reform has been adopted 
at the end of June 2012); to Lithuania as concerns 
fixed-term contacts, dismissal provisions and 
temporary agency work; to Poland concerning the 
partial abuse of self-employment and civil law 
contracts; to Sweden and Slovenia.  
There are several recommendations on labour 
taxation (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, 
Spain, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia), 
largely designed to shift the burden from labour to 
less growth-distortive tax bases and aimed at 
making labour taxation more employment friendly. 
Tackling the social consequences of the crisis has 
also come to the forefront in a number of 
countries, especially those with already weak 
social protection systems and heavy pressures on 
public spending. Recommendations to make social 
transfers more effective and to improve the 
employability of vulnerable groups have been 
addressed to Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain, Lithuania, 
Latvia and the United Kingdom. Rising social 
concerns in programme countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Romania) are being addressed in the 
framework of their economic adjustment 
programmes. 
Finally, several Member States have been asked to 
step up their efforts to tackle the low activity rates 
of older workers and the widespread use of early 
retirement and invalidity pension schemes (e.g. 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, 
France, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Slovenia). The effect of demographic 
ageing is accelerating the withdrawal of 
experienced workers from the labour market and 
the prospects of a stagnating/diminishing working 
age population is imminent in many of these 
countries, with correlated new risks of skills 
mismatches and shortages. Some of these countries 
are also not fully using the potential of migrant 
workers (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Sweden). 
In addition to the AGS and the EU Semester CSRs, 
specific recommendations relating to employment 
policies were issued by the European Commission. 
The Employment Package (Commission 
Communication "Towards a Job-rich recovery, 
COM(2012) 173 final) complements the policy 
priorities identified by the AGS; it identifies and 
recommends a number of measures to promote 
labour demand and boost labour supply over the 
medium-term in line with the European 2020 
employment objectives. Inter-alia, the 
Employment Package stresses the role of fiscal 
measures to foster job creation (e.g. budgetary 
neutral and cost-effective targeted hiring subsidies 
and reductions in tax wedge on labour) to avoid a 
deterioration of employment chances of specific 
population segments (e.g., the long-term 
unemployed, the young). 
National plans 
The action plans announced by the Member States 
in their 2012 National Reform Programmes are 
broadly consistent with the priorities set out in the 
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Annual Growth Survey and to a variable extent 
address existing country-specific challenges. 
Much is proposed in order to improve the 
effectiveness of ALMPs, in particular to improve 
the school-to-work transition and the 
employability of workers. Key reforms of job 
protection legislation are tabled in those countries 
that have been addressed CSRs in this field. Major 
reforms of the unemployment system are foreseen 
in a few cases, while active ageing is gaining 
momentum in several countries. 
Measures that enhance the capacity and 
effectiveness of placement and matching services, 
as well as of training and activation policies, have 
been announced in many countries (e.g. Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Finland, France, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain), in some cases specifically targeted at 
groups such as long-term unemployed, young 
people and those at risk of social exclusion. Few 
interventions are also planned to improve the 
effectiveness of wage subsidies (Latvia, Poland 
and Romania). Only a few countries announce 
measures to improve the labour market 
participation of women (Czech Republic, Finland 
and the Netherlands). 
Graph I.5.4: Total number of planned reforms by domain in 
the EU, 2011- 2012 
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Source: National Reform Programmes 2011 and 2012 
The urgency of tackling youth unemployment is 
reflected in the variety of policy plans presented in 
this field across the EU. Apprenticeship and 
internship schemes will be reinforced in Belgium, 
Denmark, Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania and Portugal. 
In Slovakia a new apprenticeship scheme will be 
developed, while Spain has planned a reform of its 
education and vocational training systems and the 
introduction of a dual vocational training system. 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Cyprus and 
Estonia will reform their education systems. Malta 
expects to present a strategy to tackle early school 
leaving by end 2012, while Lithuania is preparing 
a new Lifelong Learning Action Plan. Other 
measures to facilitate school-to-work transition for 
young unemployed are being devised in several 
countries, often on an experimental basis (Austria, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg 
and Slovenia). From its part, Hungary is 
contemplating a youth minimum wage, while 
Ireland is devising a programme to support 
business start-ups of young people. 
Large reforms are also expected on the front of 
EPL, concerning fixed-term contracts (Latvia, 
Lithuania), the notice period and severance pay 
(Lithuania, Slovenia), the termination of 
employment contracts (Lithuania, Portugal and 
Slovenia). In Slovenia, the move towards a single 
contract is also being discussed, with a view to 
ease the transition of workers from flexible to 
more stable forms of employment, while a 
modification of the labour law is pending in 
Sweden. As described in Box I.5.3, EPL reforms 
may entail substantial effects on the overall 
turnover, thereby enhancing labour market 
dynamism and workers' reallocation across jobs 
and sectors. Based on the framework developed in 
the thematic Chapter 2 and an own update of EPL 
indicators using OECD methodology (ibidem), 
reforms of EPL carried out in a number of Member 
States entail an increase in the labour turnover 
between 13% and 50% relative to the pre-crisis 
historical average in the turnover level. An 
interesting finding of the analysis is that most of 
this increase is due to an increase in the job finding 
rates rather than to an increase in the job 
separation rates.  
Plans for major reforms to the unemployment 
benefit system have been put forward in the 
Netherlands, where employers will pay for the first 
six months of unemployment benefits, and in the 
United-Kingdom, where unemployment benefits 
will be transformed into a universal credit from 
October 2013. In-work benefits will be stepped up 
in Austria and Finland. 
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Box I.5.3: Effect of reforms of employment protection legislation
Firing restrictions associated to tight EPL regulation have a bear on the dynamics of job flows: both inflows 
into unemployment and the outflows out of unemployment (see Chapter on EPL in this report). A sclerotic 
labour market has major costs: it implies higher spells of unemployment and, possibly, higher structural 
unemployment. Moreover, reallocation of labour across economic activities is hampered, with implications 
for macroeconmic adjustment.  
The reforms recently enacted in several Member States have the potential of reducing the hiring and firing 
costs, with positive effects on workers' turnover and labour market dynamism. This box provides an attempt 
to analyse ex-ante the potential effects of reforms in Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal on job market flows. 
With a view to quantify the effect of the different reforms on EPL strictness, the EPL indicators constructed 
by the OECD have been updated in light of the main policy changes introduced, following the standard 
OECD methodology. (1) It is important to stress that while some aspects of the legislation (like advance 
notices, the severance payments or the length of the probationary period) can be measured with precision, 
other features, like strictness of fair dismissal definitions, are more difficult to quantify and measurement 
make use of simplifying assumptions. Moreover, some aspects of EPL systems, like interactions among EPL 
features, labour court practices and jurisprudence, or fiscal treatment of different labour contracts, are not 
always captured in synthetic EPL indicators.  
For example, in Greece the recent EPL reform has only changed the required notice before dismissal, while 
leaving severance payments untouched. However, since the legislation foresees that only half the severance pay 
is due when termination is with notice, the reform de-facto reduces also overall severance payments, because 
employers after the reform will much more likely terminate a contract with notice, at reduced costs. These 
aspects are not captured by the OECD EPL indicators. Similarly, measures introduced in Italy or in Spain to 
promote a rapid resolution of controversies on economic dismissal cases are not incorporated in the indicators.  
With these caveat in mind, EPL indicators have been re-calculated to incorporate the changes introduced for 
the recent reforms The main effects on the indicator are summarised in the tables below.  
 Recent reforms of employment protection legislation for open-ended contracts: 2010-2012  
 
Greece Italy Spain Portugal 
Notification procedures 
 ↓   
Delay involved before notice can start     
Length of notice period at 9 months of tenure   ↓  
Length of notice period at 4 years of tenure ↓  ↓  
Length of notice period at 20 years of tenure ↓  ↓  
Severance pay at 9 months of tenure 
  ↓ ↓ 
Severance pay at 4 years of tenure 
  ↓ ↓ 
Severance pay at 20 years of tenure 
   ↓ 
Definition of justified or unfair dismissal 
   ↓ 
Length of trial period ↓  ↓  
Compensation following unfair dismissal   ↓  
Possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal  ↓   
Maximum time to make a claim of unfair dismissal 
    
Elements of regulation not entering in EPL calculation ↓ ↓ ↓  
Note: arrows show the effect of on EPL (down means less rigid EPL).  
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Box (continued) 
 
 Recent reforms of employment protection legislation for temporary contracts  
 Greece Italy Spain Portugal 
Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts 
    
Maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts     
Maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts ↓    
Elements of regulation not entering in EPL calculation ↓ ↑↓   
 
 Recent reforms of employment protection legislation for collective dismissals  
 Greece Italy Spain Portugal 
Definition of collective dismissal ↓    
Additional notification requirements for collective dismissals 
    
Additional delays involved before notice can start  
  ↓  
Other special costs to employers of collective dismissals  ↓   
Elements of regulation not entering in EPL calculation 
    
 
The reforms enacted in the countries examined entail a significant change in the ranking of EU countries 
according to the EPL indicator (see Graph 1). The overall EPL indicator, obtained as the sum of the indicator 
for individual dismissals and for temporary contracts, falls especially for Greece and Portugal, while the EPL 
indicator for collective dismissals falls for Italy and Spain. For regular contracts, the largest change in the 
rank is for Portugal, which before the reform had the strictest regulation. The overall EPL indicator for greece 
is affected by less strict conditions for temporary employment.  
 
Graph 1. Computed changes in EPL synthetic indicators 
 
 
 
The impact of EPL reforms on job flows can be gauged by means of the estimated sensitivity of job flows to 
changes in the EPL sub-indicators for regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismissals. Since 
these sensitivities, estimated on a panel of countries (see the second analytical Chapter in this report for the 
value and the methodology), indicate that the impact of EPL indicators is stronger in case of job finding rates, 
the analysis is focused on this type of flows.  
 
Graph 2. Computed impact of EPL reforms on job finding rates (% change compared with pre-crisis average) 
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Denmark and Latvia plan a broad tax reform to 
significantly reduce the tax burden on labour. Cuts 
in employees' social security contributions are 
being put forward in Belgium (2012 June plans) 
and Germany to increase the financial incentives to 
work, while Hungary will apply a wide range of 
reduction in employers' social security 
contributions to support labour demand. Greece 
also foresees cuts in employers' social security 
contributions. 
A number of countries are planning to reform their 
early retirement schemes or to step up the financial 
incentives to work longer (e.g. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark and Sweden). Thorough reforms of 
disability pension schemes are planned in Austria 
and Denmark, while specific measures will be 
taken in Finland, Latvia and the Netherlands to 
strengthen work incentives and increase the 
employment rate of partially disabled people. 
Assessing the impact of reforms 
The accelerated and more ambitious reform action 
that took place in recent years requires appropriate 
monitoring, with a view to calibrate further 
refinements of policy framework where necessary 
and fine-tune the policy agenda looking forward. 
Appropriate analytical tools are needed to assess 
both ex-ante and ex-post the impact of major 
reforms. Box I.5.3 provides an example of ex-ante 
analysis on the impact of recent major EPL 
reforms in EU countries. 
5.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Recent years have witnessed a strong 
intensification of reform activity across the EU. 
Major reforms have been passed and others are 
planned for the years to come.  
Most of the measures adopted in the latest years 
appear to be largely in line with the priorities set at 
European level, notably measures that help to 
mobilise labour, make labour markets more 
dynamic, tackle precariousness and improve 
competitiveness. 
Countries with high unemployment and large 
external imbalances have taken up the challenge of 
improving the responsiveness of wages and their 
labour market adjustment capacity, by thoroughly 
reforming their job protection and wage setting 
systems. In these same countries, priorities are 
now moving forward to ensuring that these 
reforms pay-off once growth resumes. 
However, while ambitious policy agendas were 
adopted in several countries to remove obstacles to 
labour market adjustment, in others reforms were 
rather marginal, rarely encompassing more than a 
single dimension at a time. There, EU 
recommendations give a direction for action.  
Looking forward, EU labour market challenges 
will remain high on the policy agenda. The extent 
to which potential growth can sustainably resume 
largely depends on how successfully labour market 
bottlenecks are addressed and the risk of 
unemployment hysteresis is tackled. Effectively 
tackling joblessness will also be a key condition to 
ensure the social and political sustainability of 
current reform action and fiscal and 
macroeconomic adjustment strategies. In light of 
the very differentiated labour market conditions 
across Europe, and of the important policy 
spillovers, notably in the euro-area, the policy 
response needs to be differentiated and 
coordinated. In this respect, EU surveillance will 
continue to play a key role. A number of short-to-
medium term priorities emerge as follows: 
Box (continued) 
 
Graph 2 reports the combined effect of reforms in various EPL elements in terms of percentage change in job 
finding rates compared with the pre-crisis average. These effects need to be interpreted as steady-state 
changes. As effects arising from reforms in temporary employment turned out being negligible they are not 
reported. The reforms of the EPL carried out in these countries entail a substantial increase in their labour 
market dynamism, corresponding to an increase in the turnover from 12% to 50%, depending pre-crisis 
average turnover of each country. The 12% increase in the turnover of Spain needs to be considered against a 
relatively higher pre-crisis turnover rate. 
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• the recent momentum towards ambitious 
structural reforms favouring adjustment needs 
to be maintained in countries characterised by 
major labour market challenges, including for 
what concerns a proper implementation of 
enacted measures; 
• momentum should be kept also towards policy 
action to raise participation rates; where fiscal 
conditions allow, tax reforms should create the 
conditions for better mobilising labour supply 
and demand; 
• to prevent employment losses becoming 
permanent and avoid hysteresis effects once 
growth resumes, policy frameworks need to be 
stepped up, where necessary, to ease labour 
market matching and maintain the long-term 
unemployed in the labour force, and adequate 
resources ensured; 
• in countries with serious youth unemployment 
problems, policy action could address, with 
different emphasis, labour legislation, the tax 
and benefit regime, ALMPs, and education and 
training, including via an effective use of the 
apprenticeship systems; 
• among the schemes aimed at tackling the risk 
of hysteresis a the current juncture by 
promoting the hiring of workers at risk of 
leaving the labour force (the long-term 
unemployed, young workers with no previous 
experience…), temporary social security cuts 
or job subsidy schemes for new hires can be 
considered, if well targeted and effectively 
designed; 
• in some countries, surging unemployment and 
falling incomes call for the enhancement of 
current social protection systems in terms of 
adequacy, sustainability and incentives.  
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the outburst of the financial crisis, EU 
countries are facing tremendous reform challenges. 
Since the onset of EMU, there was clear awareness 
that a successful monetary union would have 
required reforming labour markets where needed 
in such a way to ease adjustment in the face of 
asymmetric shocks and to permit a prompt reaction 
of price competitiveness as a tool to absorb 
idiosyncratic shocks and favour the correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. The need for such 
reforms has become not only evident but urgent 
after the crisis in light of the highly asymmetrical 
impact on the financial sector, public finances, and 
the real economy of EU and euro-area countries, 
and as a consequence of the sudden unwinding of 
large external imbalances accumulated over the 
2000s in a number of these countries.  
The need of timely and courageous labour market 
reforms was reflected in the identification of 
policy priorities at EU level. Recommendation to 
put in place policies to counter the tremendous loss 
of output after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
in 2008 by means of strengthened temporary 
income support for the unemployed and short-term 
working schemes were included in the 
Commission European Economic Recovery 
Package. Reforms improving the functioning of 
the labour market, including by means of 
supportive labour taxation, EPL frameworks aimed 
at favouring job creation and tackling 
segmentation, benefit and activation systems 
providing the unemployed with incentives to take 
up jobs, adjustment-friendly wage setting 
frameworks, feature prominently among the 
priorities identified in the 2011 and 2012 Annual 
Growth Survey by the Commission, endorsed by 
the EU and European Council. Country Specific 
Recommendations were issues in the framework of 
the EU Semester for economic surveillance, 
reflecting these priorities.  
Against the background or an increased urgency to 
reform labour markets, and broadly in line with the 
recommendations by European institutions, most 
Member States have stepped up their reform 
agenda both by taking an increased number of 
measures and taking action to reform those aspects 
that are key to ensure effective changes but that are 
at the same time politically costly because having 
relevant redistributive implications. 
This increased reform activism calls for a 
proportionate increased effort to track the record of 
past reforms and assess their features, determinants 
and effects. Such an assessment is complex, most 
notably in light of the very heterogenous character 
of the complex and varied set of policies that 
normally fall under the broad heading “reform”. 
The first and most important condition for an 
effective assessment of reforms is adequate 
information on the reform features and 
characteristics. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe recent 
reforms carried out in EU countries making use of 
the LABREF database that was set up by DG 
ECFIN of the European Commission in 
cooperation with the Economic Policy Committee. 
This database contains information on a large set 
of policy measures carried out between 2000 and 
2010. As compared with other similar existing 
databases, contains information on a larger set of 
reform characteristics. 
The remainder of the Chapter is organised as 
follows. The next section discusses issues relating 
to the measurement of economic reforms. The 
description of the LABREF databases follows. 
Section 3 presents information on the main trends 
and cross-country features for what concerns 
labour market reforms in the EU since 2000. 
1.2. MEASURING LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: 
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
1.2.1. Tracking labour market reforms 
Reform databases can either be descriptive or 
indicator-based. Descriptive databases collect 
information on enacted reforms on the basis of 
predefined criteria, with the aim of providing an 
exhaustive description of the main policy measures 
taken. Indicator-based databases aim instead at 
quantifying the degree of stringency and distortion 
associated with existing regulations and 
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institutions. These indicators provide therefore a 
synthetic measure of the anti-competitive 
implications of the existing stock of regulations 
and institutions, and reforms can only be measured 
indirectly, and in an aggregate fashion, by means 
of time differences in the indicator. While 
indicator-based databases permit a very effective 
synthesis of information for comparisons over time 
and across countries, information at the level of the 
specific policy measures is missing. 
Descriptive databases 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
provides synthetic information on measures 
adopted in the fields of minimum wages, maternity 
protection and working time and referral to 
relevant regulations.  The ILO also compiles the 
NATLEX database, providing a comprehensive 
record of abstracts of legislation and relevant 
information of national labour, social security and 
related human rights laws for over 190 countries.    
The inventory of labour market reforms developed 
by the OECD in the framework of the evaluation 
of the OECD Jobs Strategy contains information 
on reforms in seven main policy areas grouped in 
two sub-periods (1995-1999 and 2000-2004) .  
The “Social Reforms Database” developed by the 
Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti provides 
information on reform measures adopted in the EU 
countries starting from the eighties. The database 
collects information on the main qualitative 
features of reforms in four broad policy areas - 
employment protection legislation; public pension 
systems; non-employment benefits, migration 
policies.  
Indicator-based databases 
Structural indicators are increasingly used in 
policy analysis. While providing a very useful 
proxy for the extent of government intervention in 
the labour market, these indicators raise a number 
of measurement issues: (i) the choice of the weight 
attributed to the various aspects of regulation is 
somehow arbitrary; (ii) only a subset of regulatory 
aspects is taken into account and relevant country-
specific features in the design of the regulations 
are not considered; (iii) the degree of enforcement 
of specific regulations is often not captured.  
Indicators measuring the stringency of 
employment protection regulations have been 
developed by the OECD, which capture the most 
important features of regulation, both for regular 
and temporary contracts, and for collective 
dismissals, for most OECD countries since the 
eighties.  
Indicators for labour market regulations are 
developed also by the in the framework of the 
Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom around the 
World” index. Indexes scoring the absence of anti-
competitive restrictions in a number of domains 
are produced for a large number of countries 
across the world, starting from the seventies. The 
economic freedom index for the labour market is 
the combination of separate indicators on 
minimum wage, flexibility in hiring and firing, 
level of collective bargaining, unemployment 
insurance; use of military conscripts.  
The World Bank “Doing Business” database 
provides scores for regulations hampering a 
business-friendly environment, with an attempt to 
capture also information on enforcement. Within 
the Doing Business framework, a number of 
indicators concerning labour market regulations 
for 85 countries in the early 2000s were developed 
by Botero et al. (2004). While the country 
coverage is large, the database spans a relatively 
short time series (it starts in 2003).  
The Global Labour Survey (GLS) database (Chor 
and Freeman, 2005) conducted in 2004 at the 
Harvard Labour School seeks to measure de facto 
labour practices around the world covering aspects 
of labour institutions such as employment 
regulations, employee benefits, wage setting, and 
builds indices of labour practices in ten broad areas 
for 33 countries. 
1.2.2. Description of the LABREF database 
The LABREF database was developed upon 
initiative of the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG ECFIN) and the Labour Market 
Working Group (LMWG) attached to the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) in 2005.  
The aim is to build an effective tool for the 
surveillance of labour market policies in the 
framework of the EU economic policy 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2012 
 
66 
coordination processes, and for the analysis of the 
impact of reforms on labour market performance. 
LABREF is a descriptive database providing, 
compared with other similar databases, a higher 
amount of information on the features and 
characteristics of measures in a broad range of 
labour market and welfare policy fields. 
LABREF is organised around 52 policy fields, 
further grouped in 9 broad policy domains (see 
Box II.1.1). The fields covered by the database 
reflect standard classifications of labour market 
and welfare institutions (e.g., Nickell and Layard, 
1999), with the addition of labour mobility and 
migration policies.  
The measures reported in the database refer to 
information on enacted legislation (approved by 
Parliament), as well as other public acts of general 
scope (such as decisions of public authorities or 
general court decisions) likely to have an impact 
on labour market performance, including measures 
entailing changes in the implementation 
framework of a previously adopted reform. In 
addition, reported reforms also encompass 
collective agreements, including cross-industry 
agreements, tripartite agreements (involving 
government, trade unions and employers’ 
federations), sector-level collective agreements 
(whenever the agreement concluded in one sector 
is likely to set the patterns for negotiations in other 
sectors) and company agreements, provided that 
they have the potential to affect a large proportion 
of employees or to engender a change of regime in 
the medium term (for instance, innovative 
company agreements concluded in Germany on 
pay and working time). The database does not 
record information on discussions of planned 
reforms or law bills not yet formalised. (22)  
For each measure the database collects information 
on the main objective and status of the reform 
(legal status, timing of adoption and 
implementation) and on a number of 
characteristics which are likely to shed some light 
on its design, scope, implementation and durability 
(e.g., target group, budgetary cost, presence of a 
                                                          
(22) A single piece of legislation may cover several areas of 
policy intervention and will consequently be recorded as 
pertinent to a multiplicity of policy fields or domains in 
LABREF. 
broad policy package and complementarities with 
other policies, positions of social partners…). 
Information on the direction of reforms (whether 
they are ex-ante likely to have an employment-
friendly impact by reducing taxation, regulations, 
generosity of out-of labour income, improving 
incentives and labour market matching…) and 
relevance (major versus non-major reforms) is 
codified by means of binary indicators (see Box 
II.1.1 and the Appendix for the criteria followed 
for such classification). 
Although such classifications are subject to 
inevitable simplifying assumptions and, for that 
reason, are to be interpreted with caution and 
should not be given mechanistic normative 
implications (e.g., reforms increasing labour 
taxation or the generosity of unemployment benefit 
systems might not directly help the creation of 
employment but may be fully justified on different 
grounds), they prove useful when analysing 
determinants and effects of reforms, as shown in 
the following sections. 
The compilation of the database is carried out in 
two steps. Firstly, information is collected by DG 
ECFIN, using publicly available national and 
international sources and classified according to 
the criteria agreed with the EPC. (23) In a second 
step, the information collected are sent for 
validation to national authorities via the EPC. At 
present, LABREF covers policy measures for the 
EU-25 over the 2000-2010 period, plus Romania 
and Bulgaria starting form 2003. Information up to 
2010 was validated by the Members of the 
Economic Policy Committee of the ECOFIN 
Council. The database is accessible through the 
website http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_fina- 
nce /indicators/labref/. 
                                                          
(23) Sources used to compile LABREF include ILO databases, 
information published by EIRO (European Industrial 
Relations Observatory of the Dublin Foundation for the 
Improvement of Working and Living Conditions), country 
reports by the OECD and IMF, National Action Plans for 
Employment annually set-up in the framework of the 
Employment Strategy, National Reform Programmes under 
the Lisbon Strategy, national legislation and other 
information available from the websites of the EU 
Ministries for Employment and Social Affairs. 
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Box II.1.1: Overview of the LABREF database
The database covers main reforms in 52 labour market and welfare policy fields, which are further grouped in 
9 broad policy domains as follows: 
 
1. Labour taxation 
- Employers’ social security contributions 
- Employees’ social security contributions 
- Income tax 
- Other 
2. Unemployment benefits 
- Net replacement rate 
- Duration of unemployment benefits  
- Coverage (number of people or sectors of the economy covered) 
- Entitlement (eligibility rules, job availability requirements) 
- Other 
3. Other benefits 
- Short-time working schemes 
- In-work benefits (employment conditional benefit or tax credit) 
- Means-tested benefits (housing, social assistance) 
- Sickness schemes 
- Family-related benefits 
4. Active labour market programmes 
- Public Employment Services (job assistance, job-counselling etc.) 
- Training 
- Direct job creation and employment subsidies 
- Special schemes 
- Other  
5. Job protection 
- Permanent contracts 
• Procedural requirements  
• Notice and severance payments 
• Restrictions to dismissal  
• Collective dismissals 
• Other  
- Temporary contracts 
• Maximum number of renewals  
• Maximum duration 
• Temporary agency work 
• Other  
6. Pension Systems 
- Early retirement 
- Disability schemes 
- Pensions  
• Level  
• Eligibility 
• Coverage 
• Tax treatment  
• Contributions 
• Other  
7. Wage Setting  
- Statutory minima 
- Contractual minima 
- Contractual Flexible arrangements (e.g. performance-related pay)  
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Box (continued) 
 
- Social Pacts, framework agreements (changes in the level of wages, changes in the 
way the wage setting system works) 
- Government intervention in wage bargaining (e.g. extension clauses) 
- Public wages 
- Other  
8. Working time  
- Working hours management 
- Participation friendly schemes  
- Working time organisation over the life time (e.g. working time accounts; part-time 
work arrangements for older workers; sabbatical leaves etc) 
- Other 
9. Immigration and mobility  
- Immigration 
• Immigration control 
• Selective Immigration policies  
• Measure to facilitate labour market integration of immigrants 
- Internal mobility 
- Other 
The information on reform characteristics collected and reported in LABREF concerns the following aspects: 
• General description of the measure: The aim and main features of the reform are described. Reference 
to the text establishing the measure is reported (budget law, decree,…). The specific information source 
used to fill the database is indicated. 
• Timing. Year of adoption: the date when a reform measure is approved (by Parliament, government, 
social partners,…). Timing of implementation: this corresponds to the scheduled or expected timing of 
the implementation (i.e., entry in force, phasing-in schedule,…). No recording of planned reforms. 
• Scope, targeting. Is the measure applied to new entrants only or also to current incumbents? Are there 
particular socio-economic categories targeted ( i.e., young, older worker, low wage earners,..)?.  
• Direct budgetary costs for general government: As a first option here appears only information from 
national authorities. 
• Monitoring, enforcement. Are enforcement and monitoring procedures put in place? Is an ex-post 
evaluation foreseen? If so, is the assessment carried out by the government or by some independent 
organisation?  
• Reform packages, interactions. Is the reform part of a broader reform package? Does the reform require 
policy interventions in related areas? Is the measure embedded in a formal long-term policy programme?  
• Role of social partners. Is there an involvement of the social partners? If so, do they have an active role 
or a passive (consultative) role? Do they agree on the measure?  
Binary indicators have also been constructed for each policy measure as follows: (i) direction: employment-
friendly reforms reducing labour taxation, regulatory restrictions, the generosity of out of work support, or 
improving labour market matching (score 1) are separated from the rest (score -1); (ii) intensity: major 
reforms (reforms that are either systemic or parametric but revising at the same time a number of relevant 
parameters) are distinguished from the rest. The criteria chosen for the classification of the direction of 
reforms are detailed in the Appendix.  
Synthetic indicators have been constructed to aggregate information on reform activity within a given policy 
domain or field in a given country, in a given year. In addition to a synthetic indicator of reform intensity 
corresponding to the total number of reforms carried out, a synthetic direction indicator (obtained as the algebraic 
sum of direction binary indicators) provides information on whether reform action was employment-friendly.  
For the sake of presentation and analysis in this Chapter, only reforms with relevant direct impact on labour 
market outcomes are considered. Immigration and mobility policies are not examined, as well as pension 
reforms different than those with direct impact on early exit from the labour market. Only wage setting 
reforms that modify the standard criteria for wage formation are considered (government intervention on 
wage setting mechanisms, framework agreements on collective bargaining, social pacts and tripartite 
agreements), while changes in the level of statutory minimum wages are not analysed.  
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1.3. EU LABOUR MARKET REFORMS 2000-2010: 
STYLIZED FACTS  
This section looks at the evolution of reforms and 
their characteristics, and their distribution across 
different policy domains and country groups with a 
view to distil a number of stylised facts.  
Graph II.1.1 shows the evolution the average 
number of reforms for each policy domain, 
distinguishing for country groups.  For instance, 
the height of the first bar under "Active Labour 
Market Policies" indicates that on average EU 
member states implemented 1.5 reforms in this 
domain in 2000. (24) The colour code within the 
                                                          
(24) The analysis is based on the country taxonomy proposed by  
Esping and Andersen (1990) and European Commission 
(2007) where countries are classified into five groups on 
the basis of soci-economic systems. This classification 
covers 22 EU countries which are classified into five 
groups on the basis of principal component analysis. The 
five missing EU countries were allocated as follows: Malta 
and Cyprus were allocated to the Anglo-Saxon group of 
countries, Luxembourg to the Continental group; Romania 
and Latvia to the Central, Eastern group of countries. Note 
that in the Esping and Andersen taxonomy the Netherlands 
in classified among northern countries, Greece among 
Eastern countries. 
bars shows the distribution of the reforms across 
country groups. These groups represent types of 
labour market institutions: countries within each 
group have relatively similar institutional structure.   
A first look at the graphs reveals that the frequency 
of policy intervention varies considerably across 
policy domains. On average, most reforms were 
undertaken in the active labour market policy and 
labour taxation domains, while early withdrawal 
and wage setting reforms are relatively scarce. In 
most policy domains the number of reforms is 
showing an increasing trend. This is due to the 
increased number of reforms during the crisis, 
which is at the end of the sample period. Policy 
activism seems to peek in 2008-2009.  Two policy 
domains are exceptions to this trend: early 
withdrawal and working time reforms. In these 
domains there are significantly less reforms during 
the crisis period.  
When looking at the distribution of reforms across 
country groups, two observations stand out. First, 
this distribution is unstable over time: in some 
periods some groups are more active, in other 
periods reform activity is instead observed in other 
groups. An explanation could be that, with the 
Graph II.1.1: Number of reforms by domain and country group 
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exception of the crisis period, reforms are often the 
response to asymmetric shocks, which is consistent 
with a relatively low degree of synchronisation of 
reforms across countries over the whole decade. 
Second, some country groups do not undertake 
reforms in some policy domains for a large part of 
the observed period. For example, there are very 
few reforms concerning early withdrawal 
instruments by Anglo-Saxon countries or 
concerning job protection by Nordic countries. 
Given that country groups are defined on the basis 
of similar labour market institutions, these 
differences reflects the fact that the timing of 
reforms is linked to the interplay between shocks 
and the typology of existing institutions.   
Graph II.1.2: Distribution of reforms across policy domains 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
The distribution of reforms across policy domains 
is much more stable, especially until 2008, as 
Graph II.1.2 shows. Until 2008, the only trend one 
can observe is the gradual decline in the incidence 
of working time and early withdrawal reforms and 
a parallel increase in labour taxation and other 
welfare-related benefit reforms. The latter also 
include short term working schemes, which were 
implemented simultaneously by a number of EU 
countries as a response to the crisis in 2008 and 
2009 (as revealed by the sudden increase in these 
years of policy measures in the "other benefit" 
domain, Graph II.1.1). 
As the crisis dragged on, labour market reforms 
became more frequent in domain of active labour 
market policies, job protection, wage setting. 
Measures in these domains account by themselves 
two thirds of the total of the measures 
implemented in 2010. 
The crisis also increased the number of reforms 
that target some specific part of the population 
(women, self-employed, young etc.) as Graph 
II.1.3 indicates. No clear time trend is instead 
visible for what concerns the fraction of reforms 
that are classified as "major" (e.g., systemic or 
tackling more than one parameter, see Box II.1.1). 
Graph II.1.3: Fraction of major and targeted reforms 
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Active Labour Market Policies Early withdrawal Job Protection (EPL)
Labour Taxation Other welfare-related benefits Unemployment benefits
Wage Setting Working Time
Fraction of major reforms Fraction of targeted reforms
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Similarly, no trend is apparent concerning the 
scope of reforms, i.e., the fraction of reforms 
targeted to the whole population, incumbents, or 
new entrants only (Graph II.1.4): most reforms 
extend to the whole population over the whole 
decade.  
Graph II.1.4: Fraction of reforms aimed at new entrants and 
incumbents 
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Active Labour Market Policies Early withdrawal Job Protection (EPL)
Labour Taxation Other welfare-related benefits Unemployment benefits
Wage Setting Working Time
Both incumbent and new entrants Only new entrants
Only incumbents
 
Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
Part II 
Thematic chapters 
 
Graph II.1.5: Direction of reforms by policy domain (average yearly frequency across the EU) 
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Nevertheless, there were periods when measures 
targeted mostly new entrants, most notably in the 
early withdrawal domain, and, to a lesser extent, in 
the active labour market policy, job protection and 
unemployment benefit domains.  
Information on the direction of the policy 
measures (i.e., whether a measure is employment-
friendly) provides additional insight into the nature 
and purpose of labour market reforms during the 
last decade. Graph II.1.5 shows the evolution of 
the average number of reforms in each domain, 
distinguishing by direction. For example, the first 
blue bar of the "Early withdrawal" policy domain 
shows that, on average, 0.25 employment-friendly 
reforms were implemented in 2000 (i.e., one fourth 
of the countries implemented such a reform), while 
the green bar indicates that about the same number 
of reforms in the same domain were implemented 
in parallel the same year, but without having an 
employment impact that can ex-ante be judged as 
positive. 
The first message of the graph is that there are 
considerable differences across policy domains 
regarding the fraction of employment-friendly 
measures. Not surprisingly, by their own nature, 
ALMPs are predominantly employment-friendly. 
Labour taxation and working time reforms are also 
happened to be more frequently employment 
friendly overt the past decade. Measures in other 
domains (job protection, unemployment benefits, 
wage setting) present a roughly balanced 
distribution between reforms that are employment-
friendly and that are not. Reforms in the other 
benefit domain (which include most social 
assistance schemes), in light of the criteria adopted 
(see Appendix) happen to be more frequently 
classified as not having an employment-friendly 
impact, because of the possible repercussions on 
labour participation (of course, this implies no 
judgement on the desirability of these policies on 
different grounds). 
In most policy domains, an increasing trend is 
observed for reforms in both directions. However, 
after the crisis, the frequency of employment-
European Commission 
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friendly reforms increased, notably in some 
domains. The clearest example are reforms in 
wage setting that became more frequently 
employment-friendly after 2007.  
It is worthwhile to look deeper between policy 
domains and zoom into those policy fields with the 
most relevant macro-structural impact: 
unemployment benefits, job protection, and wage 
setting policies.  
Graph II.1.6 shows policy measures (fields) within 
the unemployment benefits domain. It reveals that 
most measures in the field of duration and 
entitlement were often employment-friendly. The 
coverage of benefits was instead raised after the 
crisis. The balance between measures raising and 
reducing replacement rates shifted as the crisis 
unfolded: initially a higher number of measures 
raised benefits; as the crisis dragged on measures 
reducing benefits became relatively more frequent.  
Graph II.1.6: Direction of reforms in the unemployment 
benefit domain (average yearly frequency 
across the EU) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
Graph II.1.7, shows reforms within the job 
protection domain. It reveals increased policy 
activism in the case of permanent contracts since 
2006, with a broadly-balanced frequency of 
measures in terms of directions. As for fixed-term 
contracts, in the past decade the incidence of 
measures relaxing conditions is almost 
systematically below that of measures tightening 
conditions, which may reflect, in a number of 
cases, a gradual adjustment to past reforms 
relaxing conditions for fixed term contracts with 
the implication of raising employment while at the 
same time creating segmentation. 
Graph II.1.7: Direction of reforms in the job protection 
domain (average yearly frequency across the 
EU) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
The cyclicality of measures affecting wage setting 
(higher frequency of employment-friendly reforms 
in low-growth years) previously pointed for the 
whole domain of measures (including also social 
pacts and tripartite agreements) is even clearer 
when focusing on the field comprising government 
intervention aimed reforming the wage setting 
system only (Graph II.1.8) This evidence suggests 
a shift in the positioning of governments on the 
wage-employment trade off during periods of high 
unemployment. 
Graph II.1.8: Government intervention in wage setting 
(average yearly frequency across the EU) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to compare reform 
directions across countries within each policy 
domain. The graphs in Appendix A.1.2 provide 
some interesting insights: 
• the comparison of reform patterns within 
country groups reveal some similarities, thus 
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confirming that institutional factors play a role 
in driving reform patterns.  
• Central and Eastern European countries were 
relatively less active in the ALMP domain.  
• Concerning job protection measures, Anglo-
Saxon countries barely implemented 
employment-friendly reforms, while Southern 
Countries carried out frequently this type of 
reforms.  
• Eastern and Continental countries relied 
relatively strongly on employment-friendly 
welfare benefit reforms.  
• Even within country groups, there is a good 
deal of heterogeneity in terms of direction of 
unemployment benefit and wage setting 
reforms.  
• Continental countries were by far the most 
frequent users of employment-friendly working 
time measures. 
1.4. SEARCHING FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF 
LABOUR MARKET REFORMS 
When and where labour market reforms are more 
likely to take place? What are the characteristics of 
countries exhibiting higher reform intensity? 
During which periods reform action is more 
abundant? What factors trigger reforms? These are 
the questions addressed in this section. To this 
purpose, the analysis builds on synthetic reform 
indicators varying across countries and years, as 
described in Box II.1.1.  
The co-movement between the number of reforms  
and the most relevant labour market variable for 
policy makers, unemployment, suggests that 
reforms are more frequent in periods when 
unemployment starts increasing (Graph II.1.9). 
This is particularly evident after the 2008 recession 
in most countries.  
The scatterplot in Graph II.1.10 confirms this 
finding in a cross-section of countries. The average 
reform intensity tends to be higher in countries 
characterized on average by a higher 
Graph II.1.9: Number of reforms and the unemployment rate 
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unemployment rate. The cross-country positive 
relation between reforms and unemployment is 
quite neat, Poland and Slovakia being outliers in 
light of the high unemployment rates in early 
2000s following transition.  
Graph II.1.10: Average number of reforms and 
unemployment rate, 2000-2010 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database, Eurostat 
A number of additional cross-country correlations 
appear of interest, as reported in Table II.1.1. 
Country-specific factors are distinguished as 
follows: structural characteristics affecting labour 
market outcomes, labour market outcomes, and 
other macro-fiscal relevant characteristics, 
including income per capita, GDP growth, debt 
and fiscal stance. Correlations are reported 
separately for employment-friendly and other 
reforms. As expected, overall reform intensity is 
higher in countries with more regulated labour 
markets (EPL), a higher tax wedge on labour, a 
higher coverage of collective bargaining, and more 
generous unemployment benefits. However, these 
correlations hold most notably for employment-
friendly reforms.  
Unsatisfactory labour market outcomes are also 
correlated with more intense reform activity. Most 
importantly, reforms are more frequent in 
countries with high unemployment. Interestingly, 
reforms in high-unemployment countries are more 
frequent in both directions: employment-friendly 
and other reforms. One the one hand, more support 
to the unemployed is necessary, which requires 
more generous benefit systems. On the other hand, 
employment-friendly policies, ALMPs, and an 
efficient design of benefit systems are necessary.  
Reforms are also more frequent in countries with 
segmented labour markets. Countries with a 
particularly high share of long-term unemployment 
do not exhibit instead a significant correlation with 
employment-friendly policies: the evidence based 
on aggregate reform indicators do not permit to 
establish a clear pattern and disaggregate 
information on reforms is required.  
 
Table II.1.1: Reform intensity and country characteristics: 
cross-country correlations 
Total number 
of reforms
Number of 
employment-
friendly reforms
Number of other 
reforms
Structural factors
Tax wedge 0.5887 0.658 0.4496
Unemployment benefits 
spending g (% GDP) 0.3782 0.5716 0.0708
EPL indicator, overall EPL 0.2788 0.3741 0.1033
Collective bargaining coverage 0.2528 0.3969 0.0975
Labour market outcomes
Unemployment rate 0.3138 0.2988 0.2651
Share of temporary employment 
(% total) 0.373 0.4631 0.1235
Share of long-term 
unemployment (% total) 0.0702 0.0006 0.1845
Other macro-fiscal variables 
Real GDP per capita, euros -0.117 0.0351 -0.2833
Real GDP growth -0.499 -0.5638 -0.2619
Government debt / GDP 0.7797 0.7762 0.6485
Change in primary cyclically-
adjusted budget balance -0.4802 -0.4027 -0.373
 
(1) Rank correlations of averages over the period 2000-2010. 
Source: Tax wedge: European Commission-OECD Tax and 
Benefit Project; Unemployment benefit spending: Eurostat; 
EPL:OECD; Collective bargaining coverage: ICTWSS 
database; Labour market outcomes: Eurostat; Other macro-
fiscal variables: ECFIN AMECO database. 
 
Reforms appear to be less frequent in countries 
with high growth rates, irrespective of their 
direction. As for income per capita, the relation is 
negative, but mostly for other reforms. This result 
is to a large extent driven by catching up and 
former transition economies that reformed their 
labour market systems by introducing new 
instruments of workers’ protection. Finally, 
countries with higher government debt and a fiscal 
stance oriented towards the improvement of the 
state of public finances implement more reforms. 
Aggregate reform indicators do not permit to 
assess how different types of reforms are driven by 
different determinants. Moreover, correlation 
analysis helps to shed light on some stylized facts, 
without however providing sufficient elements for 
interpreting findings. Achieving additional insight 
requires looking separately at reforms in different 
domains, taking into account the time dimension in 
addition to cross-country comparisons, and 
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analysing the impact of several explanatory factors 
at the same time. 
With a view to address the above limitations, 
regression analysis on the panel of all EU countries 
are carried out, separately for different policy 
domains: EPL, labour taxation, unemployment 
benefits, wage bargaining. To keep the sample 
used in the analysis homogenous in terms of 
reform objectives, the reform variable used is the 
number of employment-friendly reforms, 
separately in each domain. In contrast with 
existing analogous exercises making use of 
synthetic indicators summarizing structural 
conditions (e.g., Hoj et al., 2007) which employ 
standard least square regression models, non-linear 
models for count data become necessary in the 
present analysis. Box II.1.2 describes the empirical 
strategy and the estimation method followed.  
 
 
Box II.1.2: Investigating the determinants of labour market reforms with count data 
Econometric analysis can help identifying the determinants of the number of reforms taking place in a given 
country, in a given year. The first step in this type of analysis is to ensure a broadly homogenous sample of 
reforms in terms of expected driving factors: in absence of a sufficient degree of homogeneity, no 
discernible pattern may become visible. To this purpose, the analysis refers only to employment-friendly 
reforms. The analysis is also conducted separately by selected policy domains. 
The dependent variable used in the analysis is the number of employment-friendly reforms concerning EPL, 
unemployment benefits, labour taxation (reforms selected reduce the tax wedge), wage bargaining (the 
reforms selected are those where government intervention is aimed at reducing downward rigidities). This 
type of count data (bounded to be non negative and integer) do not allow the use of standard econometrics. 
A Poisson regression is therefore applied, which permits to estimate the probability of observing a given 
number of reforms within a time interval as a function of a set of explanatory variables assuming a Poisson 
distribution for the underlying stochastic events. 
Since some relevant reform determinants may be slow-moving variables, and in light of the relatively short 
time series available (10 years), rather than estimating Poisson conditional fixed effect regressions, cross-
section and time series data are pooled, while ensuring robust error terms with respect to non-independence 
within country clusters. This allows assessing reform determinants both along the time series and the cross-
section dimensions. 
The chosen specifications have the following form for each reform domain: 
1
1
1, ))/(log( −
=
− ∑+= it
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j
jitti XaXNE β      (1) 
where i and t denote, respectively, countries and time periods, j denotes a generic explanatory variable, and 
where N and X denote, in turn, the reform dependent variable and the explanatory variables (variables 
labelled with an upper bar are multi-dimensional vectors). Note that what appears at the right hand side of 
(1) is the logarithm of the conditional expected value for the reform variable, so that the effect of the 
explanatory variables is not linear, i.e., their marginal impact changes depending on the level of 
tiX , . The 
assumption for the distribution of 
tiY ,  is that it follows a Poisson with rate (mean and variance) given as in 
(1). The explanatory variables are all lagged one period to tackle the risk of reverse causation and are 
selected on the basis of a general-to-specific approach: starting from a general specification that includes a 
large set of explanatory variables, the least significant are eliminated. Lagged variables of the dependent 
variable are generally highly non-significant, except for the labor taxation domain, which is consistent with 
the assumption of independence among reform intensity observations which is implicit in the Poisson 
model. Public finance variables (Government debt and the change in the primary cyclically-adjusted 
balance) are not statistically significant. 
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Table II.1.2 reports the results of the empirical 
analysis of reform determinants. EPL reforms 
making the system more “flexible” appear more 
likely in sclerotic (low job finding rates) and 
segmented (high share of temporary labour) labour 
markets. EPL reforms are also less likely in 
conditions of low growth.  
 
Table II.1.2: Determinants of labour market reforms 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory variables
0.093
[1.86]*
-0.128
[2.38]**
8.151
[4.11]***
0.037
[5.07]***
-0.039
[3.00]***
3.953
[1.43]
0.015
[1.50]
0.088
[4.15]***
Wage share 0.091
[2.10]**
Unemployment 0.125
[3.34]***
0.017 0.083
[3.83]*** [4.65]***
Real GDP growth -0.078 0.047 -0.09 -0.06
[2.61]*** [3.06]*** [3.38]*** [1.47]
Constant -0.865 0.278 -5.913 -7.828
[2.03]** [0.36] [2.59]*** [2.84]***
Observations 218 226 95 236
Job finding rate
Lagged dependent 
variable
Government 
intervention
Unemployment 
beneftis
Labour 
taxationEPL
Unemployment benefit 
duration
Net replacement rate
Employment rate
Tax wedge on labour
Share of temporary 
employment
Real per-capita GDP, 
euros
Share of long-term 
unemployment
 
(1) Dependent variables: number of employment-friendly 
reforms. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
Estimation method: Poisson regressions, pooled cross section 
time series data. Standard errors robust with respect of non 
independence within countries. Robust z statistics in 
brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 5% and  *** 1%. 
Source: Tax wedge, unemployment benefit et replacement 
rate and duration: European Commission-OECD Tax and 
Benefit Project; Job finding rate; elaborations on Eurostat 
data; Other labour market outcomes: Eurostat; Other 
macro-fiscal variables: ECFIN AMECO database 
 
Reforming labour taxation appears to be a process 
that gradually unfolds over time, as revealed by the 
significant coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable: reforms reducing labour taxation this year 
are more likely the higher the number of the same 
type of reforms the previous year. Labour tax 
reforms are, as expected, more frequent if starting 
from a situation with a high tax wedge on labour 
and with a low employment rate. It also turns out 
that labour tax reforms are more frequent in high 
income countries and during good times, probably 
in light of the stronger budgetary room for 
manoeuvre. 
Unemployment benefit systems are more likely to 
be reformed the higher is the generosity of 
unemployment insurance schemes (both net 
replacement rates and duration) and the higher the 
share of long-term unemployment. This type of 
reforms is also more likely in countries with higher 
income per capita and periods of low growth. 
In line with expectations, reforms in wage 
bargaining are more frequent starting from a 
situation where a large fraction of value added 
accrues to labour and when the unemployment rate 
is high. It also appears that low growth conditions 
are more conducive to this type of reforms, 
although the coefficient does not reach statistical 
significance. 
Overall, the analysis of LABREF data confirms the 
view that reforms are carried out mostly when and 
where justified both on the ground of structural 
regulatory and institutional factors and on the 
ground of labour market outcomes. Other macro-
fiscal conditions play a role, which is however less 
clear-cut. Reform activism is generally associated 
with low GDP growth, but not for all policy 
domains. Countries with higher income per-capita 
are more likely to deregulate labour markets in 
selected domains. Public finances also appear to 
play some role in cross-country correlation 
analysis (countries with high public debt exhibit 
more reform intensity, while countries taking a 
tougher fiscal consolidation stance reform less), 
which is however not clearly confirmed in 
regression analysis conducted separately by policy 
domain.  
1.5. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF REFORMS: 
SOME PRIMA-FACIE EVIDENCE 
This section discusses the effect of reforms on 
outcomes. A thorough assessment of the impact of 
changes in policy frameworks requires the use of 
disaggregated data: only in this way it is possible 
to identify the effect of reforms by comparing the 
specific outcome variables affected by the reforms 
between those population groups, sectors, 
individuals, that are concerned and those that are 
not (e.g, Imbens and Woolridge, 2009). The 
findings from the previous analysis also show 
quite clearly the risks of reverse causation when 
running analysis on aggregate outcome variables: 
unsatisfactory outcomes trigger reforms, and 
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reforms at the same time produce effects on those 
outcomes over time. In light of these arguments, 
the LABREF database has been used in past 
analysis to assess policy effects with the help of 
disaggregate data, including the impact of reforms 
across different gender and age groups (Arpaia et 
al, 2009) and on marginally attached workers 
(European Commission, 2008). 
Notwithstanding their limitations, attempts to 
assess the impact of reforms on macro data are not 
uncommon, not only because easier to implement, 
but because helpful in providing a synthetic, 
prima-facie gauge on the direction and order of 
magnitude of reform effects (e.g., Layard and 
Nickell, 1999; Belot and Van Ours, 2004; 
Bassanini and Duval, 2006, Bouis and Duval, 
2011).  
With a view to shed some light on the impact of 
reforms, and without pretence of providing 
definitive answers, panel regressions were run 
separately for selected labour market outcome 
variables: the share of temporary labour, the job 
finding rate, the participation rates, the 
unemployment rate. The analysis aims at assessing 
whether reforms play a role in driving the 
evolution of these variables over time.  
The reform indicator used in the analysis is the 
direction score for selected reforms, i.e., the 
algebraic sum of the direction indicator for all 
measures taken in a given country in a given year 
(see Box II.1.3). This indicator aims at capturing 
the extent to which policy action in a given 
country, in a given year, in a given domain, 
affected the underlying structural conditions. 
Hence, the purpose of the statistical analysis is to 
test whether the labour market outcomes that are 
expected to be more closely linked to the various 
reform indictors actually move in an employment-
friendly direction. Box II.1.3 describes the 
empirical methodology followed.  
Results are displayed in Table II.1.3. The 
preponderance of employment-friendly reforms 
implies a more negative value for the each reform 
direction score. The presence of 3 lags of the 
reform direction score indicator allows evaluating 
how the impact of reforms unfolds over time.  
A variable capturing reforms addressing labour 
market segmentation (employment-friendly 
reforms in the EPL for regular contracts net of the 
same type of reforms for temporary contracts) 
exhibit the expected sign in driving the share of 
temporary employment in the economy. The 
coefficient is positive, which indicates that 
employment-friendly reforms reduce 
precariousness, although it reaches a degree of 
statistical significance close to 10 per cent only 
after 3 years. 
 
Table II.1.3: Reform effects on selected outcome variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of 
temporary 
employment, 
year-on-year 
change
Job 
finding 
rate
Activity rate, 
year-on-
year change
Unemployment 
rate, year-on-
year change
Dep. variable (1 lag) 0.582 -0.188 0.402
[6.02]*** [1.53] [4.83]***
Dep. variable (2 lags) 0.057 0.055
[0.46] [0.41]
Dep. variable (2 lags) -0.308 -0.371
[2.45]** [2.48]**
0
[0.04]
0
[0.40]
0.001
[1.61]
EPL reforms (1 lag) -0.12
[1.13]
EPL reforms  (2 lags) -0.131
[1.26]
EPL reforms  (3 lags) 0.007
[0.05]
-0.103 0.03
[2.18]** [0.66]
-0.089 0.084
[1.78]* [0.98]
-0.009 0.168
[0.18] [1.79]*
-0.011
[0.18]
0
[0.00]
0.182
[1.52]
Social benefits (1 lag) -0.002
[0.03]
Social benefits (2 lags) -0.011
[0.16]
Social benefits (3 lags) -0.114
[1.43]
Constant 0.001 5.429 -0.11 0.149
[0.71] [4.58]*** [0.45] [0.33]
Observations 193 167 193 171
R-squared 0.12 0.53 0.17 0.62
EPL reforms addressing 
segmentation  (3 lags)
EPL reforms addressing 
segmentation  (2 lags)
EPL reforms addressing 
segmentation (1 lag)
Unemployment benefit 
reform (3 lags)
Unemployment benefit 
reform (2 lags)
Unemployment benefit 
reform (1 lag)
Labour tax reform (3 
lags)
Labour tax reform (2 
lags)
Labour tax reform (1 lag)
 
(1) Reform variables are the algebraic sums of binary 
direction indicators  of all measures taken in a given country 
and a given year (for employment-friendly reforms the 
direction indicator is set at -1, for other reforms at 1).  EPL 
reform addressing segmentation: employment-friendly  EPL 
reforms for permanent and  other reforms for temporary 
contracts. All specifications include country and year 
effects. Estimation method: least squares dummy variables. 
Standard errors robust with respect of non independence 
within countries. Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 
10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
Source: Commission Services. 
 
Employment-friendly EPL reforms at large (both 
permanent and temporary contracts) have instead 
the expected positive impact on the job finding 
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rate, as revealed by the negative regression 
coefficient: lower EPL restrictions tend to impact 
positively on job creation, as measured by the 
hazard rate at which unemployed find a job. The 
effect is not statistically significant at 10 per cent 
but, after 2 years, the t tests reveal a quite 
satisfactory significance level. 
Activity rates are put in relation with tax and 
benefit reforms. Reforms reducing the tax wedge 
have a statistically significant impact on the 
activity rate, which fades away gradually over 
time. Reforms reducing the generosity of social 
benefits also have the expected positive impact on 
activity rates (negative regression coefficient), but 
effects do not reach statistical significance and 
take time to materialize (growing from the first to 
the third year after the reform), probably in light of 
the fact that these reforms mostly concern new 
beneficiaries or foresee a gradual phasing out of 
benefits for current beneficiaries. 
Tax wedge and unemployment benefit reforms 
appear to help reducing the unemployment rate. 
Regarding the tax wedge, the effect achieves 
statistical significance, but only over time (the 
third year after reform). This result contrasts that 
found in the case of participation rates (immediate 
impact of tax wedge reforms) and could be linked 
to the fact that, in case of reforms reducing 
personal income taxation, employment decisions 
by firms are affected only with the necessary delay 
necessary for the tax cut to feed into reduced wage 
demands by workers. Probably, analogous reasons 
(delays for benefit reductions translating into 
reduced wage demands and higher) explain the 
fact that also the effects of unemployment benefit 
reforms take time to materialize.  
It is important to take these results with the 
necessary degree of caution. Aggregate approaches 
to assess the impact of reforms have a limited 
power in identifying the effect of reforms because 
they do not allow measuring the impact on what is 
 
 
Box II.1.3: Assessing the impact of reforms from the LABREF database on aggregate 
variables
The empirical specification chosen for the estimation of the effect of reforms exploits the time series 
properties of selected labour market outcome variables. The idea is that of augmenting simple auto-
regressive models for stationary variables with lags of reform indicators that are ex-ante expected to have a 
potential effect. By looking at the coefficients of the various lags of the reform indicator it is possible to 
gauge the intensity and direction of the impact of reforms, and their evolution over time. 
The reform variable chosen is the direction score for selected reforms. Hence, the indicator represents the 
number of employment-friendly reform measures carried out in a given country in a given year, minus the 
number of other reforms. The choice of this indicator is dictated by the need, when assessing the impact of 
reforms, of taking account not only of the intensity of the reform action, but also of the likely impact on 
underlying regulations and institutions.  
Since the time series dimension of the LABREF database is limited, the estimation is carried out over a 
whole panel of EU countries. To ensure the stationarity of the outcome variables selected, time differences 
are performed when necessary. Lags of the dependent variables are added to the specification until they 
remain statistically significant. To capture common, time-varying factors that may impact the dependent 
variable (e.g., global economic economic conditions,…) time fixed effects are included in addition to 
country fixed effects. 
The selected specification for a generic variable Y is as follows 
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where i, and t denote, respectively, country and time period, where L is the number of lags of the dependent 
variable, R is the reform direction score indicator, and where η and θ are, respectively, country and year 
effects, while ε is white-noise disturbance. 
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directly changed by policy measures and do not 
permit separating the effects between the 
population affected by the reform and the one 
which is instead not affected. Hence, rather than a 
proper quantification of the reform impact, 
aggregate analysis provide a statistical account of 
the extent to which the dynamics of relevant labour 
market outcome variables was affected by the 
adoption of a certain number of reforms of a 
certain type. In light of the relatively small sample 
size and the indirect link between reform 
indicators and outcome variables, it is not 
surprising that in many cases statistical 
significance is not reached.  
Nevertheless, the results from aggregate analysis 
presented in this section appear in light of a-priori 
expectations of reform impact, which is reassuring 
in that confirms priors often implicitly or explicitly 
underlying reform action by governments or policy 
advice and recommendations by experts, think 
tanks and policy institutions. The results also 
provide a number of new insights, notably 
regarding the time pattern of reform effects, that 
deserve further investigation. 
1.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This increased reform activism recorded by EU 
countries over the recent past calls for a 
proportionate increased effort to track the record of 
past reforms and assess their features, determinants 
and effects. Such an assessment is complex, most 
notably in light of the very differentiated character 
of the multi-faceted set of measures that normally 
fall under the broad heading “reform”.  
The rich information contained in the LABREF 
database, developed by DG ECFIN of the 
European Commission in cooperation with the 
Economic Policy Committee, allows tracking 
labour market reforms in the EU over the past 
decade.  
Descriptive analysis reveals a number of 
noteworthy trends and regularities: 
• Over the whole decade, reforms do not appear 
to be strongly synchronised across countries, 
which may reflect that measures are often taken 
in response to idiosyncratic shocks.  
• However, there is some indication that 
countries with similar institutional settings tend 
to follow analogous reform patterns. 
• Moreover, the 2008 crisis, triggered increased 
policy activism in most policy domains in a 
large number of EU countries. The crisis acted 
as a common shock and required simultaneous 
responses. External pressure from markets and 
sovra-national institutions, notably the EU, and 
increased economic uncertainty, may also have 
helped governments to publicly commit and 
swing away part of the political responsibility 
of unpopular policies. (25)  
• A higher incidence of reforms with macro-
structural relevance (EPL, unemployment 
benefits, wage setting) is observed with the 
crisis.  
• With the crisis, a tendency for reforms to 
become more frequently aimed at supporting 
employment by easing regulations or welfare 
benefits generosity is also observed.  
• Correlation and regression analysis shows that 
reforms tend to be more frequently carried out 
when and where justified by unsatisfactory 
labour market outcomes (notably high and 
growing unemployment) and by outdated 
regulations and institutions. Other macro-fiscal 
conditions play a role which is less clear-cut.  
• Statistical analysis of the effects produced by 
selected reforms on aggregate labour market 
outcomes is supportive of common priors: tax 
and benefit reforms tend to be followed with 
some lags by improved activity rates and lower 
unemployment; EPL reforms are followed by a 
reduced share of temporary contracts and 
increased job-finding rates.  
Further analysis on the LABREF database could 
aim at assessing the effect of reforms on labour 
market outcomes using micro-level data that allow 
better identifying the impact of the policy across 
population groups. 
                                                          
(25) Buti et al. (2010), Gancia, G.; A. Bonfiglioli (2011). 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011 some Member States received Country-
Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to revise 
selected features of EPL to reduce segmentation 
and enhance labour market flexibility. In particular 
measures were advocated to enhance labour 
market flexibility to allow for a better use of 
temporary contracts (Lithuania) or reduce the 
asymmetries in rights and obligations between 
permanent and temporary contracts (Slovenia, 
Spain, France, Italy). In the framework of 
Economic Adjustment Programmes Greece and 
Portugal are in the process of revising their EPL 
system with a view to foster job creation, tackle 
segmentation, and enhance the adjustment capacity 
of the economy. 
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, it 
provides an overview of key concepts to fully 
appreciate the multi-faceted aspects of EPL and 
describes the main characteristics of EPL systems 
across EU countries. Second, it discusses the 
effects of EPL on labour markets on the economy 
at large on the basis of existing literature and in 
light of original analysis. In particular, there will 
be a discussion of the channels through which EPL 
can affect growth potential and external 
adjustment. Third, the note discusses which factors 
need to be taken into account when assessing 
reforms needs in the EPL domain and how can 
desirable reform paths be characterised depending 
on countries' economic and institutional 
characteristics. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as 
follows. In the next section basic facts and 
definitions about EPL are reviewed. In section 2 
the EPL characteristics of EU countries are 
compared and discussed. Section 3 reviews 
existing studies on the effects of EPL and presents 
fresh analysis on the topic. In section 4 the 
discussion focuses on the identification of reform 
needs and on avenues for desirable reform 
strategies in EU countries. 
2.2. KEY CONCEPTS ABOUT EPL 
2.2.1. Basic facts about employment 
protection legislation 
Employment Protection legislation (EPL) consists 
of rules and procedures that define private 
employment relationships. EPL refers to 
provisions defining the lawfulness of dismissal, 
formal and procedural requirements to be followed 
in case of individual or collective dismissals, 
payments to workers for early contract termination 
and remedies to deal with the consequences of 
unfair dismissal, hiring restrictions (e.g. favouring 
specific groups of disadvantaged workers or 
limiting specific types of contracts).  
The economic rationale of EPL is to address the 
risks for workers associated with the lay-off 
process (e.g., Pissarides, 2010). Since 
unemployment risks can hardly be fully covered 
by the insurance market, risk-averse, liquidity-
constrained employees may demand employment 
protection to reduce income volatility and 
employers may agree to provide such protection in 
exchange of reduced wages (the so-called 
"bonding argument"). Under perfect-information, 
competitive environment, EPL would be voluntary 
and efficient, and there would be no need for 
minimum mandatory employment protection. 
Under imperfect information, however, cases of 
under-provision of employment protection may 
arise, giving raise to an economic reason for 
mandatory minimum EPL (see, e.g., Blanchard and 
Tirole, 2003). (26) An additional economic reason 
why EPL may be needed is to address the 
externalities associated with the break-up of 
employment relationships. (27) 
                                                          
(26) When employers have incomplete knowledge about 
workers' ability, job applicants tend to ask for low job 
protection, with a view to signal they are high-quality 
workers who do not expect being easily dismissed 
(signalling problem). Similarly, firms tend to undersupply 
EPL, since offering a high degree job security would attract 
the less qualified and motivated workers, difficult to fire 
once hired (adverse selection problem). 
(27) Workers that are laid off, if not quickly re-employed, may 
lose skill and motivation, thus becoming hardly re-
employable. Employers, when deciding about lay offs do 
not take into account the fact that their decision may have 
implications in terms of effective labour inputs availability 
for the whole economy. 
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The existence of EPL is not only justified on 
economic grounds. Views concerning workers' 
rights and fair labour relations also play a relevant 
role. For instance, dismissals motivated by 
discriminatory reasons are generally considered 
illegal, while protection to employees is generally 
not provided when dismissals are justified by major 
disciplinary reasons. Protection against dismissal is 
also recognised in ILO Conventions, in the EU 
charter of fundamental rights, and in EU law. (28) 
Specific EPL features are the outcome of different 
legal and institutional traditions. Countries with 
civil and common law traditions provide 
employment protection in different ways. In the 
former, EPL tends to be regulated by law, while in 
the latter it relies more on contracts and private 
litigations. In common law countries, courts have 
ample judicial discretion as opposed to civil law 
where procedural codes play a greater role. 
Moreover, EPL is an articulated set of institutions 
enshrined not only in law but also in collective  
and individual labour contracts. 
2.2.2. Main features of EPL 
Individual dismissals, regular contracts 
EPL legislation generally contains a number of 
conditions that are to be respected by the employer 
for dismissing workers. The lack of respect of 
these conditions renders the dismissal unfair, with 
implications in terms of obligations to the 
employer and rights to compensation to the 
worker. The main aspects of EPL for individual 
dismissals for regular contracts are as follows. 
• Probationary period. During the trial period 
both parties can terminate the employment 
relationship at no costs. Employers may favour 
long probationary periods as they find it 
cheaper to discourage less qualified applicants 
                                                          
(28) The information and consultation of employees is a 
fundamental right recognised by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (Art. 27). The protection 
against unjustified dismissal is a fundamental right 
recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(Art. 30) and is subject to the ILO Termination of 
Employment Convention C 158. Art.151 and 153 TFEU 
provide in particular that the Union shall have as its 
objectives the promotion of employment, improved 
working conditions, the information and consultation of 
workers and the protection of workers when their 
employment contract is terminated. 
from seeking jobs than to renegotiate the 
contracts of workers who are found to be 
unsuitable. However, to avoid the risk of 
employers abusing of long trial periods, the 
legislation often establishes maximum trial 
periods. In some countries, the legislation 
allows deviations from the standard maximum 
trial period by way of temporary derogations, 
most notably for work-related training. In some 
cases, the trial period is disciplined in such a 
way to grant lower dismissal costs at the 
beginning of the employment relationship.  
• Procedural requirements and notice periods. 
Legislations often require a notice period prior 
dismissal and a written notification. Long 
notice periods may have relevant monetary 
implications as they imply involuntary and 
possibly unproductive employment. In some 
countries, failure to comply with the notice 
period may give the right to a compensation for 
the earnings that the worker would have 
received had this been correctly observed. 
• Reasons for individual dismissal. Most current 
regulations dealing with employment 
termination require the fulfilment of not only 
prior procedural requirements before dismissal 
(like a notification to the worker to be 
dismissed), but also impose an obligation on 
the employer to substantiate the reasons 
justifying dismissal. The cases for justified 
dismissal can be: (i) on disciplinary grounds or 
for personal reasons, except discriminatory 
cases (e.g. based on age, gender, colour, 
religion, trade union activity, maternity and 
educational leave,…);  (ii) on economic 
grounds (extinction of the post, technological 
change, unsuitability of the worker). 
While dismissals on disciplinary grounds do not 
imply compensations to the worker, dismissals on 
economic grounds may imply compensations in 
some countries. National legislation differs as to 
the scope of valid reasons for dismissal and the 
discretion of judges in questioning employers' 
decisions. The valid reasons for dismissal can be 
defined in a broad way, with the advantage of 
providing room to cope with a disparate range of 
situations. Alternatively, the reasons for justified 
dismissal could be very detailed, thereby reducing 
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the scrutiny of the labour judges on employers' 
decisions. 
• Consequences of unfair dismissal. In common 
law countries employees are often compensated 
via severance payments in case of dismissals 
by law or collective agreement, and a justified 
economic reason for dismissal may not be 
necessary for such compensation (no 
compensation for disciplinary dismissal). In 
civil law countries, the legislation often 
prescribes a justified economic reason and if 
the court verifies that justified reasons are not 
present the employer may have to reinstate the 
employee. The payment of a monetary 
compensation as an alternative to reinstatement 
may be contemplated by the law in some 
countries, and the choice may be given either to 
the employer or to the employee. In addition to 
reinstatement, employers may have to 
compensate for wage losses and the social 
security contributions unpaid during the period 
between the dismissal and the judgment.   
• Design of severance payments. The severance 
pay consists of a lump sum payment to a 
worker who has been involuntary laid-off. 
Severance payment entitlements may be 
enshrined in law or be bargained in collective 
agreements. The payment may differ according 
to the reason for dismissal (justified or not 
justified). In the majority of the countries 
severance payment exists in case of dismissal 
for economic reasons, while they are not 
usually due in case of dismissal for disciplinary 
reasons. The size of severance payments is 
often linked to the number of years of service 
and on the wage pay close to the moment of 
dismissal. Severance payments may be subject 
to a maximum cap. In some countries the size 
of severance payments is negatively linked to 
the length of the notice period given to the 
dismissed employee. 
Collective dismissals 
Collective dismissal procedures are triggered by 
the simultaneous dismissal of a number of 
employees in light of economic reasons. The 
legislation often defines additional requirements 
on to the employers in case of collective 
dismissals, in view of the social implications 
arising from the lay-off of many employees in a 
short time period, in a specific geographical area. 
What changes as compared with individual 
dismissals is generally the necessity of fulfilling 
additional procedural requirements and the notion 
of admissible economic dismissal for the dismissal 
to be considered fair. Rules on collective 
dismissals concern a number of elements as 
follows. 
• Definition of collective dismissal. The 
legislation sets the minimum number of 
workers dismissed in a given lapse of time, in a 
given location, for the dismissal to qualify as 
collective. Often this minimum number is 
linked to firm/plant size. 
• Procedural and notification requirements. 
Employers are required to consult with 
workers' representatives when contemplating 
collective dismissals, with a view to find 
alternative solutions whenever possible. 
Employers are also required to notify the 
intention to operate collective dismissals to the 
competent public authority. 
• Criteria for selecting employees to be 
dismissed. Transparent and non-discriminatory 
criteria may be indicated by law, in collective 
agreements, or may have to be announced by 
the employer at the moment of dismissal.  
Compensations, implications of unfair collective 
dismissals. In most cases, severance payments 
provided irrespective of the specific reason for 
individual economic dismissal are also due in case 
of collective dismissal. Additional monetary 
compensations (e.g., co-financing of 
unemployment benefits) may have to be provided 
by the employers. National legislations provide 
alternative implications for the lack of respect of 
procedural and notification requirements of in case 
of the disrespect of selection criteria for dismissal. 
Legislation on fixed-term contracts 
EPL legislation also deals with conditions under 
which fixed-term contracts can be used and on the 
main features of such contracts. Employers may 
have incentives to use series of fixed-term 
contracts rather than regular contracts, for 
example, to save on dismissal costs. The 
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legislation poses constraints on the use of such 
contracts with a view to prevent discrimination of 
fixed-term workers and a possible abuse of fixed-
term contracts. Requirements generally consist of 
pre-defined cases justifying the use of fixed-term 
contracts and limits on the number of renewals or 
total duration of cumulated contracts. Among the 
reasons that are often mentioned in the legislation 
justifying the use of fixed-term contracts, the 
following are among the most recurrent: coping 
with unexpected fluctuations of demand; replacing 
permanent staff on holiday, maternity leave or sick 
leave; hiring workers with specialised skills to 
carry out specific projects; start-up ventures 
implying risky and uncertain returns. 
Different contract typologies may define different 
conditions for the use of temporary labour. As 
opposed to permanent contracts that are generally 
subject to a rather homogenous discipline within 
each country, different typologies of temporary 
labour are often present, with a view to modulate 
conditions for the use of fixed-term labour to the 
specific reasons underlying the choice of fixed-
term contracts. For instance, in the case of very 
short labour relations often related to the need of 
replacing permanent workers that are temporarily 
absent, interim work is often chosen in light of 
relatively low procedural costs. 
2.3. EPL REGIMES IN EU COUNTRIES 
2.3.1. Quantitative EPL indicators 
Synthetic indicators permit a prima-facie 
quantification of the strictness of EPL legislation. 
The OECD compiles regularly such indicators for 
most OECD countries on the basis of the 
codification of 21 elements of the legislation, 
covering all three main aspects of employment 
protection: protection of permanent workers 
against individual dismissal; regulation on 
temporary forms of employment; specific 
additional requirements for collective dismissals 
(see Box II.2.1 for the construction of the 
indicators).  
Graph II.2.1 provides a synthetic overview of the 
evolution of EPL stringency in EU countries. The 
latest available indicators computed by the OECD 
are for 2008 (data for 2009 are available for France 
and Portugal). The Graph shows that since 1998 
the EPL legislation for individual regular contracts 
 
 
Box II.2.1: The construction of OECD EPL indicators
Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts. This index incorporates three main aspects of 
dismissal protection: (i) procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, 
such as notification and consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance pay, which typically 
vary by tenure of the employee; and (iii) difficulty of dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in 
which it is possible to dismiss workers, as well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found 
to be unfair (such as compensation and reinstatement). 
Additional costs for collective dismissals: most countries impose additional delays, costs or notification 
procedures when an employer dismisses a large number of workers at one time. This measure includes only 
additional costs which go beyond those applicable for individual dismissal. It does not reflect the overall 
strictness of regulation of collective dismissals, which is the sum of costs for individual dismissals and any 
additional cost of collective dismissals. 
Regulation of temporary contracts: quantifies regulation of fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts 
with respect to the types of work for which these contracts are allowed and their duration. This measure also 
includes regulation governing the establishment and operation of temporary work agencies and requirements 
for agency workers to receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers in the user firm, which 
can increase the cost of using temporary agency workers relative to hiring workers on permanent contracts. 
For each of these indicators a score from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions) is given. Sub-indicators 
are aggregated into upper-tier indicators by means of simple averaging. The overall EPL indicator is the 
simple average of the EPL indicator for individual dismissals on regular and fixed term contracts. 
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Table II.2.1: EPL reforms for permanent and fixed term contracts 2008-2010, an overview 
Country AT BG CZ EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LV NL PT UK
Permanent contracts - Restrictions to individual 
dismissals
2008; 
2009 2008 2010 2008 2009 2010 2009
Permanent contracts - Notice and severance 
payments 2008 2010 2008 2009
Permanent contracts - Procedural  requirements 2010 2008 2008 2008 2008; 2009 2010 2009 2008
Permanent contracts - Probation period 2010 2008
Permanent contracts - Collective dismissals 2009 2008 2010 2009
Permanent contracts - Other 2009
Temporary contracts - Max number of  renewals 2010 2010
Temporary contracts - Max duration 2008 2010 2010 2008 2010 2009
Temporary contracts - Temporary agency work 2010 2010 2008 2009 2010
Temporary contracts - Other 2009 2008 2010 2010 2008 2009
 
Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
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and collective dismissals is broadly stable over 
time in most EU countries, while the regulation of 
fixed-term contracts have changed quite 
considerably in a number of countries. EPL for 
fixed-term contracts became less rigid notably in 
Southern countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal), but 
also in Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia. 
Conversely, EPL for fixed-term contracts become 
more stringent in some New Member States 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), albeit 
generally starting from a situation of high 
flexibility. 
Cross-country illustration of the main EPL features 
is provided in Graphs II.A2.1 and II.A2.2 and in 
Table II.A2.1 in the Appendix. (29)  In the radar 
charts the EPL main sub indicators (EPL for 
regular contracts, EPL for temporary contracts, 
additional requirements for collective dismissals) 
and the sub indicators for the EPL for regular 
contracts for each country are put in comparison 
                                                          
(29) The taxonomy, proposed by the European Commission 
(2007), is based on principal component analysis and 
largely confirms the findings of existing seminal work on 
the taxonomy of socio-economic systems (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). 
Graph II.2.1: Evolution of OECD EPL indicators in EU countries 
 
Source: OECD. 
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with the EU average and with the average of 
country groups defined on the basis of similarities 
in flexicurity models (Nordic Countries, 
Continental Countries, Southern Countries, Eastern 
European Countries).  
The latest available information for all countries is 
for 2008. Since then, a number of countries have 
carried out reforms, in some cases relevant (see 
Box II.2.1) which are not taken into account in the 
value of the EPL indexes for 2008. Table II.2.1 
presents and overview of EPL reforms in EU 
countries implemented in the 2008-2010 period on 
the basis of the ECFIN LABREF database. Table 
II.2.2 presents correlation analysis across the 
various indicators. It is shown that the various EPL 
dimensions tend to be positively correlated, so that 
the countries with a higher degree of strictness of 
EPL in one aspect tend also to be more restrictive 
in other aspects. 
 
Table II.2.2: Correlation among OECD EPL sub-indices 
EPL on regular 
contracts
EPL on temporary 
contracts
EPL on collective 
dismissal
1
0.407 1
-0.0308 0.0789 1
Procedural 
inconvenience of 
dismissal
Notice and 
severance pay
Difficulty of 
dismissal
1
0.3337 1
0.5895 0.4156 1
EPL sub-indexes
Sub-indexes for EPL on regular contracts
EPL on regular 
contracts
Procedural 
inconvenience 
of dismissal
 
(1) Sub-indices for regular contracts: Procedural 
inconvenience of dismissal – procedural inconveniences 
(unweighted average of notification procedures and delay 
involved before notice can start). Notice and severance 
pay- Length of notice period and severance pay at 9 
months, 4 years and 20 years of tenure (unweighted 
average). Difficulty of dismissal – consequences of unfair 
dismissal (unweighted average of definition of justified 
dismissal, lenth of trial period, compensation following unfair 
dismissal, possibility of reinstatement following unfair 
dismissal, deadline to make a claim of unfair dismissal). 
Source: Elaboration on OECD data. 
 
Graphs II.A2.1 and II.A2.2 permit a comparison of 
the main EPL elements across EU countries for the 
latest available value of the indicators. The radar 
charts in Graph II.A2.1 provide information about 
the protection for regular employment, the 
restrictions for the use of temporary employment, 
the additional requirements to be respected if 
dismissal is collective. Graph II.A2.1  summarise 
information on procedural inconvenience 
employers encounter if they intend to dismiss a 
worker (notification and notice period), trial 
period, notice and severance payments (for tenures 
up to 4 years and 20 years), definition of unfair 
dismissals and their consequences (pecuniary 
compensation and reinstatement). A larger 
perimeter of the radar chart suggests a more rigid 
regulation of individual dismissals. The main 
points can be summarised as follows: 
• Broad EPL elements. Individual dismissals are 
relatively strictly regulated in Southern 
countries, notably for permanent contracts. 
Nordic countries and Continental countries 
have on average the tightest regulation of 
temporary work. Anglo-Saxon Countries are in 
general characterised by flexible employment 
protection legislation. Country groupings are 
relatively homogenous, although with some 
exceptions (e.g, high regulation for collective 
dismissals wither respect to Southern Countries 
in Italy, relatively low regulation of fixed-term 
contracts in Slovakia as compared with Eastern 
Countries,…). 
• Individual dismissals, permanent contracts. 
Individual dismissals tend to be considerably 
more expensive in Southern countries, 
including on account of a short trial period. The 
definition of unfair dismissals is relatively 
strict in Continental and Northern countries, 
while the opposite holds for Central and 
Eastern countries. Anglo-Saxon countries have 
in all aspects the most flexible regulation of 
individual dismissals. Country regulations 
appear highly heterogenous also within country 
groupings. 
2.3.2. Main features of EPL regulations across 
EU countries (30) 
Where EPL differs most is the regime for 
individual dismissals on regular contracts. Tables 
II.A2.1-II.A2.4 summarise information on the 
main characteristics of EPL legislation for 
individual dismissals. The source is OECD; the 
latest available information for all countries is for 
2008 (so that reforms having taken place 
afterwards are not contemplated). The EPL regime 
                                                          
(30) Information in this section is mostly based on OECD 
http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_2649_33927
_42695243_1_1_1_1,00.html or ILO http://www.ilo.org 
/dyn/eplex/termmain.home?p_lang=en. Further information 
can be found at the website of the European Labour Law 
Network:  http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/home/prm/52/ 
size__1/index.html. 
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differs quite considerably not only in terms of the 
degree of stringency but also in terms of the 
instruments used to protect workers against 
dismissal. A number of points stand out as follows: 
• Individual notice and dismissal. Normally, 
procedures depend on whether the reason for 
dismissal is personal (e.g. due to worker's 
incapacity, disciplinary reasons) or economic. 
Procedures may also depend on the typology of 
worker, company size, and trade union 
membership. In general, if dismissal is based 
on personal reasons procedures tend to be 
lighter. In some countries employers have to 
notify, sometimes on request by employee, one 
or more third parties (normally workers' 
representatives or the public employment 
service, labour inspectorate or other 
government authorities) if they intend to 
dismiss an employee. Apart from notification, 
in some countries employers also have to 
provide third parties with a justification of 
dismissals. Depending on the country, delays 
before notice can start may exceed one month.  
• Definition of fair and unfair dismissals. In 
some countries the definition of fair dismissal 
is not highly restrictive and unfair dismissals 
are limited to cases which are not reasonably 
based on economic circumstances and on cases 
of discrimination (e.g., Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom). In 
some countries dismissals are not justified if 
they are not based on an effective and relevant 
reason (e.g. Finland, France). In addition, in 
case of redundancy, dismissals are considered 
as unfair if the employer fails to take into 
account specific circumstances of dismissed 
workers such as social dimension (e.g., France, 
Germany, Austria), tenure (e.g., Estonia, 
Sweden), family responsibilities (e.g., France, 
Estonia), professional qualifications (e.g., 
Estonia, France), age/gender balance in a firm 
(the Netherlands) etc. In some countries fair 
dismissal requires specific alternatives to 
redundancy to be considered. These 
alternatives may include retraining, 
rehabilitation and/or a transfer of a worker to 
another position in a firm (e.g., Austria, 
Finland, Estonia, France, Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands).  
• Trial period, notice period and severance pay. 
Monetary costs related to dismissal depend on 
both the lengths of notice period and severance 
payments. In some countries employers do not 
bear any severance payments, however, notice 
period can be very long (e.g., Finland, 
Sweden). (31) In others, severance pay is the 
main cost of dismissal (e.g. Spain, the 
Netherlands). Notice period and severance pay 
generally do not apply during the trial period. 
The maximum trial period in the EU spans 
from less than 1 month to 12 months; in a 
majority of countries it is between 3 and 6 
months. As for the financing of severance 
payments, it generally comes fully from the 
employer that operated the dismissal, but in 
some countries severance payments are shared 
among several employers. In Austria for 
instance, severance payments are financed via a 
fund at the name of the employee, which is 
portable across employers until it is used 
(dismissal or retirement) and to which all 
employers in the career history of the employee 
contribute.  
• Compensation and reinstatement if dismissal is 
unfair. In case of unfair dismissal, firms have 
additional obligations against an employee. 
Normally, a worker is entitled either to a 
pecuniary compensation on top of what is 
normally required for fair dismissals or to be 
reinstated, and employers may also have to pay 
the worker's foregone wages ("back pay"). The 
regime for reinstatement differs widely across 
EU countries. In some cases reinstatement is 
not foreseen (e.g., Belgium, Finland) while in 
others reinstatement is the rule (e.g., Austria, 
Estonia, Luxembourg, Czech Republic). Often, 
the decision about reinstatement is left to the 
worker. In some cases, firms may have to bear 
additional compensation in the absence of 
reinstatement (e.g., Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom, Slovakia). In some countries, firms 
have to both reinstate a worker and provide 
"back pay" (e.g., Italy, Portugal). In some 
countries, instead of additional compensation 
only "back pay" is required (e.g., Czech 
Republic, Greece, Ireland). "Back pay" is 
                                                          
(31) With few exceptions (Germany, Belgium, Greece), 
statutory severance payments are due without any 
consideration of the notice period. 
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capped in some countries (e.g., Czech 
Republic, Portugal, Ireland). 
EU countries exhibit a somewhat lower variation 
in terms of the legislation to deal with collective 
dismissals. In spite of differences, a series of 
common elements are found, which are inter-alia 
linked to the presence common EU principles to be 
followed in case of collective enshrined in EU 
Council Directives 75/129 and 98/59/EC. 
• Definition of collective dismissal. National 
laws generally refer to the minimum number of 
workers dismissed in a given period of time, 
most often linked to firm/plant size.  
• Notification and consultation procedures. In all 
EU countries, employers are required to inform 
and consult with workers' representatives when 
contemplating collective dismissals. 
Consultation most often concerns alternatives 
 
 
Box II.2.2: EU directives on collective dismissals and on fixed-term labour
Collective dismissals 
The Directive on collective redundancies (98/59/EC) provides that an employer which envisages collective 
redundancies must provide workers’ representatives with specified information concerning the proposed 
redundancies and must consult with the workers’ representatives in good time with a view to reaching an 
agreement. These consultations should cover ways of avoiding or of reducing the redundancies, and of 
mitigating their consequences by recourse to social accompanying measures aimed, in particular, at aid for 
redeployment and retraining of the redundant workers. The Directive also provides for the public authorities 
to be notified of any projected collective redundancies, and requires that these redundancies cannot take 
effect earlier than 30 days after this notification. 
Fixed-term labour 
The EU Council Directive 1999/70/EC is based on the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded 
by the EU representation of social partners (ETUC, UNICE, CEEP) and sets EU-wide principles to prevent 
the discrimination of fixed term workers and the abuse of  fixed-term contracts.  
According to the principle of non-discrimination, treating fixed-term workers in a less favourable manner 
than permanent workers solely because they have a fixed-term contract is forbidden, unless the difference in 
treatment can be justified on objective grounds. 
To prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts, the legislation on the 
individual labour contract of definite duration must have one or more of the following measures: 
• objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships;  
• the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts and relationships;  
• the number of renewals.  
In general, Member States can choose to introduce either objective reasons to justify renewals, or a 
maximum total duration or a maximum number of renewals of the fixed-term employment contract or 
relationship. 
The Directive on temporary agency work (2008/104/EC) aims to guarantee an effective protection to 
temporary workers while contributing to the development of the temporary work sector as a flexible option 
for employers. To be implemented by December 2011, it lays down the principle of non-discrimination, 
regarding the essential conditions of work and of employment, between temporary workers and workers 
who are recruited by the user company. 
Details on directives and their implementation are to be found at http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId 
=157&langId=en. 
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to redundancy and ways to mitigate its effect. 
In a majority of countries, the employer has 
also the obligation to draw up a social plan that 
may comprise both passive (subsidies to 
alleviate the hardship following dismissal) and 
active labour market policies (re-training,…). 
All EU countries also provide for the obligation 
of employers to notify the intention to operate 
collective dismissals to competent public 
authorities.  
• Dismissal selection and re-employment 
criteria. EU Directives require that the 
employers notify workers representatives the 
criteria followed for selecting employees to be 
dismissed. Various countries have also 
introduced mandatory criteria to be followed as 
a protective measure for workers (e.g., Estonia, 
Germany). In some countries, rules must be 
followed for the reinstatement of collectively 
dismissed workers when employers begin new 
hiring (e.g., Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, 
Slovakia, Slovenia). In some countries legally 
binding selection criteria for dismissals coexist 
with priority rules for re-employment (e.g., 
France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden).  
• Monetary costs. In most cases, the same 
severance payments provided for individual 
economic dismissal are also due in case of 
collective dismissal. In some countries, 
additional monetary compensations have to be 
provided by the employers (e.g., Belgium, 
Italy, Poland). In other countries, specific 
provisions are contained in the social plan (e.g., 
Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands). 
• The regulation of fixed term employment 
differs quite considerably across the EU, in 
spite of the presence of common EU principles. 
Following the EU Council Directive 
1990/70/EC on fixed term contracts, the 
legislation generally discipline at least one of 
three aspects of temporary contracts: (i) 
reasons justifying their use; (ii) maximum 
number of renewals (i.e. contracts with the 
same firm); (iii) maximum duration of 
successive fixed-term contracts. The legislation 
in Member States differs as to the way it 
regulates different combinations of these 
elements. 
• Reasons justifying fixed-term employment. In 
some countries there is no requirement to use 
fixed-term contracts only in pre-defined valid 
cases (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom,…), while others define only broadly 
the context for their use (e.g. Austria, Belgium, 
Italy,…). In some countries the legislation list 
instead specific reasons for hiring with fixed-
term contracts (e.g. Finland, France, 
Romania,…). In some countries, limits on 
renewal and the maximum cumulated period of 
fixed-term contracts depend on whether the use 
falls or not within pre-specified cases. 
• Renewal of fixed-term contracts. Some 
countries define a maximum number of 
renewals of fixed term contracts (generally 
between 2 and 4), while in others there is no 
upper bound on how many time the same 
worker can be offered a fixed-term contract. In 
those case, subsequent renewals generally 
imply a conversion to a permanent contract 
except in case of objective reasons (e.g., 
Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland). 
• Maximum cumulated number of fixed-term 
contracts. The cap on cumulated maximum 
duration may either absent or very long (e.g. 
Austria, Poland, Estonia) or rather short instead 
(between two and three years, e.g., France, 
Luxembourg, Spain). 
2.4. EPL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
2.4.1. Labour market impact 
EPL generally comprises both a "transfer" (e.g., 
severance payments from the employer to the 
employee) and a "deadweight loss" component 
(notably, procedural costs, long dispute settlement 
processes). While the deadweight loss component 
inevitably raises effective labour costs, thereby 
weighing not only on dismissal decisions but also 
on hiring, the transfer component of EPL may 
have neutral effects, but only under restrictive 
conditions, namely, provided wages are 
sufficiently flexible to compensate for the 
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insurance provided with firing restrictions (Bertola 
and Rogerson, 1997; Elmeskov et al., 1998). 
Strict employment protection goes especially to the 
detriment of the adjustment capacity of labour 
markets and may involve social costs. EPL reduces 
the likelihood that jobs are destroyed in the 
presence of shocks, but, by raising the effective 
cost of employment, it also dampens job creation. 
While the predicted effect on the unemployment 
rate of strict EPL is ambiguous, lower job 
destruction coupled with reduced creation are 
likely to translate into longer unemployment spells 
or into higher labour market segmentation, 
resulting from a high share of fixed-term job 
offers. 
Job market flows 
Economic theory demonstrates that employment 
protection reduces both job separations but also 
hiring. It has been shown by means of imperfect 
matching labour market models that, by increasing 
the firing costs borne by firms, EPL also reduces 
the present value of a filled job for the employer, 
thereby leading to lower job creation (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994; Bertola, 1999; Garibaldi, 1998).  
A number of existing empirical studies find 
evidence of a negative cross-country relationship 
between employment protection and flows in and 
out of unemployment. Among others, Garibaldi, 
Konings and Pissarides (1997) present data on job 
reallocation rates for 10 OECD countries, finding a 
negative correlation between job reallocation and 
employment protection. Gomez-Salvador, Messina 
and Vallanti (2004) find that EPL has a negative 
effect on the dynamics of job reallocation. Table 
II.A2.5 provides a summary of the results of 
selected empirical studies. 
New empirical work supports existing findings and 
helps qualifying them: 
Table II.2.2 displays correlation coefficients 
between indices of job market flows and OECD 
EPL indexes. Data on job market flows were 
constructed according to the methodology detailed 
in Arpaia and Curci (2009). The job finding rate 
appears to be negatively correlated with all 
indicators of EPL considered, and the relation is 
particularly strong for EPL for regular employment 
(notably with the sub-indicator encompassing the 
strictness of notice and severance pay 
requirements) and for EPL for collective 
dismissals.  
Graph II.2.2: Job finding rate and strictness of overall 
employment protection legislation, 2003-2007 
 
Source: Elaboration on OECD and LFS data 
Graph II.2.2 provides a visual representation of the 
cross-section relation between the overall EPL 
index and the job finding rate. The job separation 
rate is also negatively related with these two 
components of EPL, but exhibits a positive relation 
with the EPL indicator for fixed-term contracts. 
Graph II.2.3: Share of temporary workers in total 
unemployment and strictness of overall 
employment protection legislation, 2003-2007 
 
Source: OECD and EUROSTAT (LFS). 
Cross-country regression analysis controlling for 
time effects broadly confirm these findings. Table 
II.2.3 reports the results. Four different 
specifications of the regression model are 
considered, using alternative the overall EPL 
indicator, the sub-indicators for regular 
employment, collective dismissals, fixed-term 
contracts, and three sub-indictors for EPL for 
regular employment. As suggested by the 
correlations, the job finding rate has a stronger 
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relation with EPL than the job separation rate and 
EPL for regular employment and collective 
dismissal exhibits a significant negative relation 
with both job finding and job separation rates. The 
significance of the EPL indicator for regular 
contracts on both labour market flows appear to be 
associated especially with the impact of long 
notice periods and high severance payments, 
followed by the sub-indicator on difficulty of 
dismissal (taking into account trial period, the 
definition of fair dismissal, the implications of 
unfair dismissals, possibilities of reinstatement). 
Overall, the analysis of the data shows that higher 
EPL, notably for regular contracts and collective 
dismissals, appears to be robustly associated with 
lower job finding rates, less strongly with job 
destruction rates. The results also suggest that the 
aspects of EPL regulating notice and severance 
pay, appear to be the strongly linked to job finding 
rates. 
Unemployment rates 
Existing evidence concerning the link between 
employment protection legislation and the overall 
unemployment rate is not clear-cut. Economic 
theory predicts that strict employment protection 
regulations reduce flows out of and into 
unemployment, with ambiguous effects on overall 
unemployment. A majority of the empirical studies 
(such as Bertola, 1990; OECD, 1999; Blanchard 
and Portugal, 2001), do not find significant effects 
of EPL on unemployment. However, other studies, 
such as Lazear (1990), estimate a positive impact 
of employment protection on overall 
unemployment. 
Correlation and regression analysis presented in 
the Tables II.2.3 and II.2.4 broadly confirm the 
result that EPL is not significantly related with 
overall unemployment. Correlation and regression 
coefficients are non-significant, with the exception 
of the indicator of collective dismissal, which 
appears to be positively and significantly linked to 
overall unemployment. An explanation for this 
result is not straightforward, and requires further 
analysis aimed at disentangling the possible 
influence of omitted variables in explaining the 
cross-country variation in unemployment rates, an 
exercise which is beyond the scope of this note. 
Employment protection legislation however does 
affect the duration and the age composition of 
unemployment. Since job finding rates are lower 
with stricter EPL, also the average length of 
unemployment spells tend to become longer. The 
implication is that with strict EPL there is a higher 
risk of long-term unemployment (see e.g. OECD, 
2004) and a higher risk of unemployment for those 
that enter the labour market for the first time, 
namely the young. The correlation and regression 
analysis confirm the expectation for long-term 
unemployment, which appear to be positively 
 
Table II.2.3: Correlation coefficients between EPL indicators and measures of labour market performance, 18 EU Member 
States, 1999-2007 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overall 
EPL
EPL on regular 
contracts
EPL on 
temporary 
contracts
EPL on 
collective 
dismissal
Procedural 
inconvenience of 
dismissal
Notice and 
severance pay
Difficulty of 
dismissal
Job finding rate -0.1861 -0.2362 -0.0902 -0.2693 -0.0873 -0.3133 -0.1449
Job separation rate 0.083 -0.1146 0.1886 -0.1473 0.0196 -0.1901 -0.0937
Overall unemployment 0.1105 0.0064 0.1442 0.311 -0.0479 0.1371 -0.0891
Youth unemployment 0.2041 -0.0418 0.3012 0.3316 -0.1548 0.1219 -0.0813
Long-term unemployment 0.1774 0.2251 0.0934 0.4211 0.078 0.2158 0.2367
Share of temporary workers 0.6136*** 0.4178* 0.5402** -0.0477 0.3951 0.3371 0.2466
Job finding rate -0.1849**  -0.2280*** -0.0947 -0.2463*** -0.0538 -0.2852*** -0.1838**
Job separation rate 0.0527 -0.0882 0.1306 -0.1009 0.0656 -0.1605* -0.0984
Overall unemployment 0.1096 0.0085 0.1392* 0.3009*** -0.0446 0.1246 -0.0745
Youth unemployment 0.1964** -0.037 0.2825*** 0.3192*** -0.1448* 0.1078 -0.0655
Long-term unemployment 0.1358* 0.1273 0.0967 0.3190*** -0.0192 0.2077*** 0.0951
Share of temporary workers 0.5868*** 0.3929*** 0.5168*** -0.0633 0.3744*** 0.3174*** 0.2238***
Correlation of average values across countries
Correlation across the whole panel
 
(1) Sub-indices for regular contracts: Procedural inconvenience of dismissal procedural inconveniences (unweighted 
average of notification procedures and delay involved before notice can start). Notice and severance pay- Length of 
notice period and severance pay at 9 months, 4 years and 20 years of tenure (unweighted average). Difficulty of dismissal 
consequences of unfair dismissal (unweighted average of definition of justified dismissal, lenth of trial period, compensation 
following unfair dismissal, possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal, deadline to make a claim of unfair dismissal). 
Source:  
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linked with most EPL indicator, notably EPL for 
regular contracts (especially the sub-index 
summarising notice and severance payments) and 
collective dismissals. The youth unemployment 
rate appears instead to be positively linked 
especially with EPL for fixed-term contracts, a 
result that could be interpreted in light of the fact 
that the young are more likely to be hired on fixed 
term contracts than the old. 
Labour market segmentation 
Flexibility to hire with fixed-term contracts 
coupled with persistently high EPL for regular 
contracts may lead to increased segmentation of 
the labour market. As shown previously, reforms 
reducing the stringency of EPL since the nineties 
mainly concerned fixed-term contracts. This type 
of reforms is likely to entail “honeymoon” 
(transitory job creation) effects and a decline in 
productivity (see Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). The 
persistence of high EPL on regular contracts, 
however, may lead to a situation where job 
creation takes place mostly by means of temporary 
jobs. More importantly, the risk arises that the 
workers that are initially hired with temporary 
contracts cannot easily move into permanent jobs, 
i.e., that the labour market becomes segmented, 
with some workers having well-protected 
permanent jobs, and some workers being relegated 
to precarious employment. Furthermore, the high 
incidence of short-term contracts makes 
employment more volatile and prone to large 
fluctuations over the economic cycle, with 
employment variations concentrated. 
EPL for permanent contracts is correlated across 
countries with the incidence of temporary 
employment. As shown in Boeri (2011), there is a 
positive cross-section correlation between the 
share of temporary contracts in total employment 
and the strictness of EPL for permanent contracts. 
This evidence is confirmed in Graph II.2.3 and in 
Tables II.2.3 and II.2.4. Note that the relation 
between the share of temporary contracts and 
fixed-term employment is also positive, which is 
opposite of what one may expect. The result could 
be spurious, and mostly explained by the fact that 
EPL for regular and fixed-term contracts are 
correlated across countries (see Table II.2.2, so 
that the countries with higher EPL for fixed 
contracts have more fixed-term employed because 
permanent contracts are hardly offered due to high 
EPL for regular jobs).  
 
Table II.2.4: EPL and labour market performance 18 EU countries, 1999-2007 
Dependent variables
Explanatory variables
-0.013** 0.0003 0.563    2.322*** 2.550** 0.045***
[0.006] [0.0004] [0.364] [0.798] [1.246]     [0.005]
R-squared 0.068 0.008 0.031 0.054 0.032 0.364
-0.023*** -0.001** 0.278 -0.381 4.144*** 0.022***
[0.006] [0.0004] [0.316] [0.681] [1.317]     [0.003]
0.002 0.0007** 0.373 2.12*** 0.27 0.023***
[0.003] [.0003] [.24475] [0.523] [0.963] [0.005]
-0.024*** -0.0009* 1.606*** 3.537*** 7.246*** -0.001
[0.006] [0.0005] [0.410] [0.829] [1.315] [0.004]
R-squared 0.186 0.067 0.126 0.189 0.163 0.365
0.007 0.001** -0.025 -1.749 -2.288 0.023***
[0.006] [0.0004] [0.625] [1.348] [1.716] [0.005]
-0.013*** -0.0006* 0.674** 1.373** 2.861** 0.014***
[0.004] [0.0003] [0.257] [0.552] [1.158] [0.004]
Difficulty of dismissal -0.009 -.0009* -0.589 -0.07 1.795 -0.005
[0.008] [.0005] [0.615] [1.473] [2.013] [0.006]
R-squared 0.126 0.065 0.052 0.059 0.07 0.209
Overall EPL
EPL on regular contracts
EPL on temporary contracts
EPL on collective dismissal
Procedural inconvenience of 
dismissal
Notice and severance pay
Job finding rate
Overall of EPL 
Overall EPL  sub-indicators
EPL sub-indicators for regular employment
Share of temporary 
workers
Long-term 
unemployment ratioYouth unemployment Overall unemploymentJob separation rate
 
(1) Estimation method: cross-section regression including year effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. * Statistically 
significant at 10% level ** Statistically significant at 5% level *** Statistically significant at 10% level. Sub-indices for regular 
contracts: Procedural inconvenience of dismissal – procedural inconveniences (unweighted average of notification 
procedures and delay involved before notice can start). Notice and severance pay- Length of notice period and severance 
pay at 9 months, 4 years and 20 years of tenure (unweighted average). Difficulty of dismissal – consequences of unfair 
dismissal (unweighted average of definition of justified dismissal, lenth of trial period, compensation following unfair dismissal, 
possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal, deadline to make a claim of unfair dismissal). 
Source:  
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Table II.2.5: Share of temporary contracts and EPL reforms 
18 EU countries, 1983-2008 
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
-0.127*
[0.0509]
-0.00285+
[0.00162]
0.0120*
[0.00481]
Observations 342
Number of countries 18
R-squared 0.175
Change in share of temporary contracts 
on total employment
Lagged change in EPL index for 
temporary contracts
Log share of temporary contracts on 
total employment
Constant
 
(1) ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; specifications include 
country and year effects. Estimation method: Least Square 
Dummy Variables, standard errors robust with respect to 
heteroschedasticity and within country autocorrelation. 
Source: OECD and EUROSTAT (LFS). 
 
There is evidence that reductions in EPL for fixed-
term is associated with a more widespread use of 
fixed-term labour. This is interpretation is 
corroborated by the econometric evidence reported 
in Table II.2.5. The table reports results from a 
regressions putting in relation the change in the 
share of temporary contracts on total employment 
to EPL reforms for temporary contracts 
(corresponding to a negative change in the EPL 
index), taking into account country and time 
factors by means of fixed effects and the starting 
level of the incidence of temporary contracts. It 
turns out that after reforms reducing the 
restrictiveness of EPL, the share of temporary 
contracts in the total economy was reduced 
significantly on average across the sample. 
2.4.2. Impact on productivity growth and 
adjustment 
The economic literature has identified a number of 
channels through which EPL can affect 
productivity and, indirectly, economic growth. On 
the one hand, job security can foster human capital 
investments in firm-specific knowledge (e.g., Belot 
et al., 2007). This incentives to firm-specific 
human capital investments are likely to raise 
productivity. On the other hand, a series of 
channels suggest an opposite, negative effect of 
stringent EPL on productivity.  
• First, EPL may deter firms’ restructuring and 
the reallocation of labour, both voluntary and 
involuntary, towards fastest growing activities 
and sectors, thereby reducing overall 
productivity in level and growth rates (e.g., 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993). 
• Second, high EPL may discourage firms’ 
investments in innovative activities. Since this 
type of activities are risky, and since high EPL 
tend to shift lay-off risks onto the employers, 
high EPL could deter productivity growth due 
to a depressed innovative performance (e.g., 
Saint Paul, 2002).  
• Third, overly high EPL could lead to reduced 
productivity since well-protected workers may 
tend to provide less effort compared with less 
protected ones.  
• Finally, if asymmetric EPL for fixed term and 
temporary labour produces segmentation 
outcomes, productivity growth may suffer in 
light of the reduced incentives to invest in 
human capital by workers that find themselves 
trapped in precarious jobs (Booth et al 2002). 
Empirical analysis provides some support to the 
view that strict EPL can have negative 
implications for productivity growth. Although 
country-level studies are mostly inconclusive on 
the relation between alternative measures of 
productivity growth and EPL (e.g., Nickell and 
Layard, 1999), analyses using disaggregate data 
and exploiting identification strategies based on 
the presence of stricter EPL for part of the sample 
often find evidence supportive of the various 
channels through which EPL can affect 
productivity. Burgess et al. (2000) and Caballero et 
al. (2004) analyse sectoral data in cross-country 
panels and show that in countries with higher EPL 
inter-sectoral adjustment is slowed down. 
Bassanini et al. (2009) in a cross-country sectoral 
panel show that TFP growth tends to be lower in 
sectors where EPL is more likely to be binding. 
Autor et al. (2007) and Cingano et al. (2010) on, 
respectively, US and Italian data, support the view 
that firms with stronger EPL constraints also have 
a weaker EPL performance. Pierre and Scarpetta 
(2006) in a cross-country sample show that the 
firms that are the most innovative are also those 
being mostly negatively affected by EPL. Ichino 
and Riphahn (2005) and Riphahn (2004) provide 
evidence on the negative relation between EPL and 
workers effort.  
EPL coupled with flexibile working hours may 
help mitigating the employment impact of 
temporary shocks, but is also likely to hamper the 
Part II 
Thematic chapters 
 
93 
capacity of the economy to adjust to external 
imbalances. EPL coupled with flexibility of 
working hours helps mitigating the impact of 
temporary shocks to headcount employment, thus 
reducing the risk that transitory shocks produce 
longer-term effects. However, as long as EPL 
hampers the reallocation of labour, the necessary 
inter-sectoral adjustment that needs to take place 
between the tradable and the non-tradable sector 
during phases of adjustment to correct large 
current account imbalances is also slowed down. 
Moreover, to the extent that EPL increases the 
effective labour costs borne by the employers, 
excessively strict EPL may also translate into cost 
price competitiveness compared with trading 
partners. EPL reforms therefore may help 
adjustment not only by reducing obstacles to 
sectoral reallocation but also by bringing gains in 
terms of cost competitiveness in labour market 
setting where wages are rigid downward. 
 
Table II.2.6: Employment shift from non-tradables to 
tradables and EPL Insights from regressions 
analysis (6 EU countries, 1985-2008) 
Sample: Countries with average 
current account balance/GDP<-1%
Dependent variable: Delta log(E_tr_ntr)
Explanatory variables
Delta log(E_tr_ntr), 1 lag 0.1
[0.0549]
Log(E_tr_ntr), 1 lag -0.215**
[0.0322]
EPL, 1 lag -0.0229+
[0.00961]
Constant 0.0405+
[0.0162]
Observations 88
R-squared 0.355
Number of countries 6
 
(1) ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; the specifications include 
country and year fixed effects. Estimation method: Least 
Square Dummy Variables, standard errors robust with 
respect to heteroschedasticity and within country 
autocorrelation. Delta log(E_tr_ntr): growth rate in relative 
employment in tradable versus non tradable sectors. 
Tradables include manufacturing, agriculture and trade, 
transport and communication services. Non-tradables 
include the rest of market services and construction. 
Log(E_tr_ntr): log relative employment in tradable versus 
non tradable sectors. EPL: OECD indicator for overall 
employment protection legislation. The counties with 
average current account balance/GDP ratios below -1% 
over the period are as follows: Greece, Spain, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, United Kingdom.  
Source: OECD and EUROSTAT (National Accounts) 
 
The issue is not studied extensively in existing 
analyses, but a simple panel regressions support 
the view that EPL matters for the reallocation of 
labour between the tradable and the non tradable 
sector during the process of macroeconomic 
rebalancing. Table II.2.6 reports results of a 
regression analysis where the growth rate of the 
share of employment in the tradable and the non-
tradable sector is explained by the stringency of 
EPL. The specification includes country and time 
effects and takes into account the dynamics in the 
adjustment of relative sectoral employment. The 
expectation is that the share of employment in the 
tradable sector needs to grow in countries that are 
in the process of adjusting large current account 
deficits. The analysis is therefore run separately for 
EU countries with relatively high current account 
deficits over the sample period (larger than 1 per 
cent of GDP on average). In line with expectations, 
EPL turns out to have a significantly negative 
effect on labour reallocation towards tradables for 
these countries. 
2.5. IMPROVING THE DESIGN OF EPL 
2.5.1. Assessing reform needs 
The desirability and design of EPL reforms depend 
on the seriousness of the problems in the labour 
market, on current EPL settings, and on other 
relevant institutional framework conditions. It 
depends first and foremost on the extent and type 
of labour market malfunctions, on current EPL 
characteristics, institutions relevant for the 
implementation and enforcement of the EPL 
system, including the judiciary system, on other 
framework conditions, including other labour 
market institutions, notably the unemployment 
benefit and the wage setting system, the 
availability of short-term working schemes, and 
the framework for active labour market policies, 
which contribute to determine the effects of EPL 
on labour market outcomes and the feasibility of 
EPL reforms. 
Assessing whether labour market and 
macroeconomic performance can benefit from 
EPL reform requires analysing data on job market 
flows and unemployment composition. As shown 
previously, EPL is expected to produce effects 
especially in terms of reduced inflows and 
outflows in unemployment, and in terms of 
increased incidence of long-term unemployment. 
Constant monitoring of labour market flows is 
especially important to assess whether EPL 
strictness is producing undesired results.  
European Commission 
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EPL quantitative indicators provide a prima-facie 
assessment of EPL settings and permit cross-
country benchmarking. The available indexes 
measuring EPL strictness are an utmost useful 
instrument to evaluate the evolution of EPL 
legislation, perform cross-country comparisons, 
have a synthetic picture of the main EPL features. 
Regarding the bechmarking of EPL indexes across 
countries, alternative benchmarks could be 
considered. In addition to benchmarking against 
the EU average, a comparison against country 
groups presenting similarities in terms of 
flexicurity models and labour market institutions at 
large appears recommendable.  
The assessment of EPL characteristics should go 
beyond the comparison of quantitative indicators 
and dig into the specific provisions in the 
legislation. This is dictated by a number of 
reasons. First, EPL indicators are not immune from 
drawbacks, since not all aspects of the legislation 
can be easily codified and since there is a 
fundamental uncertainty on the weights to be 
attributed to different legislation elements when 
building synthetic indexes. The second 
fundamental reason is that only a satisfactory 
understanding of the legislation permits the 
identification of concrete paths for reforms. The 
third reason is that only a proper understanding of 
the legislation allows pinning down the reasons 
underlying a more or less satisfactory 
implementation and enforcement. 
The institutions that play a role in the 
implementation and enforcement of EPL also 
deserve scrutiny. EPL laws have direct 
implications by determining minimum 
requirements for employers to be respected when 
dismissing workers and also an indirect impact, by 
setting the starting point for dismissal conditions 
included in collective or individual labour 
contracts. Depending on the collective bargaining 
practice, countries with relatively flexible EPL 
legislation may be characterised by a de-facto 
relatively protected system, in that EPL standards 
more generous than those provided in the 
legislation may be included in collective contracts. 
At the opposite, the minimum requirements 
provided by the legislation may de-facto be lower, 
because enforcement of the legislation provision 
may be weak in some countries. A proper 
understanding of the functioning of the litigation 
system and of the judiciary in this respect is key, 
not only to assess whether EPL laws are actually 
enforced, but also to gauge the costs and the 
inefficiencies associated with the enforcement 
mechanism, and therefore with the overall EPL 
system. 
Evaluating the interaction of EPL with other 
labour market institutions is key to assess the 
impact of EPL on labour market outcomes and the 
feasibility of alternative avenues for reform. It was 
previously pointed out that the effects of EPL are 
mediated by other labour market institutions, 
notably wage setting institutions: if wages are 
sufficiently responsive, EPL would partly translate 
into moderate wage claims rather than into reduced 
job creation. Other institutions are key for the 
feasibility of EPL reforms. In particular, the 
absence of adequate social safety nets and 
unemployment insurance render major EPL 
reforms hardly feasible in the presence of weak 
cyclical conditions due to the social costs 
associated with increased risk of job destruction. 
Conversely, the presence of efficient ALMPs and 
employment services may reduce the risk of long-
term unemployment at given degree of EPL 
strictness, thereby reducing the urgency of a major 
EPL overhaul.  
2.5.2. Paths for desirable reforms 
There is no single way to reform EPL systems, but 
rather different reform paths that depend on 
country characteristics. The specific scope and 
direction of reform depends on the ranking of the 
labour market problems to be tackled, on the EPL 
features that can better contribute to pursue the 
reform objectives, on the need to address other 
institutions than strictly EPL to ensure 
effectiveness or feasibility.  
• Depending on the severity of economic 
challenges involved and on the prevailing 
policy settings, in some cases reforms in 
selected EPL aspects may be sufficient, while 
in others the EPL system needs to be more 
fundamentally re-thought.  
• Reforms may concern the EPL regime for new 
hires or affect also the regime of current 
employees. While reforms limited to new hires 
have the advantage of bringing benefits in 
terms of job creation while limiting the impact 
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on job destruction, their impact on sectoral 
reallocation is more limited. 
• In some cases, reforms to be effective or 
feasible cannot be confined to EPL only. For 
instance, in some countries reforming EPL 
requires also putting in place alternative 
insurance mechanism against increased risk of 
dismissal (e.g., strengthening unemployment 
insurance), while in others EPL should be 
accompanied by an attempt to improve the 
functioning of the judicial system in settling 
labour disputes. Support by social partners is 
functional to the effective implementation and 
social sustainability of ambitious EPL reforms. 
Countries having to reduce EPL for permanent 
contracts may have to follow different paths 
depending the main characteristics of their EPL 
regime. A series of specific considerations are in 
order: 
(i) EPL reforms for individual dismissals should 
aim at reducing deadweight costs associated with 
heavy procedures and lengthy and uncertain 
dispute settlement mechanisms following claims of 
unfair dismissal. As discussed previously, these 
deadweight costs are detrimental both to the 
employer and the employee, to different extents 
depending on the specific context. A number of 
reform measures, rather complementary than 
alternative, can be identified in those cases: 
• Lengthening the trial period. Excessively short 
trial periods may not permit sufficient 
monitoring of workers and raise the risk of 
disciplinary dismissals or economic dismissals 
for workers' unsuitability. As long as these 
dismissals are challenged in court, and dispute 
settlement is long and uncertain, costs may 
arise for both the employer and the employee.  
• Reducing the compensation due to workers in 
case of ascertained unfair dismissal and 
compared to that available irrespective of the 
reason for dismissal (other than disciplinary). A 
key factor determining the extent to which 
deadweight losses can impinge on EPL systems 
is whether compensations to the employee are 
mostly due only in case of unfair dismissal. If 
this is the case, the incentive for workers to 
appeal against dismissal is strong. Reforms in 
this direction could comprise re-defining the 
cases justifying the compulsory reinstatement 
of employees and their modalities. 
• Modifying the definition of unfair dismissal. In 
some cases, the definition of fair economic 
dismissal can be overly restrictive, thereby 
leading to frequent appeals on the part of 
workers, high settlement costs and a highly 
inefficient system of protection. In other cases 
the problem could lie in a highly discretionary 
role played by courts in judging economic 
dismissal cases in the presence of fair 
economic dismissals that are defined in 
relatively broad terms. (32) In this respect, a 
forward-looking definition of fair economic 
reason for dismissal making reference to the 
need for employers to cope not only with 
existing but also with forthcoming expected 
difficulties could make a difference. 
• Tackling procedural costs and delays and 
enhancing the efficiency of the dispute 
settlement system. In particular, incentives 
could be provided for parties to agree on pre-
trial settlements of disputes and fast-track 
procedures for labour trials could be 
introduced. 
(ii) Protection systems based on lengthy notice 
periods and high severance payments can also 
imply efficiency costs if not properly designed. 
The alternative of generously compensating 
workers irrespective of the specific reason for 
dismissal (other than disciplinary) is not free of 
costs either, since employers may find themselves 
liquidity-constrained during crisis period, when 
collective dismissals or frequent individual 
dismissals for economic reasons may imply high 
monetary dismissal payments concentrated in time. 
High severance payments growing with seniority 
can also imply reduced voluntary mobility for 
senior employees, aware of losing severance 
payments entitlements if moving to different 
employers. Overall, these costs may imply a 
relevant impact on labour market outcomes (which 
is confirmed by the high significance of the notice 
and severance payment EPL sub-indicator in the 
                                                          
(32) Ichino et al. (2003) show on Italian data that the distinction 
between disciplinary and objective is blurred by firms' 
perceptions about what constitutes a worker misbehaviour 
which changes over the cycle and the financial position of 
the firm. 
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empirical analysis) and on the adjustment capacity 
of the economy. Reforms could go in the following 
directions. 
• Improving the design of severance payments. 
Severance payments growing with seniority 
without limit may reduce voluntary mobility 
and imply unaffordable dismissal costs for 
established firms mostly employing permanent 
workers. The presence of caps to overall 
severance payments can help tackling this 
issue. Replacing notice periods for severance 
payments could also help mildening financial 
constraints.  
• Reforming the financing of severance 
payments. The financial constraints associated 
with the payment of large severance payment 
lump sums can be tackled by setting up funds 
regularly financed by a potentially large pool of 
employers that are activated when dismissals 
take place. Depending on the specific design of 
the fund, the system can involve a different 
degree of risk sharing and re-distribution across 
employers. Funds defining employee-specific 
individual severance payment accounts that are 
portable across employers (e.g., the system 
currently prevailing in Austria) have the 
additional advantage of encouraging voluntary 
job-to-job mobility. 
• In countries characterised by a segmentation 
problem reforms should bed aimed at aligning 
EPL conditions for regular and fixed-term 
contracts. In a number of EU countries the 
problem is not only or not fundamentally that 
of avoiding excessively strict or inefficient 
EPL for individual contracts, but reducing the 
large asymmetry between EPL for permanent 
and fixed-term contracts, with a view to tackle 
the associated segmentation of the labour 
market. A number of Country –Specific 
Recommendations were issued in 2011 in the 
framework of the EU semester to countries 
with a need to labour market segmentation 
(Slovenia, Spain, France, Italy). 
• Sequencing reforms. As discussed previously, 
reform action aimed at improving job creation 
in a number of EU countries took place in 
terms of enhanced entry flexibility, mostly in 
terms of reduced requirements for the use of 
fixed-term contracts and higher availability of 
flexible contractual forms. The consequence of 
the piece-meal reform strategy was to create 
employment at the expense of an increased 
degree of labour market segmentation. The 
experience of these countries is useful for the 
design of reform strategies looking forward: in 
absence of appropriate reforms concerning exit 
flexibility, the risk is that flexibilisation of 
entry alone results into segmented labour 
markets. 
• Defining priorities. In some countries (e.g., 
Spain), the analysis of EPL settings suggests 
that segmentation is not so much the outcome 
of very flexible EPL for fixed-term contracts. 
For these countries, the origin of segmentation 
may lie in the regime for EPL for regular 
contracts. However, the way the legislation on 
fixed term contracts is applied and enforced 
can also play a role. (33) The high incidence of 
fixed-term contracts in other countries (e.g., 
Poland) may instead be mainly linked to a 
history of a relatively flexible regime for fixed-
term contracts. 
• The debate on the single contract. For countries 
with segmented labour markets it has been 
emphasized in the recent debate the desirability 
of a “single” labour contract. (34) Although 
there is no unique single-contract definition 
and proposals in the debate differ quite 
substantially, the broad aim of the introduction 
of a single labour contract is that of better 
aligning EPL for permanent and fixed contracts 
while at the same time reducing the number 
and typology of available fixed term contracts. 
The radical application of the idea of a single 
contract would foresee a unique labour 
contract, with a degree of protection designed 
in such a way to grow over time, replacing 
                                                          
(33) A typical example is that of Spain, whose EPL index for 
fixed-term contracts rank high in light of relatively strict 
limit of the renewal and maximum cumulated periods with 
for the use of fixed-term contracts. However, for years the 
maximum number of fixed-term contract renewals applied 
to single undertakings, with the implication of the same 
worker possibly receiving a large number of consecutive 
fixed-term contracts within the same group, as long as 
different firms appear as counterparts. The 2010 Spain EPL 
reform has tackled this issue by applying the maximum 
number of fixed term contract renewals at group rather than 
firm level. 
(34) See, e.g., Cahuc and Kramarz (2004), Boeri and Garibaldi 
(2008), Andrés et al. (2009), Bentolila (2010). 
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existing permanent and fixed term contract 
typologies. Despite being often advocated as a 
desirable instrument to tackle segmentation, 
reforms introducing a “strictu-sensu” single 
contract have not been carried out yet, notably 
in light of the opposition by social partners to 
the elimination of available fixed term contract 
typologies or to the substantial “flexibilisation” 
of regular employment. Recent reforms 
aligning the conditions for permanent and 
fixed-term contracts have nonetheless taken 
place, notably in Portugal and Spain. (35) 
In countries with low labour market participation 
of second earners, young, or old-age workers, EPL 
reforms may contemplate easing conditions for 
fixed-term contracts. In some countries that 
situation is, quite the opposite, one where a strict 
regulation of fixed-term contracts risks deterring 
employment and labour participation for categories 
of workers more likely to benefit from temporary 
employment opportunities. Romania for instance 
has recently taken steps to reform the Labour Code 
with a view to increase the opportunities for fixed-
term employment. Lithuania received a Country-
Specific Recommendation aimed at fostering 
reforms capable of triggering a better use of 
temporary contracts.  
The particularly precarious employment situation 
for the youth in some countries requires revisiting 
the system of labour contracts system with a view 
to improve the school-to-work transition. In 
particular, the development of apprenticeship 
labour contracts combining work with training 
could be an effective instrument to ease labour 
market entry for the youth, as shown by the 
successful experience of a number of countries 
(e.g. Austria, Germany, the Netherlands…). 
Apprenticeship contracts offer the advantage of 
providing marketable skills to young workers 
while at the same time giving incentives to firms 
that retain the workforce on which they have made 
an investment in terms of training. Fiscal 
incentives can play a role in stimulating the supply 
of apprenticeships. However, the effectiveness of 
apprenticeship contracts in bridging the gap 
between school and permanent employment 
requires that apprenticeships are not only 
                                                          
(35) See, e.g., Turrini (2011) on the way the recent programme 
of EPL reforms in Portugal contribute to align conditions 
for permanent and fixed-term contracts. 
motivated by the purpose of receiving lower 
taxation, but that are part of a genuine long-term 
strategy to recruit and train the workforce. In this 
respect, the role of social partners is key for the 
effective design and implementation of 
apprenticeship contracts. 
In countries facing major labour market 
challenges, the reform of the EPL needs to be 
sufficiently ambitious and embedded in a wide-
ranging reform action with a view to improve not 
only the capacity of the economy to create jobs but 
also growth and adjustment prospects. A number 
of EU countries facing challenges linked to low 
potential growth (Italy, Portugal, Greece), high 
unemployment (Spain, Greece), and to the 
correction of accumulated current account 
imbalances (Greece, Spain, Portugal) have recently 
taken action or are in the process of taking action 
to ambitiously reforming the EPL system (see 
Chapter 4 of this report) in conjunction with other 
aspects of the labour market. Countries facing 
major labour market challenges and having to put 
in place an adequate structural reform package to 
improve the growth potential and ease adjustment 
will also have to find the right balance between 
EPL reform elements only concerning new hires 
(which permit to limit the job destruction impact of 
the reform) and elements extending to current 
employees with a view to foster labour mobility 
and ease sectoral relocation. In Portugal, the recent 
reform of severance payments extends to current 
employees without reducing matured entitlements. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
EU countries differ considerably in their EPL 
systems. Differences concern not only the degree 
of strictness of EPL, but also the composition of 
the available instruments to provide protection to 
workers against dismissal. Differences are 
remarkable for the protection of regular labour 
contracts, but non-negligible differences are found 
also in terms of regulations for fixed-term 
contracts. Further analysis could be useful to 
assess to what extent these large differences are 
among the factors that underlie the very different 
response of EU labour markets to the crisis. 
EPL affects labour market outcomes notably by 
reducing not only job destruction but also and most 
notably job creation. Sclerotic labour markets 
European Commission 
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linked to excessively high EPL are not necessarily 
associated with higher overall unemployment rates 
but tend to be characterised by a higher incidence 
of long-term unemployment and by higher 
unemployment rates for the young. Segmentation 
of the labour market between workers with 
temporary and permanent contracts is also a 
typical outcome of strict EPL for open-ended 
contracts especially if coupled with flexible 
regimes for fixed-term contracts.  
The impact of EPL is not limited to labour market 
outcomes. By affecting the extent to which labour 
can easily be re-allocated across firms and 
industries, EPL has indirect effects on productivity 
and then economic growth and on the capacity of 
the economy to adjust with a view to correct 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
The assessment of reform needs is helped by an 
indicator-based approach but has to go beyond and 
look into labour market performance and 
legislation aspects, including implementation and 
enforcement. Quantitative EPL indicators provide 
a useful prima-facie gauge of EPL strictness and 
features and permit cross-country benchmarking. 
However, a proper assessment of reform priorities 
needs to go beyond and to take into account a 
number of aspects: 
• The extent to which the performance of labour 
markets appears to exhibit typical malfunctions 
associated with overly strict EPL should be 
evaluated by looking not only at 
unemployment rates, but also at data on labour 
market flows. Theory and empirical evidence 
shows that EPL produces its main effects on 
labour market dynamics. In this respect, 
availability of data on job finding and job 
separation rates and on transitions between 
fixed and permanent contracts is key. 
• The implementation and enforcement aspect of 
EPL, including the working of dispute 
settlement systems and the judiciary 
framework, should be looked at, as well as the 
way the legislation interacts with practice 
followed in collective and individual contracts. 
• The effectiveness of and feasibility of EPL 
reforms need also to be evaluated in 
conjunction with other labour market 
institutions, notably the unemployment benefit 
system, the wage setting system, the 
availability of short-term working schemes, 
and the framework for Active Labour Market 
Policies. 
• There is no single way to reform EPL systems, 
but rather different reform paths that depend on 
country characteristics. The specific scope and 
direction of reform depends on the ranking of 
the labour market problems to be tackled, on 
the EPL features that can better contribute to 
pursue the reform objectives, on the need to 
address other institutions than strictly EPL to 
ensure effectiveness or feasibility. Depending 
on the severity of economic challenges 
involved and on the prevailing policy settings, 
in some cases reforms in selected EPL aspects 
may be sufficient, while in others the EPL 
system needs to be more fundamentally re-
considered. Support by social partners is 
functional to the effective implementation and 
social sustainability of ambitious EPL reforms. 
• Depending on the organisation of EPL systems, 
some countries may have mostly to reform the 
definition of admissible dismissals, the 
implications of unfair dismissal or the dispute 
settlement mechanism, while others may have 
to focus on the magnitude, design and 
financing of severance payments. 
• For countries with segmentation problems the 
priority may be to align the protection for 
permanent contracts with that of fixed-term 
contracts, while keeping an overall EPL system 
compatible with job creation and a dynamic 
labour market. 
• The serious youth unemployment problem in 
some countries require the strengthening of 
contractual forms easing the transition from 
school to work, including well-designed 
apprenticeship systems. 
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A1.1. OPERATIONALISING THE DIRECTION OF 
LABOUR MARKET REFORMS 
Reforms potentially leading to better employment 
outcomes (henceforth employment-friendly 
reforms) reducing taxation on labour, regulations, 
generosity of out-of-work support, and improving 
incentives to supply labour and labour market 
matching are distinguished as follows.  
Labour Taxation 
• Social security contributions (SSCs): enacted 
measures decrease SSCs for employers and/or 
for employees. 
• Level of labour income taxation: enacted 
measures decrease the rate of labour income 
taxation and its coverage. 
• Progressivity of labour income taxation: 
enacted measures make labour income taxation 
less progressive. 
 
Unemployment Benefits 
• Unemployment insurance: enacted measures 
decrease the generosity (replacement rate, 
coverage, duration) of the unemployment 
insurance benefits or tighten eligibility 
conditions/job availability requirements. 
• Unemployment assistance: enacted measures 
decrease the generosity (replacement rate, 
coverage, duration) of the unemployment 
assistance benefits or tighten eligibility 
conditions/job availability requirements. 
 
Other benefits 
• In-work benefits: enacted measures decrease 
the generosity (level, coverage, duration) of in-
work benefits, tighten the eligibility, remove or 
decrease the possibility to cumulate them with 
other benefits or wages. 
• Other benefits (means-tested benefits, sickness, 
and family-related schemes): enacted measures 
decrease the generosity (level, coverage, 
duration) or tighten the eligibility conditions 
for other benefits. 
Active Labour Market Policies 
• Public employment services (PESs): enacted 
measures enhance the effectiveness of PESs 
and its services. 
• Direct job creation and employment subsidies: 
enacted measures increase the availability of 
direct job creation schemes and the generosity 
of the incentives to hire vulnerable groups. 
• Training and Special Schemes: enacted 
measures enhance the quality and frequency of 
the provided training. 
 
Employment Protection Legislation 
• Permanent contracts: enacted measures loosen 
the definition of/conditions for dismissals, 
decrease the notice period duration and the 
level of severance payments, increase the trial 
period, or reduce the procedural requirements 
for dismissals under permanent contracts. 
• Temporary contracts: enacted measures 
increase the maximum cumulated duration of 
fixed-term and temporary contracts and the 
maximum number of renewals, or loosen the 
definition of the cases where fixed-term and 
temporary contracts can be used. 
 
Pensions, Early retirement, and disability schemes 
• Contributions: enacted measures decrease the 
level of contributions for the pension/disability 
schemes. 
• Eligibility conditions: enacted measures 
decrease the coverage or tighten the eligibility 
conditions for pension/early retirement/ 
disability benefits. 
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• Pensions - Retirement age: enacted measures 
increase retirement age and penalties/age for 
early retirement schemes. 
• Pensions – Entitlements: enacted measures 
decrease the amount of pension benefits and 
allowances, or increase the taxation of pension 
benefits. 
 
Wage Bargaining Framework 
• Statutory and contractual minimum wages and 
collective minimum via tripartite agreements: 
enacted measures decrease statutory and 
contractual minimum wages/ tripartite 
agreements decrease the indicative wage 
threshold for lower level wage negotiations 
beyond past records, or remove/decrease non-
wage emoluments. 
• Government interventions, tripartite 
agreements, and other measures on wage-
bargaining mechanism: enacted measures, 
governmental interventions or tripartite 
agreements:  
− decrease the bargaining coverage or 
(automatic) extension of collective agreements. 
− reform the bargaining system in a less 
centralized way, for instance by removing or 
limiting the "favourability principle", or 
introducing/extending the possibility to 
derogate from higher level agreements or to 
negotiate firm-level agreements. 
− result in an overall reduction in the wage-
setting power of trade unions. 
• Performance-related pay: enacted measures 
increase the share of the variable component 
(dependent on workers' 
productivity/performance) on employees' wage 
or the share of firm's profits and bonus. 
 
Working Time Organization 
• Flexible working time arrangements: enacted 
measures increase working time, decrease the 
payment of extra hours, make working hours 
more flexible, introduce or extend schemes of 
banks of hours/hours off instead of overtime 
pay, or encourage the use of part-time 
contracts. 
• Participation-friendly schemes: enacted 
measures extend training, sabbatical or 
educational leaves, allow for longer/more 
generous maternity/paternity/parental leave or 
leave for employees that have a sick relative, 
improve reconciliation of family and work life, 
or promote the creation of kindergarten and 
taking hours off to take care of the children. 
 
Immigration and Labour-Mobility Policies 
• Immigration: enacted measures reduce barriers 
to immigration, the quotas for immigrants with 
specific professional background, or improve 
the immigrants' integration through education 
and initial support. 
• Labour mobility: enacted measures increase 
support for geographical labour mobility within 
the country. 
If the measures present the characteristics listed 
above, a negative score, arbitrarily normalised to -
1 is assigned, if the effects of the measure go in the 
opposite direction, score 1 is assigned. In a few 
cases, if the direction of the reform is ambiguous 
or not easily classifiable on the basis of the above 
criteria, score 0 is assigned. The algebraic sum of 
the direction scores in a given domain or field, in a 
given country, in a given year, provides a synthetic 
gauge of the reform stance. 
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A1.2. DIRECTIONS OF REFORMS BY POLICY 
DOMAIN AND COUNTRY 
Graph II.A1.1: Direction of active labour market policy 
reforms by country (average yearly frequency 
over the 2000-2010 period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
 
Graph II.A1.2: Direction of early withdrawal reforms by 
country (average yearly frequency over the 
2000-2010 period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
 
Graph II.A1.3: Direction of job protection reforms by country 
(average yearly frequency over the 2000-2010 
period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
 
Graph II.A1.4: Direction labour taxation reforms by country 
(average yearly frequency over the 2000-2010 
period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
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Graph II.A1.5: Direction of other welfare benefit reforms by 
country (average yearly frequency over the 
2000-2010 period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
 
Graph II.A1.6: Direction of unemployment benefit reforms by 
country (average yearly frequency over the 
2000-2010 period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
 
Graph II.A1.7: Direction of wage setting reforms by 
country(average yearly frequency over the 
2000-2010 period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
 
Graph II.A1.8: Direction of working time reforms by country 
(average yearly frequency over the 2000-2010 
period) 
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Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
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Graph II.A2.1: Benchmarking employment protection regulation, main EPL sub-indicators 
 
Source: OECD. 
APPENDIX 2 
Macroeconomic implications of EPL 
 
108 
  
 
Graph II.A2.1: Benchmarking employment protection regulation, main EPL sub-indicators - continued 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
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Graph II.A2.1: Benchmarking employment protection regulation, main EPL sub-indicators - continued 
 
 
(1) Legend:  
epl_reg – EPL for regular employment  
epl_temp – EPL for temporary contracts  
epl_dis – EPL, additional requirements for collective dismissals 
Source: OECD. 
European Commission 
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Graph II.A2.2: Benchmarking employment protection regulation for individual dismissals, EPL sub-indicators for regular 
employment 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
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Graph II.A2.2: Benchmarking employment protection regulation for individual dismissals, EPL sub-indicators for regular 
employment, continued 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
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Graph II.A2.2: Benchmarking employment protection regulation for individual dismissals, EPL sub-indicators for regular 
employment, continued 
 
 
 
(1) Legend:   
un_dis_def - definition of justified or unfair dismissal 
trial_per - length of trial period 
pro_inconv - procedural inconveniences (unweighted average of notification procedures and delay involved before notice 
can start) 
not_sev4 - Length of notice period and severance pay at 9 months and at 4 years of tenure (unweighted average) 
not_sev20 - Length of notice period and severance pay at 20 years of tenure (unweighted average) 
un_dis_con - consequences of unfair dismissal (unweighted average of compensation following unfair dismissal and possibility 
of reinstatement following unfair dismissal) 
Source: OECD. 
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Table II.A2.1: Notice periods and severance pay for individual dismissals at three lengths of service, 2008 
9 months 4 years 20 years 9 months 4 years 20 years
Austria Blue collar 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Austria White collar
1.4 2.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium Blue collar 1.2 1.2 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium White collar
3.0 3.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic All workers 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic Economic: Redundancy cases 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Denmark Blue collar 0.7 1.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark White collar 3.0 4.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 3.0
Estonia Liquidation of firm 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
Estonia Economic: Redundancy
2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
Estonia Personal: Unsuitability 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Finland All workers
0.5 1.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France All workers 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.8 6.7
Germany Personal reasons 0.9 1.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Germany Economic: Operational reasons 0.9 1.0 7.0 0.4 2.0 10.0
Greece Blue collar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 4.0
Greece White collar 1.0 3.0 16.0 0.5 1.5 8.0
Hungary All workers
1.0 1.2 3.0 0.0 1.0 5.0
Ireland All workers 0.2 0.5 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ireland Economic: Redundancy cases
0.5 0.5 1.8 0.0 0.8 3.8
Italy Blue collar 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy White collar 0.5 2.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg All workers 2.0 2.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 6.0
Netherlands Termination via PES 1.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands Termination via court 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 18.0
Poland All workers
1.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portugal All workers 0.5 1.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 20.0
Slovak Republic All workers
2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 3.0
Slovenia Economic reasons 1.0 1.0 2.5 0.0 0.8 6.7
Slovenia Personal: Incapacity
1.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.8 6.7
Spain All workers 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 3.5 17.0
Sweden All workers 1.0 3.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom All workers 0.2 0.9 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom Economic: Redundancy cases 0.2 0.9 2.8 0.0 0.9 4.6
Notice period Severance pay
 
Source: OECD. 
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Table II.A2.2: Conditions under which individual dismissals are fair or unfair, 2008 
Legal provisions Score
Austria Fair: dismissals for “serious reason”, including non-performance or lack of competence, and for operational reasons or other business needs. In the case of dismissal for operation 
reasons, the court may examine whether dismissal was actually necessary or whether it would have been possible to transfer the worker to another post.
Unfair: “socially unjustified” dismissals (which would affect the dismissed employee more unfavourably than other comparable employees of the company, or which would impair the 
interests of the employee to a greater degree than the interest of the firm in dissolving the employment relationship); and dismissals on inadmissible motive (e.g. discrimination, trade 
union activity or imminent military service). Employers intending to terminate older workers‟ contracts with a tenure of more than 2 years have to take social aspects into account if it 
appears to be difficult for such workers to get another job.
1
Belgium Unfair: for blue collar workers, dismissals for reasons which have no connection whatsoever with the capability or conduct of the worker or which are not based on the operational 
needs of the undertaking, establishment or department. For white collar workers, the concept of abusive dismissal does not exist in regulation and one will refer to the general concept 
of abuse right. The right to lay off must be exerted for an aim for which it was granted, namely the interest of the company. Also unfair are dismissals of workers on maternity or 
educational leave, and trade union and works council delegates.
0
Fair: Dismissals for failure to meet performance requirements and for reasons of technological and organisational change. 0
Unfair: Dismissals based on discrimination (age, sex, colour, religion, union membership, etc.).
Denmark Fair: Lack of competence and economic redundancy are legitimate reasons. 0
Unfair: Dismissals founded on arbitrary circumstances” (blue collar workers) or “not reasonably based on the employee‟s or the company‟s circumstances”. Dismissals based on race, 
religion, national origin, etc. and as a result of a corporate take-over are also unfair.
Estonia Fair: decrease in work volume, reorganisation of production or work, liquidation or bankruptcy of business, unsuitability of employee for work, unsatisfactory performance, breach of 
duties, corruption, loss of trust, long term incapacity, employee has reached retirement age. In the case of redundancy, employer is required to offer another position to the employee if 
possible. The employer should also give preference when laying off workers to retaining employee representatives, workers with better results, those with occupational diseases or 
injuries sustained while working for the employer, workers with the longest tenure, with dependents or those engaging in education or training to increase their productivity.
2
Finland Fair: Dismissals are justified for “specific serious reasons”, including personal characteristics and urgent business needs. Dismissals for economic and personal reasons are valid only 
if employees cannot be reasonably, in view of their skills and abilities, transferred or retrained. Unfair: Dismissals for an employee‟s illness, participation in a strike, union activities and 
political or religious views.
2
France Fair: Dismissals for real and serious cause: for personal characteristics such as non-performance or lack of competence, or for economic reasons. In case of dismissal for economic 
reasons, the employer must take account of certain criteria (such as social characteristics, family responsibilities, professional qualifications). The employee is given priority when 
rehiring in the year following dismissal.
2
Unfair: Dismissals without a real and serious cause. In case of employee illness or dismissals for economic reasons, the employer must attempt to find another position for the 
employee.
Null: Dismissals for reasons relating to the private life of the employee, based on discrimination or following harassment.
Germany Fair: Dismissals based on factors inherent in the personal characteristics or behaviour of the employee (such as insufficient skill or capability), or business needs and compelling 
operational reasons.
2
Unfair: Dismissals where the employee can be retained in another capacity within the same establishment or enterprise, and redundancy dismissals where due account has not been 
taken of “social considerations” (e.g. seniority, age, alimony). Rehabilitation must already have been attempted before the dismissal, or the dismissal is considered unfair.
Greece The termination of an employment contracts according to Greek law is a unilateral, non-causative legal act, except for those cases stipulated otherwise by law (e.g. dismissal of 
employee representatives, recent mothers, or for reasons of pregnancy or discrimination). The definition of fair or unfair (abusive) dismissal is based on case law. Generally, dismissals 
for non-performance of business needs are considered fair. In larger companies, dismissals have to be a "last resort" possibly only after exhaustion of oral and written warnings, pay 
reductions and suspensions, and after consultation with employer representatives.
0.5
Hungary A regular employment contract may be lawfully terminated: (a) by mutual consent of the employer and employee; (b) by ordinary notice (e.g. for reasons in connection with the 
employer‟s operations); (c) by extraordinary notice (where the employee has seriously violated key obligations under the employment relationship deliberately or by serious 
carelessness or otherwise acts in such a way that makes it impossible to sustain the employment relationship); or (d) with immediate effect during the trial period. A termination is 
regarded as unfair/unlawful if it is not undertaken according to the cases mentioned above.
0
Ireland Fair: Dismissals for lack of ability, competence or qualifications, conduct, or redundancy. Unfair: Dismissals reflecting discrimination on grounds of race, religion, age, gender, etc., 
including when these factors bias selection during redundancies. Exercise or proposed exercise of rights under carer‟s leave, maternity leave, parental leave, adoption leave or 
minimum wage legislation.
0
Italy Fair: Termination of contract only possible for “just cause” or “just motive”, including significant non-performance of the employee, and compelling business reasons.
Unfair: Dismissals reflecting discrimination on grounds of race, religion, gender, trade union activity, etc.
0
Luxem-bourg Fair: Dismissal is fair if it is based on serious misconduct; worker capability; economic needs of the business. In assessing the conduct of the employee in unfair dismissal cases, 
judges take into account education, work histories, social status and elements affecting the employee's responsibility and consequences of dismissal.
1
Nethe-rlands Fair: Dismissals on grounds of employee conduct or unsuitability, and for economic redundancy. In the latter case, data on the financial state of the company and proof that alternatives 
to redundancy have been considered must be given, and the selection of dismissed employees be justified (age/sex balance of the workforce, for example). Unfair: Unfair are “obviously 
unreasonable” terminations, and dismissals of pregnant women, the disabled, new mothers and works council members.
1.5
Poland Fair: Dismissals based on factors inherent in the employee (e.g. lack of competence) or on economic grounds of redundancy of the job. 0
Portugal Fair: Dismissals are permitted for economic grounds and for lack of professional or technical capability. Dismissals for individual redundancy must not involve posts also manned by 
people on fixed-term contracts. Dismissals for lack of competence are only possible after introduction of new technology or change to job functions.
Unfair: Where the grounds for dismissal are irregular (where some of the formalities are not followed) or illegal (where the grounds for dismissal are declared unfounded by a judge or 
which lack fundamental procedural aspects).
2
Slovak Republic Fair: An employer may only give notice for the reasons specified in the Labour Code (e.g. personal reasons: continual minor breaches of work discipline or unsatisfactory work results – 
redundancy, economic or organisational reasons).
0
Unfair: An employer cannot give notice for other reasons, such as discrimination, etc.
Slovenia Fair: Cancellation is legitimate if there exists a justified reason for cancellation which prevents continued work under the conditions from the employment contract.
Unfair: Cancellation is not valid if it is: discriminatory, made owing to a threat or deception by the employer or for an unjustified reason. Unjustified reasons for regular cancellation are 
deemed to be: temporary absence from work due to illness or injury, parental leave or to care for family members; participating in legal proceedings against the employer; participation 
in union activities outside working hours; participation in union activities during working hours in agreement with the employer; participation in legal strike action; being a worker 
representative; change of employer; discrimination based on race, nationality or ethnic origin, skin colour, gender, age, disability, marital status, family obligations, pregnancy, religious 
and political beliefs, national or social background; taking part in military or civil service.
2
Spain Fair: Dismissal based on objective grounds, including economic grounds, absenteeism, lack of adequacy for the job, lack of adaption to technological changes made in the enterprise 
after, if appropriate, a training course of three months, and lack of funding of public plans or programmes developed by the public administration or non-profit organisations.
2
Unfair dismissal: dismissals where none of the above-mentioned grounds is proven. Null and void: dismissals based on discrimination or carried out with violation of fundamental rights, 
as well as those based on situations derived from maternity (pregnancy, birth, feeding, childcare, etc.).
Sweden Fair: Dismissals on “ objective grounds”, i.e. economic redundancy and personal circumstances, including lack of competence. In the case of lesser capability because of (e.g.) age, 
disease, etc., the employer has to try to adjust the workplace, rehabilitate the employee or transfer the employee to other suitable work. According to case law, it is only fair dismissal if 
the employee has a "permanent reduction of the working capacity which is so considerable that the employee no more can be expected to perform work of any significance with the 
employer". In cases of redundancy, selection of workers to be dismissed has to be justified (mainly based on last-in, first-out principle).
Unfair: Objective grounds are deemed not to exist if an employee could reasonably have been transferred to another work, or if dismissal is based on events that happened over two 
months ago.
2
Fair: Dismissals relating to the capability, qualifications or conduct of the employee; because he/she is redundant; because continued employment would be illegal; or some other 
“substantial reason”. One year tenure generally necessary for being able to file for unfair dismissal.
0
Unfair: Dismissals related to a range of reasons including trade union activity, health and safety whistle blowing, pregnancy or maternity, and the national minimum wage. No qualifying 
service required for complaints for these reasons
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
 
Source: OECD. 
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Table II.A2.3: Trial period, 2008 
Legal provisions
Length 
(mths)
Austria Usually 1 month 1
Belgium Not legally required, but when introduced in the employment contract, minimum and maximum duration is 
set by law. Blue collar workers: 7-14 days; white collar workers: 1-6 months (up to 12 months if annual salary 
exceeds 34 261 EUR (2008) or 35 638 EUR (2009).
3.3
Czech Republic 3 months. 3
Denmark Blue collar: 9 months (based on collective agreements). White collar: 12 months. 10.5
Estonia A probationary period shall not exceed 4 months 4
Finland 4 months. 4
France Contracts of indefinite duration can include trial periods of two months, (three months for supervisors and 
technicians and four months for managers). The trial period can be renewed once by agreement to a 
maximum, including renewal, of four months (six months for supervisors and technicians and eight months 
for managers).
4
Germany 6 months. 6
Greece 2 months. 2
Hungary Maximum 3 months. 3
Ireland All workers: 12 months (shorter trial periods are commonly agreed between employer and employee, but 
claims under statutory unfair dismissal legislation are not normally possible until after the periods shown). 
The 12 month limit does not apply in certain dismissal situations e.g. pregnancy, exercise or contemplated 
exercise of rights under maternity, adoptive, parental or carer‟s leave legislation, for trade union activity or 
rights under minimum wage legislation.
12
Italy Blue collar: 1-2 weeks (the trial periods cited are those common in collective agreements). White collar: 3-8 
weeks.
0.8
Luxembourg The maximum length of the trial period for a contract of unlimited duration is 6 months. 6
Netherlands All workers: 1 month for contract of < 2 years duration; 2 months for contract of >2 years duration. 2
Poland All workers: Minimum 2 weeks. Ranging up to 3 months. 1.8
Portugal 180 days for general workers (240 days for managers and senior officers/top executives). 3
Slovak Republic A probationary period for the maximum of three months may be agreed in writing in an employment 
contract. A probationary period may not be prolonged.
3
Slovenia Probation can last a maximum of six months. It can be extended in the event of temporary absence from 
work. Unsuccessful completion of probation is a reason for extraordinary cancellation (without notice).
6
Spain In accordance with provisions of collective agreements. If there is no provision on this matter, this period 
may not be longer than six months for qualified experts, nine months for senior managers on indefinite 
contracts or two months for other workers (three months in enterprises with less than 25 workers).
2.5
Sweden All workers: Probationary period limited to a maximum of 6 months trial; does not exclude claim for 
damages. Deviation possible by collective agreement.
3
United Kingdom Trial periods are for agreement between employer and employee, but do not affect the employee‟s 
statutory employment rights. Claims under unfair dismissal legislation are not normally possible until 1 
year‟s service has been completed.
12
 
Source: OECD. 
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Table II.A2.4: Compensation pay and related provisions following unjustified dismissal, 2008 
Typical 
compensation 
at 20 years tenure 
(months)
Extent of 
reinstatement 
(scale 0-3)
Austria The employee has the right to choose between reinstatement and compensation, although this option is rarely taken up by employees. In the event of socially 
unjustified dismissal, the employee is entitled to compensation equal to earnings between the dismissal and the legal settlement of the case. Sums earned by 
the employee in the interim are set off against the award.
6 3
Belgium No right to reinstatement. Compensation at least equal to the notice period (in the event that notice was not given).
White collar: additional compensation for damages as determined by a judge.
Blue collar: additional compensation for damages corresponding to six months‟ wages.
14 0
Czech 
Republic
Reinstatement is always available to the employee. Unfair dismissal gives rise to a right to reinstatement. If reinstatement is not accepted by both parties, 
compensation is through severance pay and award of lost earnings during the court case (up to 6 months). Sums earned by the employee in the interim are set 
off against the award. There is no maximum amount for compensation.
8 3
Denmark Reinstatement orders are possible but rare (the possibility of reinstatement was introduced in the Main Agreement in 1981 - blue collar workers - but until now 
there have been only a few decisions in which a tribunal decided that the dismissed employee should be reinstated - Section 61 of the Labour code). For blue 
collar workers, compensation is limited to 52 weeks of pay for long service cases. Average is 10.5 weeks according to Danish Confederation of Trade Unions. 
For white collar workers, compensation depends on age and seniority with the firm and is increasing in both (maximum is 6 months for older than 30 with more 
than 15 years tenure).
9 1
Estonia If termination of an employment contract is declared unlawful, an employee has the right to reclaim his or her former job or position. In such a case, a labour 
dispute resolution body shall make a decision on reinstatement of the employee in his or her former job or position. Compensation up to six months wages, 
subject to the circumstances of the employment contract and the nature of the offence upon termination of the employment contract.
6 3
Finland No reinstatement. Compensation between 3 and 24 months. The following factors must be taken into account when determining the amount of compensation: 
estimated time without employment, estimated loss of earnings, duration of the employment relationship, and degree of guilt found on the side of employer. The 
highest compensations are used only in cases of gross injustice.
14 0
France The option of reinstatement is available to the employee in cases of discriminatory dismissal only. Compensation in addition to regular severance pay of six 
months minimum (generally 12-24 months, can be more) for employees with at least two years of tenure and working in enterprises with more than 11 
employees. For employees with less than two years of service and/or working in a firm with fewer than 11 workers, the judge an order compensation according 
to the loss suffered, but without any minimum.
16 0
Germany Reinstatement is possible, although rarely taken up by the employee concerned. Compensation of up to 12 months, depending on length of service (15 months if 
aged under 50 and tenure >15 years, 18 months if aged over 55 and tenure >20). Compensation must be requested by employee or employer during court 
action; continuation of employment must be unreasonable for one of the parties. In some cases, additional liability for wages from the expiry date of the notice to 
the conclusion of the court hearing.
18 1.5
Greece Frequent reinstatement orders, accompanied by indemnity for the period of time between notice of termination and court ruling. No reinstatement, if severance 
pay has been requested. Compensation through regular severance pay, plus a sum equal to earnings between the dismissal and the legal settlement of the 
case. According to case law, any dismissal not justified by the employer's legitimate business interests is deemed to constitute unfair dismissal and is rendered 
null and void. The consequence of nullity in cases of unfair dismissal is that the contract of employment is deemed to have continued to exist without interruption 
(hence, no legal imposition of reinstatement is necessary) and the employer is obliged to pay the employee the remuneration due for the whole of the intervening 
period since the date of the nullified termination.
6 2
Hungary If a court of law declares that the employment was illegally terminated, the employee shall be reinstated to the original position if he/she requests. At the 
employer‟s request, the court may refrain from reinstating the employee to the original position provided that the employer pays compensation. In lieu of 
reinstatement, the court shall order (upon weighing all circumstances, in particular the unlawful action and its consequences) the employer to pay no less than 
two and no more than twelve months‟ average earnings to the employee.
10 2
Ireland A reinstatement order, with back pay from the date of dismissal, is possible. Also re-engagement from date after date of dismissal with no back pay from date of 
dismissal also possible. Deciding body must specify why re-instatement/re-engagement not applied if compensation awarded. In 2007, reinstatement was 
ordered in one case and re-engagement was ordered in four cases. Maximum compensation equals 104 weeks‟ pay. Compensation awards based on financial 
loss. Maximum 4 weeks‟ award where no loss established. (Average Employment Appeals Tribunal award in 2007 was 7280 EUR.)
24 1
Italy The option of reinstatement is fairly often made available to the employee. Workers in companies employing >15 employees in an establishment or in the same 
municipality or in companies with more than 60 employees (even if distributed in production units or municipalities with less than 15 employees) can choose 
reinstatement or financial compensation of 15 months‟ (plus at least 5 months‟ compensation for the period between dismissal and court decision in both 
cases). For establishments not included in the above cases, the employer can choose between re-employment (different from reinstatement because it does not 
give rise to compensation for the period between dismissal and the court decision) and compensation of 2.5-6 months (depending on seniority and firm size). 
This can be increased up to 10 months > 10 years, and 14 months >20 years seniority.
15 2
Luxem-
bourg
When ruling on unfair dismissal, judges may request that the employee is reinstated. If the employer does not want to reinstate the employee, the employer can 
pay additional compensation of one months‟ salary. If the dismissal is found to be unfair, the employer may be required to pay damages to the employee. In 
determining the amount of damages, the court will consider a period which should have been sufficient for the employee to find a new job (typically 4-6 months). 
The dismissed employee must demonstrate that he/she has taken necessary steps to find a new job. The court also takes into account various factors such as 
seniority, age and family situation.
5 3
Nethe-
rlands
The option of reinstatement is rarely made available to the employee. Termination via PES: The employee can file a claim at the court for unfair dismissal. If the 
court comes to the conclusion that the dismissal was unfair it usually grants financial compensation according to the same formula for severance pay minus the 
salary paid during the processing time of the CWI and during the notice period. Termination via court: If the court thinks that termination is unfair, but upholds the 
contract as not feasible, then the correction factor will be more than one. Recent research documents the average compensation for dissolving a contract is 
equivalent to about seven months‟ pay.
7 1
Poland Reinstatement is possible, but not often made available by the court. Compensation of up to 3 months‟ wages depending on amount of salary earned in another 
job by the time of court decision.
3 1
Portugal Irregular dismissal: no reinstatement available. No back pay, no reinstatement, only right to compensation of 7.5-22.5 days of pay per year of service (typically up 
to 15 days per year of service). Illegal dismissal: The option of reinstatement is made available to the employee, although the employer may, in companies with 
up to nine workers, or in the case of directors or workers in management positions, submit a request to the court to oppose reinstatement. Back pay limited to 
one year (where court takes longer to rule on the issue, the State bears costs), and choice between reinstatement and compensation, typically of one months‟ 
pay per year of service (minimum payment of 3 months).
15 2
Slovak 
Republic
In the event that an employer gave an invalid notice to an employee and the employee notified the employer that he insists on further employment, his 
employment relationship does not terminate, except in the case when a court decides that the employer cannot be fairly required to further continue employing 
the employee. Compulsory compensation for unfair dismissal equal to 12 monthly wages. If an employer does not allow the employee to work or if a law suit in 
respect of unfair dismissal takes longer than 12 months, further compensation is to be determined by the courts.
12 2.5
Slovenia If the courts determines that the employer's cancellation is not legitimate, but the worker does not wish to continue the employment, it may, on the proposal of 
the worker: determine the duration of the employment; grant a period of tenure and other rights from the employment relationship; and award appropriate 
monetary compensation. If the court determines that the continuation of the employment is no longer possible, it may still adopt the same decision, irrespective 
of the worker's proposal. If there is no reinstatement, the court may grant the worker tenure and other rights from the employment relationship and appropriate 
monetary compensation up to a maximum amount of 18 months of average wages paid in the last three months prior to dismissal.
18 2
Spain In the case of unfair dismissal, the employer can choose between reinstatement with back pay (the wages for the period going from the dismissal to the final 
decision by the courts, if that stage is reached) and compensation with back pay (45 days wages per year of seniority with a maximum of 42 months wages) with 
back pay. Where the dismissed employee is a legal representative of the workers or a union delegate, the employee can choose between reinstatement and 
compensation. If the dismissal was discriminatory, the worker should always be reinstated. For new permanent contracts after 1997 (aimed at young and 
disadvantaged workers: 16-28, over 45, fixed-term employees, long-term unemployed, women where they are under-represented) compensation is fixed in 33 
days per year of service, with a maximum of 24 months pay.
22 0
Sweden Courts may order reinstatement or damages, plus a sum equal to earnings between the dismissal and the legal settlement of the case. The option of 
reinstatement is rarely made available to the employee. If employer refuses to comply with reinstatement, damages are payable on the scale: 16 months <5 
years; 24 months <10 years; 32 months >10 years.
32 1
United 
Kingdom
Employers are not obliged to reinstate but if a tribunal orders reinstatement or re-engagement in a comparable job and the employer refuses to comply, the 
tribunal may make an additional award on top of the basic and compensatory awards. Compensation may consist of various elements: basic award (up to 7 800 
GBP); compensatory award (up to 53 500 GBP); and additional awards (up to 13 520 GBP). Unlimited, if the dismissal is connected with health and safety 
matters or whistle blowing. Compensation under discrimination legislation is also unlimited.
8 1
 
Source: OECD. 
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Table II.A2.5: Effects of EPL on labour market performance: evidence from existing literature 
Author(s) Sample Effects of EPL
Belot and van Ours (2004) 17 OECD countries, 1960-1999 Insignificant effect on the unemployment rate
Negative effect on flows into unemployment
Positive effect on unemployment duration
Insignificant effect on unemployment
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) 20 OECD countries, 1960-1995 Positive effect on unemployment
Boeri (2011) All OECD countries, 2008 Positive correlation with share of temporary 
employment
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta 
(1998) 19 OECD countries, 1983-1995 Positive effect on unemployment
Garibaldi, Konings and 
Pissarides (1997) 10 OECD countries Negative correlation with job reallocation
Gomez-Salvador, Messina and 
Vallanti  (2004) 13 EU countries, 1992-2001 Negative effect on job flows
Grubb and Wells (1993) 11 EU countries, 1989 EPL for regular workers increases temporary work
No significant effect on aggregate unemployment 
Positive effect on female and youth unemployment
Lazear (1990) 22 countries, 1956-1984 Positive effect of severance pay on unemployment
Nickell and Layard (1999) 20 countries, 1983-88 and 1989-94 Insignificant effect on unemployment
Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel 
(2005) 20 OECD countries, 1961-1995 Positive effect on unemployment persistence
Insignificant effect on unemployment
Negative effect on prime-age male unemployment 
rate
Positive effect on share of self-employment
Negative effect on flows into unemployment
Negative effect on flows out unemployment
Positive effect on long-term unemployment
OECD (2004) 19 OECD countries, 1985-2002
Blanchard and Portugal  (2001) 19 OECD countries, 1985-1994
Heckman and Pagés (2000) 43 countries
OECD (1999) 19 OECD countries, 1985-1997
 
Source:  
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Belgium 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10614 10708 10796 10892 10989 0.9 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7008 7073 7126 7177 7220 0.6 %
(% of total population) 66.0 66.1 66.0 65.9 65.7 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4701 4747 4769 4856 4817 -0.8 %
Male 2595 2609 2609 2649 2623 -1.0 %
Female 2106 2138 2159 2207 2194 -0.6 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 67.1 67.1 66.9 67.7 66.7 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 33.9 33.4 32.4 32.5 32.0 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.3 85.7 85.6 86.3 84.7 -1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 35.9 36.1 37.2 39.2 40.3 1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 67.5 67.4 67.3 67.9 67.2 -0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 63.3 64.3 63.1 65.1 62.9 -2.2 pps
Male 73.6 73.3 72.8 73.4 72.3 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 36.1 36.0 34.9 35.2 34.1 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.5 92.3 91.8 92.2 90.7 -1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 44.4 44.5 45.2 47.6 47.8 0.2 pps
Female 60.4 60.8 60.9 61.8 61.1 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 31.6 30.8 29.9 29.8 29.8 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.0 79.0 79.2 80.4 78.7 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 27.5 27.9 29.3 30.9 33.0 2.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 62.0 62.4 61.6 62.0 61.9 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 27.5 27.4 25.3 25.2 26.0 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.7 80.5 79.8 80.0 79.3 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 34.4 34.5 35.2 37.3 38.7 1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 40.5 39.7 38.6 39.1 38.4 -0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 65.9 67.0 65.4 65.7 65.6 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 83.6 83.0 81.9 81.9 82.0 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 57.2 57.4 56.6 56.7 56.4 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.6 0.3 pps
Male 68.7 68.6 67.2 67.4 67.1 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 29.9 29.7 27.4 27.3 27.7 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.0 87.0 85.7 85.5 84.9 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 42.9 42.8 42.9 45.6 46.0 0.4 pps
Female 55.3 56.2 56.0 56.5 56.7 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 25.0 25.0 23.2 23.1 24.2 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.3 73.8 73.8 74.4 73.8 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 26.0 26.3 27.7 29.2 31.6 2.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4348.1 4413.7 4389.4 4450.6 4470.5 0.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.7 1.8 -0.2 0.7 1.4 0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.7 1.5 -0.6 1.4 0.4 -0.9 pps
Male 2.1 0.7 -1.4 1.1 0.1 -1.0 pps
Female 3.5 2.5 0.5 1.7 0.9 -0.8 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 13.1 12.7 13.2 13.0 12.8 -0.2 pps
Male 9.2 8.9 9.2 9.0 9.0 -0.1 pps
Female 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.8 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 8.6 8.3 8.2 8.1 8.9 0.8 pps
Male 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.7 7.7 1.0 pps
Female 10.8 10.2 10.2 9.6 10.3 0.7 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 21.9 22.4 23.2 23.7 24.7 1.0 pps
Male 7.1 7.5 8.2 8.4 9.2 0.8 pps
Female 40.5 40.8 41.4 42.1 43.3 1.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.5 7.0 7.9 8.3 7.2 -1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 18.8 18.0 21.9 22.4 18.7 -3.7 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.8 6.3 7.1 7.6 6.6 -1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 4.2 4.4 5.1 4.6 4.0 -0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 13.0 12.5 13.7 15.4 14.1 -1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.6 7.0 8.1 8.2 6.8 -1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.8 3.6 4.5 4.5 3.8 -0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.8 6.3 7.1 7.5 6.3 -1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 15.5 14.2 16.2 16.4 15.6 -0.8 pps
Male 6.7 6.5 7.8 8.1 7.1 -1.0 pps
Female 8.5 7.6 8.1 8.5 7.2 -1.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 50.4 47.5 44.2 48.8 48.4 -0.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.1 40.8 40.8 41.2 41.4 0.5 %
Male 41.9 41.7 41.7 42.1 42.4 0.7 %
Female 39.4 39.0 39.2 39.5 39.4 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -2.1 -2.9 -4.8 -4.2 0.6 pps
Building and construction 3.6 2.6 0.7 0.7 2.0 1.3 pps
Services 2.1 2.5 -0.3 1.3 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -0.1 -4.8 -3.6 -0.5 3.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.4 3.6 1.2 1.4 3.1 1.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.0 1.4 -0.1 -0.4 1.1 1.5 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.2 3.5 3.9 3.3 2.8 -0.5 pps
Wage and salaries 4.6 5.4 0.2 1.9 4.7 2.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.2 -0.8 -2.6 1.7 0.4 -1.3 pps
2010-2011
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Bulgaria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 7673 7640 7607 7564 7505 -0.8 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 5198 5169 5122 5046 4970 -1.5 %
(% of total population) 67.7 67.7 67.3 66.7 66.2 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3448 3505 3442 3356 3279 -2.3 %
Male 1820 1859 1828 1775 1723 -2.9 %
Female 1628 1646 1614 1582 1556 -1.6 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 66.3 67.8 67.2 66.5 66.0 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 28.9 30.1 29.5 28.9 27.4 -1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 85.5 84.3 83.4 82.4 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 45.7 48.7 49.2 47.9 48.3 0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.3 67.8 67.2 66.5 66.0 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 70.6 72.5 72.0 70.8 69.6 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 31.7 34.0 34.0 33.4 31.5 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.5 88.8 88.0 86.3 84.6 -1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 55.3 58.7 57.4 55.7 55.3 -0.4 pps
Female 62.1 63.1 62.5 62.3 62.4 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 26.0 26.1 24.8 24.2 23.0 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.4 82.1 80.6 80.5 80.2 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 37.2 40.2 42.1 41.3 42.4 1.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 61.7 64.0 62.6 59.7 58.5 -1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 24.5 26.3 24.8 22.2 20.1 -2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.4 81.3 79.2 75.7 74.0 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 42.6 46.0 46.1 43.5 43.9 0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 30.6 32.9 32.3 28.5 26.6 -1.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 70.6 72.7 70.0 66.0 64.5 -1.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 84.6 86.1 85.5 83.3 82.1 -1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.6 63.9 62.5 59.6 58.5 -1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 66.0 68.5 66.9 63.0 60.9 -2.1 pps
Young (15-24) 27.1 29.3 28.0 25.4 22.8 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.5 84.7 82.7 77.9 75.0 -2.9 pps
Older (55-64) 51.8 55.8 54.1 50.3 49.9 -0.4 pps
Female 57.6 59.5 58.3 56.4 56.2 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 21.8 23.1 21.4 18.9 17.2 -1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.2 77.9 75.8 73.6 73.0 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 34.5 37.7 39.2 37.7 38.8 1.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3208.8 3306.2 3204.8 3010.4 2908.3 -3.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.2 2.6 -2.6 -4.7 -4.2 0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 4.5 3.0 -3.1 -6.1 -3.4 2.7 pps
Male 4.6 3.2 -3.2 -7.0 -4.5 2.5 pps
Female 4.3 2.8 -2.9 -5.0 -2.2 2.8 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.9 10.9 11.2 11.5 10.9 -0.6 pps
Male 7.3 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.0 -0.3 pps
Female 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.9 -0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.1 -0.3 pps
Male 4.8 5.5 5.1 5.0 4.5 -0.5 pps
Female 5.4 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.7 -0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 0.0 pps
Male 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.0 0.0 pps
Female 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 0.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3 11.3 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 15.1 12.7 16.2 23.2 26.6 3.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.1 4.8 6.0 9.2 10.3 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 6.8 5.5 6.3 9.3 9.1 -0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 18.0 14.9 15.8 23.1 27.1 4.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.8 4.5 6.2 9.7 10.4 0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.4 2.3 2.9 4.5 5.0 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.9 5.7 6.9 10.3 11.3 1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 6.5 5.5 6.9 10.8 12.3 1.5 pps
Female 7.4 5.8 6.7 9.6 10.1 0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 58.9 51.6 43.1 46.4 56.1 9.7 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.4 41.4 40.7 40.9 40.6 -0.7 %
Male 41.9 41.8 41.0 41.1 40.8 -0.7 %
Female 40.9 40.9 40.3 40.6 40.4 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : 1.9 -0.9 -3.7 -3.7 0.0 pps
Building and construction 17.7 18.4 -8.9 -17.7 -9.2 8.5 pps
Services 3.3 5.3 0.7 -0.6 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : : : : : : pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 12.7 16.3 9.4 11.2 7.3 -3.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 3.2 7.3 4.9 8.2 2.2 -6.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 17.9 19.7 13.4 9.1 10.6 1.5 pps
Wage and salaries 20.7 16.2 8.3 7.4 1.9 -5.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.2 3.5 -2.9 5.3 6.1 0.8 pps
2010-2011
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Czech Republic 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10320 10422 10499 10522 10546 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7347 7410 7431 7400 7345 -0.7 %
(% of total population) 71.2 71.1 70.8 70.3 69.6 -0.7 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 5132 5163 5209 5192 5180 -0.2 %
Male 2888 2922 2952 2943 2922 -0.7 %
Female 2244 2241 2257 2249 2258 0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 69.9 69.7 70.1 70.2 70.5 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 31.9 31.1 31.8 30.9 30.1 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 87.3 87.7 87.8 88.0 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 48.2 49.5 49.6 49.7 50.6 0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 69.7 69.6 70.0 70.1 70.4 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 81.5 77.0 77.4 78.1 77.1 -1.1 pps
Male 78.1 78.1 78.5 78.6 78.7 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 36.7 35.9 37.3 36.2 35.6 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 95.0 94.8 95.1 95.5 95.3 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 62.5 64.2 63.1 62.4 62.6 0.2 pps
Female 61.5 61.0 61.5 61.5 62.2 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 26.9 26.1 26.1 25.3 24.2 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.3 79.6 79.9 79.8 80.4 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 35.2 36.1 37.2 38.0 39.4 1.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 66.1 66.6 65.4 65.0 65.7 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 28.5 28.1 26.5 25.2 24.7 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.5 83.8 82.5 82.2 82.8 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 46.0 47.6 46.8 46.5 47.6 1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 24.2 24.1 22.8 22.0 21.4 -0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 72.6 73.1 71.3 70.4 71.0 0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 84.0 83.2 82.0 81.0 81.0 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.4 65.8 64.4 64.0 64.7 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 pps
Male 74.8 75.4 73.8 73.5 74.0 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 32.8 32.4 31.1 29.6 29.2 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.7 92.1 90.5 90.5 90.9 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 59.6 61.9 59.6 58.4 58.9 0.5 pps
Female 57.3 57.6 56.7 56.3 57.2 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 23.9 23.5 21.7 20.6 19.9 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.9 75.2 74.1 73.4 74.3 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 33.5 34.4 35.0 35.5 37.2 1.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4855.9 4933.5 4857.2 4809.6 4827.8 0.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.1 2.3 -1.2 -1.7 0.3 2.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.8 1.6 -1.5 -1.0 0.4 1.4 pps
Male 2.2 2.0 -1.5 -0.9 -0.1 0.8 pps
Female 1.3 1.1 -1.6 -1.1 1.0 2.1 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 15.4 15.2 15.9 16.8 17.2 0.4 pps
Male 11.3 11.2 11.5 12.1 12.2 0.0 pps
Female 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.0 0.4 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 7.8 7.2 7.5 8.2 8.0 -0.2 pps
Male 6.5 5.7 6.1 6.8 6.7 -0.1 pps
Female 9.4 9.1 9.3 9.8 9.5 -0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 4.4 4.3 4.8 5.1 4.7 -0.4 pps
Male 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.8 -0.4 pps
Female 7.9 7.8 8.5 9.1 8.5 -0.6 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 6.7 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 10.7 9.9 16.6 18.3 18.0 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.8 4.0 6.0 6.4 5.9 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 4.6 3.9 5.7 6.5 5.8 -0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 20.4 19.4 24.4 25.3 24.7 -0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.7 3.7 6.2 7.0 6.5 -0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.8 2.9 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 5.4 4.4 6.8 7.4 6.8 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.6 3.7 5.8 4.6 5.7 1.1 pps
Male 4.2 3.5 5.8 6.4 5.8 -0.6 pps
Female 6.7 5.6 7.7 8.4 7.9 -0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 52.3 49.3 30.1 41.0 40.6 -0.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.3 42.3 41.6 41.6 41.4 -0.5 %
Male 43.6 43.6 42.9 42.8 42.6 -0.5 %
Female 40.4 40.3 39.8 39.9 39.6 -0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : 2.2 -2.4 -9.8 -2.8 7.0 pps
Building and construction 4.3 3.6 4.2 -2.1 -3.6 -1.5 pps
Services 3.3 3.0 1.6 -0.7 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 1.1 -9.5 -1.3 0.9 2.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 6.3 4.2 -1.2 3.7 1.6 -2.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.8 2.2 -3.1 5.6 2.3 -3.2 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 8.3 6.6 5.1 2.6 3.6 1.0 pps
Wage and salaries 8.3 7.5 -2.1 -0.4 1.1 1.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.5 0.8 -3.5 4.5 1.4 -3.1 pps
2010-2011
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Denmark 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 5438 5485 5517 5542 5566 0.4 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3582 3605 3616 3619 3613 -0.1 %
(% of total population) 65.9 65.7 65.5 65.3 64.9 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2869 2908 2901 2872 2864 -0.3 %
Male 1513 1533 1524 1507 1498 -0.5 %
Female 1356 1374 1377 1365 1366 0.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 80.1 80.7 80.2 79.4 79.3 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 70.6 72.2 70.9 67.5 67.1 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.9 89.9 89.4 88.7 88.2 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 61.0 59.9 60.7 61.8 63.2 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 80.9 81.3 80.6 79.8 79.8 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 66.8 70.3 74.6 72.8 72.5 -0.3 pps
Male 83.7 84.3 83.6 82.6 82.3 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 72.0 72.8 71.7 67.5 67.1 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.3 93.3 92.2 92.0 91.5 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 66.9 66.8 68.1 67.8 68.3 0.5 pps
Female 76.4 77.0 76.8 76.0 76.1 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 69.1 71.5 70.0 67.4 67.1 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.3 86.4 86.5 85.3 84.7 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 55.1 53.0 53.5 55.9 58.0 2.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 77.0 77.9 75.3 73.3 73.1 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 65.3 66.4 62.5 58.1 57.5 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.1 87.5 84.7 82.8 82.3 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 58.9 58.4 58.2 58.4 59.6 1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 64.5 65.8 62.3 58.6 57.7 -0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 81.5 81.7 78.7 77.6 77.4 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.1 88.4 86.7 85.4 85.5 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 73.3 74.1 71.4 69.4 68.8 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.4 0.4 pps
Male 80.8 81.6 78.0 75.6 75.9 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 66.5 67.4 62.2 56.7 56.6 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.8 91.0 86.9 85.3 85.7 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 64.9 65.2 64.8 63.3 63.8 0.5 pps
Female 73.2 74.1 72.7 71.1 70.4 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 64.0 65.3 62.8 59.5 58.5 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.3 84.0 82.5 80.3 78.9 -1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 52.9 51.5 51.7 53.7 55.3 1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2758.7 2806.7 2724.1 2654.0 2643.1 -0.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.8 1.7 -2.4 -2.3 -0.4 1.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)
-0.1 1.7 -2.9 -2.6 -0.4 2.2 pps
Male -0.3 1.6 -4.2 -3.0 0.2 3.2 pps
Female 0.1 1.8 -1.5 -2.1 -1.1 1.0 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 8.0 8.0 8.6 8.4 8.4 0.0 pps
Male 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.0 6.1 0.0 pps
Female 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 9.0 8.5 8.7 8.5 8.9 0.4 pps
Male 7.7 7.6 7.8 8.1 8.3 0.2 pps
Female 10.3 9.4 9.6 8.8 9.4 0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 23.0 23.8 25.2 25.6 25.1 -0.5 pps
Male 12.4 13.3 14.3 14.0 14.2 0.2 pps
Female 35.1 35.6 37.2 38.1 37.0 -1.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 3.8 3.4 6.0 7.5 7.6 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 7.5 8.0 11.8 14.0 14.2 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.2 2.7 5.4 6.7 6.8 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 3.4 2.6 4.1 5.5 5.7 0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 5.7 5.5 9.3 11.3 11.6 0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 3.0 2.8 5.6 6.9 6.8 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.0 2.3 3.7 4.8 5.3 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.5 3.2 5.8 7.1 7.1 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.2 8.7 11.8 15.0 16.5 1.5 pps
Male 3.4 3.2 6.6 8.4 7.7 -0.7 pps
Female 4.2 3.7 5.3 6.5 7.5 1.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 16.1 13.5 9.5 20.2 24.4 4.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.3 39.1 39.1 39.5 39.8 0.8 %
Male 40.5 40.4 40.3 40.8 41.1 0.7 %
Female 37.2 37.1 37.3 37.6 37.8 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : 0.0 1.4 -2.7 -1.4 1.3 pps
Building and construction 4.3 1.0 -10.3 -6.3 0.0 6.3 pps
Services 2.9 2.9 -3.1 -2.9 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 1.9 -10.0 -7.3 -0.9 6.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.6 3.5 1.8 2.7 1.6 -1.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.3 -0.7 0.8 -1.2 0.8 2.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.4 3.7 2.8 3.1 2.8 -0.3 pps
Wage and salaries 6.5 5.8 -0.4 -0.7 1.3 2.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) -1.1 -2.4 -3.5 3.6 1.2 -2.4 pps
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Germany 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 81363 81265 80967 80760 80806 0.1 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 54229 54066 53763 53546 53730 0.3 %
(% of total population) 66.7 66.5 66.4 66.3 66.5 0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 40992 41032 41030 41015 41474 1.1 %
Male 22313 22313 22232 22175 22329 0.7 %
Female 18679 18719 18798 18839 19145 1.6 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 75.6 75.9 76.3 76.6 77.2 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 51.5 52.2 51.8 51.3 52.5 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.2 87.0 87.1 87.3 87.7 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 57.2 58.7 61.0 62.5 64.0 1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 76.7 77.0 77.4 77.7 78.3 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 66.8 66.8 67.5 67.5 68.4 0.9 pps
Male 81.7 82.0 82.2 82.3 82.5 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 54.0 54.7 54.3 53.7 54.8 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.8 93.5 93.2 93.1 93.1 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 65.8 67.2 69.3 70.8 71.7 0.9 pps
Female 69.4 69.7 70.4 70.8 71.8 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 49.0 49.5 49.2 48.9 50.0 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.6 80.5 81.0 81.3 82.1 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 48.9 50.5 52.9 54.5 56.7 2.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 69.0 70.1 70.3 71.1 72.5 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 45.4 46.6 46.0 46.2 47.9 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.3 80.9 80.8 81.5 82.8 1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 51.3 53.7 56.1 57.7 59.9 2.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 44.8 45.6 45.3 45.4 46.5 1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 73.1 74.0 73.9 74.7 75.8 1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.3 85.7 86.3 86.7 87.6 0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.0 64.0 64.1 64.9 66.0 1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.6 0.3 pps
Male 74.7 75.8 75.4 76.0 77.3 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 47.2 48.7 47.5 47.9 49.7 1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.4 87.1 86.1 86.5 87.7 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 59.4 61.7 63.8 65.0 67.0 1.9 pps
Female 63.2 64.3 65.2 66.1 67.7 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 43.5 44.5 44.4 44.6 46.1 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.0 74.7 75.4 76.3 77.8 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 43.4 46.0 48.6 50.5 53.0 2.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 37397.2 37902.3 37807.8 38072.7 38979.3 2.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.7 1.2 0.1 0.6 1.4 0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.1 1.4 -0.2 0.7 2.4 1.7 pps
Male 1.9 1.2 -1.1 0.4 2.2 1.8 pps
Female 2.3 1.5 0.8 1.1 2.6 1.6 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.5 10.3 10.5 10.5 10.5 0.0 pps
Male 7.2 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.1 0.0 pps
Female 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 14.7 14.8 14.6 14.7 14.8 0.1 pps
Male 14.7 14.7 14.4 14.5 14.6 0.1 pps
Female 14.7 14.8 14.8 15.0 14.9 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 25.4 25.1 25.3 25.5 25.7 0.2 pps
Male 8.5 8.3 8.6 8.7 9.0 0.3 pps
Female 45.6 45.2 44.9 45.0 45.1 0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.7 7.5 7.8 7.1 5.9 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 11.9 10.6 11.2 9.9 8.6 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.9 7.0 7.3 6.7 5.5 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 10.3 8.5 8.0 7.7 6.5 -1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 17.3 15.6 15.9 15.1 13.4 -1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.3 7.3 7.7 7.0 5.8 -1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.2 2.5 -0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.0 6.9 7.1 6.5 5.5 -1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 16.3 14.2 14.9 13.8 11.3 -2.5 pps
Male 8.6 7.4 8.1 7.5 6.2 -1.3 pps
Female 8.8 7.7 7.3 6.6 5.6 -1.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 56.6 52.5 45.5 47.4 48.0 0.6 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.3 42.1 41.4 41.7 41.8 0.2 %
Male 43.2 43.0 42.2 42.5 42.7 0.5 %
Female 40.4 40.4 39.8 40.0 40.1 0.2 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : 0.8 0.3 -0.9 0.6 1.5 pps
Building and construction 1.6 -0.6 0.4 1.2 1.7 0.5 pps
Services 1.8 1.3 -0.1 1.1 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 2.1 -2.7 -1.7 1.9 3.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 0.8 2.1 0.2 2.4 3.0 0.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.8 1.3 -1.1 1.4 2.2 0.8 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 0.9 2.4 2.1 0.6 3.4 2.8 pps
Wage and salaries 3.2 3.8 0.1 2.9 4.8 1.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.5 -0.1 -5.2 3.6 1.6 -2.0 pps
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Estonia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 1338 1336 1336 1335 1337 0.1 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 909 907 906 904 903 -0.2 %
(% of total population) 68.0 67.9 67.8 67.7 67.6 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 663 671 670 667 674 1.1 %
Male 338 340 337 333 339 1.7 %
Female 325 331 333 334 335 0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 72.9 74.0 74.0 73.8 74.7 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 38.3 41.4 39.9 38.3 40.6 2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.5 88.1 87.8 88.2 88.3 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 62.1 65.1 66.7 64.2 64.7 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 72.2 73.0 72.8 72.6 73.8 1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 76.3 79.0 79.2 79.6 79.6 0.0 pps
Male 77.5 78.3 77.6 76.8 78.1 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 44.2 45.3 45.0 42.3 44.0 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.6 92.9 91.9 91.8 92.1 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 63.7 68.8 67.4 64.5 67.1 2.6 pps
Female 68.7 70.1 70.6 71.0 71.5 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 32.3 37.4 34.7 34.2 37.1 2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.7 83.6 83.9 84.9 84.7 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 61.0 62.3 66.1 63.9 62.9 -1.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 69.4 69.8 63.5 61.0 65.1 4.1 pps
Young (15-24) 34.5 36.4 28.9 25.7 31.5 5.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.8 83.9 76.4 74.8 78.1 3.3 pps
Older (55-64) 60.0 62.4 60.5 53.8 57.2 3.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 33.1 34.9 27.7 26.2 30.9 4.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 74.4 75.4 66.3 63.3 68.6 5.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 86.8 85.2 82.1 78.5 79.1 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 57.9 57.9 52.8 51.6 55.6 4.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 11.5 12.0 10.7 9.4 9.6 0.1 pps
Male 73.2 73.6 64.1 61.5 67.7 6.1 pps
Young (15-24) 38.8 39.5 30.7 27.4 33.6 6.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.7 88.5 77.4 75.7 81.5 5.8 pps
Older (55-64) 59.4 65.2 59.4 52.3 57.3 5.0 pps
Female 65.9 66.3 63.0 60.5 62.8 2.3 pps
Young (15-24) 30.0 33.2 27.0 24.0 29.4 5.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.1 79.5 75.5 73.9 74.8 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 60.4 60.3 61.2 54.9 57.1 2.2 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 630.7 633.5 575.8 551.8 588.2 6.6 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.8 0.2 -10.0 -4.8 7.0 11.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.5 0.4 -9.1 -4.2 6.6 10.8 pps
Male 2.7 0.3 -13.0 -4.2 10.0 14.2 pps
Female 0.4 0.5 -5.1 -4.2 3.4 7.6 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 8.7 7.5 8.0 7.9 8.0 0.1 pps
Male 6.2 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.7 0.3 pps
Female 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.4 -0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 2.2 2.4 2.5 3.7 4.5 0.8 pps
Male 2.8 3.5 3.1 4.9 5.5 0.6 pps
Female : : 2.0 2.7 3.5 0.8 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 7.2 6.4 9.4 9.8 9.3 -0.5 pps
Male 3.8 3.5 6.1 6.2 5.0 -1.2 pps
Female 10.6 9.3 12.5 13.1 13.5 0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.7 5.5 13.8 16.9 12.5 -4.4 pps
Young (15-24) 10.0 12.0 27.5 32.9 22.3 -10.6 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.3 4.7 13.0 15.4 11.8 -3.6 pps
Older (55-64) 0.0 0.0 9.4 16.2 11.6 -4.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 11.7 12.2 29.9 32.4 27.4 -5.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.9 5.9 16.1 19.6 13.0 -6.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 0.0 3.0 6.4 9.5 8.2 -1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.0 4.6 12.1 14.5 11.0 -3.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.5 10.2 22.6 29.7 21.9 -7.8 pps
Male 5.4 5.8 16.9 19.5 13.1 -6.4 pps
Female 3.9 5.3 10.6 14.3 11.8 -2.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 49.2 30.1 27.4 45.3 56.8 11.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.3 40.6 39.5 40.5 40.6 0.2 %
Male 41.9 41.1 39.9 41.2 41.1 -0.2 %
Female 40.6 40.0 39.0 39.8 40.1 0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -15.6 -9.7 2.2 13.5 11.3 pps
Building and construction 27.6 -4.0 -31.0 -26.1 23.8 49.9 pps
Services -1.4 3.8 -7.5 -4.2 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 3.2 -15.8 -5.7 12.7 18.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 25.0 9.7 -3.4 1.4 1.4 0.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 12.0 4.2 -2.4 0.3 -2.2 -2.6 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 20.0 14.0 -1.8 -2.0 4.6 6.6 pps
Wage and salaries 24.3 11.1 -14.6 -3.9 8.5 12.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 6.6 -3.8 -4.7 7.4 0.6 -6.8 pps
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Ireland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 4357 4440 4468 4476 4491 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 2997 3041 3028 3002 2979 -0.8 %
(% of total population) 68.8 68.5 67.8 67.1 66.3 -0.7 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2174 2189 2143 2094 2067 -1.3 %
Male 1236 1236 1195 1157 1138 -1.7 %
Female 938 953 948 937 929 -0.9 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 72.5 72.0 70.8 69.8 69.4 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 55.4 52.6 47.4 42.3 39.9 -2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.9 81.6 81.1 80.7 80.3 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 55.1 55.5 54.8 54.9 55.3 0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.5 71.0 70.0 69.3 68.9 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 78.9 77.3 75.4 73.1 73.3 0.3 pps
Male 81.6 80.7 78.8 77.4 76.8 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 58.8 55.2 48.6 43.1 40.6 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.6 91.3 90.3 89.6 89.1 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 69.6 68.6 66.7 65.3 65.0 -0.3 pps
Female 63.3 63.1 62.7 62.2 62.1 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 51.9 49.9 46.1 41.5 39.1 -2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.9 71.8 71.9 71.8 71.7 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 40.4 42.2 42.9 44.5 45.6 1.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 69.2 67.6 62.2 60.1 59.2 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 50.4 45.9 35.8 30.5 28.2 -2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.6 77.3 72.4 70.4 69.4 -1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 53.8 53.7 51.3 50.2 50.0 -0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 49.4 46.9 40.5 37.2 35.5 -1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 74.2 71.9 64.8 61.5 60.0 -1.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.6 84.4 80.9 79.8 79.8 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.5 56.7 53.4 52.5 52.0 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 10.6 10.9 8.9 7.6 7.2 -0.3 pps
Male 77.5 74.9 66.9 64.1 63.1 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 53.0 46.7 33.5 28.4 26.3 -2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.7 85.5 77.8 75.2 74.1 -1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 67.8 66.1 61.3 58.2 57.2 -1.0 pps
Female 60.6 60.2 57.6 56.1 55.4 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 47.8 45.1 38.1 32.6 30.0 -2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.3 69.0 66.9 65.7 64.8 -1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 39.5 41.1 41.1 42.1 42.9 0.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2072.6 2054.8 1884.8 1803.8 1764.0 -2.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.6 -1.1 -8.1 -4.2 -2.1 2.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 3.4 -0.9 -8.3 -4.3 -2.2 2.1 pps
Male 2.2 -2.4 -11.5 -5.5 -2.4 3.1 pps
Female 5.0 1.2 -4.1 -2.9 -2.0 1.0 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 15.4 15.7 16.0 15.4 15.1 -0.3 pps
Male 12.7 12.8 13.0 12.3 12.0 -0.3 pps
Female 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 8.0 8.4 8.6 9.3 9.9 0.6 pps
Male 6.7 7.1 7.5 8.6 9.5 0.9 pps
Female 9.5 9.8 9.6 10.0 10.3 0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 17.3 18.1 20.9 22.0 22.9 0.9 pps
Male 6.4 7.1 10.0 11.1 12.2 1.1 pps
Female 31.6 31.9 33.5 34.3 35.1 0.8 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.6 6.3 11.9 13.7 14.4 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 9.0 12.7 24.3 27.8 29.4 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.1 5.4 11.2 13.1 14.1 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 2.4 3.3 6.5 8.7 9.5 0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.6 10.1 17.9 22.0 24.1 2.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.4 6.2 13.5 15.9 17.1 1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.7 3.4 7.1 7.7 7.7 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.4 5.8 11.4 13.3 14.3 1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 6.1 7.7 15.8 17.4 17.5 0.1 pps
Male 4.9 7.4 14.9 16.9 17.5 0.6 pps
Female 4.1 4.9 8.0 9.7 10.6 0.9 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 29.6 27.1 29.2 49.3 59.4 10.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.5 40.2 39.5 39.6 39.7 0.3 %
Male 42.4 42.0 41.4 41.6 41.7 0.2 %
Female 36.9 36.8 36.2 36.4 36.5 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : 3.8 -16.3 -11.5 -2.3 9.2 pps
Building and construction 3.2 -11.8 -33.8 -23.1 -10.7 12.4 pps
Services 4.7 -0.2 -5.5 -2.9 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -4.4 -10.2 -6.2 -1.6 4.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.8 5.4 -1.2 -3.2 -0.2 3.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 5.2 8.8 3.9 -0.9 0.0 0.9 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.6 4.5 3.1 -0.6 -1.7 -1.1 pps
Wage and salaries 8.6 3.6 -9.4 -6.5 : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.5 -1.9 1.2 4.0 2.8 -1.2 pps
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Greece 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10754 10780 10839 10882 10925 0.4 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7208 7232 7222 7231 7230 0.0 %
(% of total population) 67.0 67.1 66.6 66.5 66.2 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4829 4851 4894 4934 4892 -0.9 %
Male 2849 2860 2857 2858 2819 -1.4 %
Female 1981 1991 2036 2077 2073 -0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 67.0 67.1 67.8 68.2 67.7 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 31.1 30.2 30.9 30.3 29.2 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.9 82.0 82.8 83.3 83.2 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 43.9 44.2 44.2 45.1 43.1 -2.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.6 66.6 67.1 67.5 67.0 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 73.3 73.6 74.8 75.8 74.6 -1.2 pps
Male 79.1 79.1 79.0 78.9 77.7 -1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 34.7 34.3 34.4 33.4 31.8 -1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.6 94.4 94.4 94.2 93.5 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 60.8 60.9 60.1 60.2 57.3 -2.9 pps
Female 54.9 55.1 56.5 57.6 57.5 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 27.6 26.1 27.4 27.3 26.6 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.1 69.4 71.0 72.2 72.7 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 28.2 28.6 29.3 30.9 29.7 -1.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 61.4 61.9 61.2 59.6 55.6 -4.0 pps
Young (15-24) 24.0 23.6 22.9 20.3 16.3 -4.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.6 76.1 75.4 73.3 69.0 -4.4 pps
Older (55-64) 42.4 42.8 42.2 42.3 39.4 -2.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 52.3 52.4 51.9 50.0 45.7 -4.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 60.8 61.2 60.4 58.6 54.4 -4.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 81.9 82.1 81.6 78.9 74.1 -4.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.9 56.8 55.4 53.9 50.7 -3.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.4 5.1 5.8 5.6 4.9 -0.7 pps
Male 74.9 75.0 73.5 70.9 65.9 -5.0 pps
Young (15-24) 29.2 28.5 27.7 24.5 19.6 -4.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.1 90.2 88.4 85.3 80.0 -5.4 pps
Older (55-64) 59.1 59.1 57.7 56.5 52.3 -4.2 pps
Female 47.9 48.7 48.9 48.1 45.1 -3.0 pps
Young (15-24) 18.7 18.5 18.1 16.2 12.9 -3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 60.8 61.9 62.2 61.1 57.7 -3.4 pps
Older (55-64) 26.9 27.5 27.7 28.9 27.3 -1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4423.5 4473.7 4423.2 4306.5 4016.6 -6.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.6 0.8 -0.2 -1.9 -6.7 -4.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.3 1.1 -1.1 -2.6 -6.7 -4.1 pps
Male 1.3 0.5 -2.0 -3.3 -7.0 -3.7 pps
Female 1.4 2.1 0.3 -1.6 -6.4 -4.8 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 28.7 28.8 29.2 29.6 30.4 0.7 pps
Male 20.9 20.6 20.9 20.9 21.2 0.4 pps
Female 7.8 8.2 8.3 8.7 9.1 0.4 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 10.9 11.5 12.1 12.4 11.6 -0.8 pps
Male 9.3 9.9 10.6 11.0 10.5 -0.5 pps
Female 13.2 13.7 14.1 14.4 12.9 -1.5 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 5.4 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 0.4 pps
Male 2.5 2.5 2.9 3.4 4.2 0.8 pps
Female 9.9 9.8 10.1 10.2 10.0 -0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.3 7.7 9.5 12.6 17.7 5.1 pps
Young (15-24) 22.9 22.1 25.8 32.9 44.4 11.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 8.3 7.6 9.4 12.6 18.0 5.4 pps
Older (55-64) 3.4 3.2 4.6 6.3 8.5 2.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.8 7.6 9.7 12.9 18.5 5.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 9.8 8.8 11.0 14.5 20.1 5.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 7.1 6.3 7.4 9.8 14.0 4.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.5 7.9 9.5 12.5 17.6 5.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 7.5 6.8 10.5 15.0 20.7 5.7 pps
Male 5.2 5.1 6.9 9.9 15.0 5.1 pps
Female 12.8 11.4 13.2 16.2 21.4 5.2 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 49.9 47.5 40.8 45.0 49.6 4.6 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.4 42.2 42.1 42.3 42.4 0.2 %
Male 43.7 43.5 43.4 43.5 43.5 0.0 %
Female 40.1 40.1 39.9 40.2 40.6 1.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -0.5 2.5 2.1 -7.7 -9.8 pps
Building and construction 6.3 -0.7 -4.5 -10.6 -22.6 -12.0 pps
Services 2.1 1.7 -0.4 -2.0 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 2.0 -1.0 -5.5 -11.5 -6.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.0 6.1 4.0 -3.3 -3.2 0.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.4 1.3 1.1 -5.0 -4.7 0.2 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.3 2.6 7.6 -1.0 : : pps
Wage and salaries 7.0 7.1 4.8 -6.0 -10.4 -4.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.4 -0.9 -3.0 -1.7 -0.2 1.5 pps
2010-2011
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Spain 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 44630 45329 45671 45820 45908 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 30808 31252 31349 31261 31127 -0.4 %
(% of total population) 69.0 68.9 68.6 68.2 67.8 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 22043 22689 22881 22933 22949 0.1 %
Male 12702 12933 12844 12730 12596 -1.1 %
Female 9341 9756 10037 10203 10354 1.5 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 71.6 72.6 73.0 73.4 73.7 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 47.8 47.7 45.1 42.7 40.9 -1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.8 83.8 84.7 85.5 86.0 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 47.4 49.2 50.2 50.8 52.3 1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.5 71.5 71.9 72.2 72.8 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 78.5 79.1 79.0 80.0 79.4 -0.6 pps
Male 81.4 81.8 81.0 80.7 80.4 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 52.1 51.5 48.3 45.1 42.6 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.6 92.6 92.3 92.5 92.6 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 63.1 65.1 64.0 63.9 63.7 -0.2 pps
Female 61.4 63.2 64.8 65.9 67.0 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 43.3 43.7 41.7 40.1 39.1 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.7 74.7 76.7 78.3 79.3 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 32.5 34.2 37.2 38.5 41.7 3.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 65.6 64.3 59.8 58.6 57.7 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 39.1 36.0 28.0 24.9 21.9 -3.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.8 75.3 70.7 69.6 68.7 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 44.6 45.6 44.1 43.6 44.5 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 57.5 55.5 49.6 48.2 47.3 -1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 68.2 67.4 62.6 60.6 58.7 -1.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 82.5 81.7 79.0 77.5 76.5 -1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.6 55.0 51.4 50.4 50.1 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.0 9.3 8.4 8.1 7.6 -0.5 pps
Male 76.2 73.5 66.6 64.7 63.2 -1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 44.2 39.3 29.5 25.6 22.1 -3.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 84.4 77.3 75.7 74.5 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 60.0 60.9 56.7 54.7 53.9 -0.8 pps
Female 54.7 54.9 52.8 52.3 52.0 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 33.8 32.5 26.5 24.2 21.8 -2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 65.6 65.9 63.8 63.2 62.7 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 30.0 31.1 32.3 33.2 35.6 2.4 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 20211.3 20102.8 18736.0 18304.1 17953.3 -1.9 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.0 -0.1 -6.5 -2.5 -1.5 1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 3.1 -0.5 -6.8 -2.3 -1.9 0.4 pps
Male 2.1 -2.2 -9.2 -3.3 -2.9 0.4 pps
Female 4.6 1.9 -3.5 -1.0 -0.7 0.3 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 16.3 16.3 15.7 15.7 15.5 -0.2 pps
Male 11.5 11.4 10.8 10.8 10.5 -0.3 pps
Female 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 31.7 29.3 25.5 25.0 25.4 0.4 pps
Male 30.6 27.7 23.8 23.9 24.2 0.3 pps
Female 33.1 31.4 27.3 26.2 26.6 0.4 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 11.6 11.8 12.6 13.1 13.7 0.6 pps
Male 3.9 4.0 4.7 5.2 5.9 0.7 pps
Female 22.7 22.6 22.9 23.1 23.4 0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 21.7 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 18.2 24.6 37.8 41.6 46.4 4.8 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.4 10.4 17.1 19.2 20.8 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 5.9 7.3 12.1 14.1 15.0 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 10.5 15.4 24.7 27.5 29.2 1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.1 10.6 17.1 19.3 21.5 2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.3 6.4 9.8 11.3 12.7 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.7 10.3 16.1 18.3 19.7 1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 12.2 17.5 28.5 30.2 32.9 2.7 pps
Male 6.4 10.1 17.7 19.7 21.2 1.5 pps
Female 10.9 13.0 18.4 20.5 22.2 1.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 20.4 17.8 23.7 36.6 41.6 5.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.1 41.0 40.7 40.7 40.7 0.0 %
Male 42.0 41.9 41.6 41.6 41.6 0.0 %
Female 39.5 39.4 39.2 39.3 39.3 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -3.9 -4.8 1.1 -3.2 -4.3 pps
Building and construction 5.6 -11.4 -22.2 -12.6 -15.6 -3.0 pps
Services 3.8 2.9 -4.8 -2.2 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -1.3 -13.9 -5.2 -0.9 4.3 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 4.6 6.7 4.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.4 3.6 4.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.6 5.1 4.9 0.8 2.8 2.0 pps
Wage and salaries 8.2 6.0 -2.5 -0.7 : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.4 1.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 -0.2 pps
2010-2011
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France 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 60505 60825 61129 61458 61773 0.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 39569 39736 39858 39995 40057 0.2 %
(% of total population) 65.4 65.3 65.2 65.1 64.8 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 27647 27817 28087 28181 28192 0.0 %
Male 14538 14603 14705 14733 14721 -0.1 %
Female 13109 13214 13383 13448 13471 0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 69.9 70.0 70.5 70.5 70.4 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 38.4 38.5 39.8 39.1 38.3 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.1 88.6 88.8 88.9 88.5 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 40.2 40.0 41.5 42.6 44.4 1.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.2 70.3 70.9 70.9 70.7 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 63.9 64.7 64.0 64.5 65.4 1.0 pps
Male 74.7 74.7 75.0 74.9 74.8 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 41.8 42.2 43.1 42.8 41.6 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.2 94.4 94.4 94.2 93.8 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 42.7 42.6 44.3 45.3 47.2 1.9 pps
Female 65.2 65.4 66.1 66.1 66.2 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 35.0 34.8 36.5 35.5 34.9 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.3 83.1 83.4 83.7 83.4 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 37.8 37.6 38.9 40.0 41.8 1.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.3 64.8 64.0 63.9 63.9 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 31.0 31.4 30.5 30.2 29.9 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.0 83.0 82.0 81.8 81.4 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 38.2 38.2 38.9 39.8 41.5 1.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 47.5 47.0 45.8 45.2 45.0 -0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 69.2 69.3 68.2 67.8 67.2 -0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 79.2 80.7 79.8 80.2 80.5 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.1 61.4 60.8 60.5 60.4 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.4 0.1 pps
Male 69.1 69.5 68.3 68.2 68.2 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 34.1 34.4 32.7 33.3 32.8 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 89.1 87.6 87.1 86.7 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 40.5 40.6 41.5 42.2 44.1 1.9 pps
Female 59.6 60.2 59.9 59.7 59.7 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 27.9 28.3 28.3 27.1 26.9 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.0 77.2 76.6 76.6 76.2 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 36.0 35.9 36.6 37.5 39.1 1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 25425.7 25756.3 25515.1 25545.4 25582.5 0.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.4 0.5 -1.3 -0.1 0.5 0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.7 1.3 -0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 pps
Male 1.0 1.1 -1.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 pps
Female 2.4 1.6 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.2 9.8 10.2 10.7 10.9 0.1 pps
Male 7.3 6.9 7.3 7.6 7.7 0.1 pps
Female 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 15.0 14.8 14.3 14.9 15.2 0.3 pps
Male 14.0 13.7 12.9 14.0 14.6 0.6 pps
Female 16.1 16.1 15.7 15.9 15.8 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 17.2 16.8 17.2 17.6 17.6 0.0 pps
Male 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.4 6.5 0.1 pps
Female 30.4 29.4 29.8 30.0 29.9 -0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.4 7.8 9.5 9.7 9.6 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 19.1 18.6 23.2 22.8 22.0 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.2 6.5 8.0 8.3 8.4 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 5.1 4.6 6.2 6.6 6.5 -0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 12.3 11.8 14.4 15.4 15.2 -0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.2 6.9 8.8 8.8 8.9 0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.5 4.5 5.6 5.5 5.4 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.5 7.0 8.7 8.9 8.7 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 16.4 14.1 17.9 17.2 18.2 1.0 pps
Male 7.8 7.3 9.3 9.4 9.1 -0.3 pps
Female 9.0 8.4 9.8 10.1 10.2 0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 40.2 37.4 35.2 40.2 41.5 1.3 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.6 39.5 39.4 39.8 39.8 0.0 %
Male 40.8 40.7 40.6 41.0 41.0 0.0 %
Female 37.6 37.7 37.5 38.0 38.0 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -3.1 -2.5 -3.4 -2.5 0.9 pps
Building and construction 4.1 2.8 0.2 -1.6 -0.6 1.0 pps
Services 1.8 0.8 -2.0 0.7 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -1.3 -4.8 -3.8 -0.9 2.9 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.5 2.6 1.8 2.3 2.9 0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.0 0.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 0.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.0 3.5 0.9 3.1 3.4 0.3 pps
Wage and salaries 4.1 3.1 0.0 2.3 2.9 0.6 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.9 -0.6 -1.9 1.7 1.2 -0.5 pps
2010-2011
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Italy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 58880 59336 59752 60051 60328 0.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 38946 39182 39406 39546 39659 0.3 %
(% of total population) 66.1 66.0 65.9 65.9 65.7 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 24350 24696 24591 24594 24686 0.4 %
Male 14483 14571 14498 14457 14438 -0.1 %
Female 9867 10125 10093 10137 10248 1.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 62.5 63.0 62.4 62.2 62.2 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 30.9 30.9 29.1 28.4 27.4 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.6 78.1 77.2 76.9 76.9 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 34.6 35.5 37.0 38.0 39.5 1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.9 62.3 61.6 61.4 61.4 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 73.2 73.3 72.7 71.4 70.9 -0.5 pps
Male 74.4 74.4 73.7 73.3 73.1 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 36.1 35.9 34.0 33.2 31.6 -1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.0 91.0 90.0 89.4 89.2 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 46.3 47.0 48.5 49.6 50.7 1.1 pps
Female 50.7 51.6 51.1 51.1 51.5 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 25.5 25.7 23.9 23.4 22.9 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 64.1 65.2 64.5 64.4 64.6 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 23.5 24.7 26.1 27.0 28.9 1.9 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.7 58.7 57.5 56.9 56.9 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 24.7 24.4 21.7 20.5 19.4 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.5 73.5 71.9 71.1 71.1 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 33.8 34.4 35.7 36.6 37.9 1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 46.5 46.0 44.5 43.6 43.7 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 67.9 67.9 66.5 65.7 65.2 -0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 77.7 78.5 77.0 76.4 77.0 0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 54.8 54.3 52.7 51.6 51.3 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.8 4.4 4.8 5.2 5.6 0.4 pps
Male 70.7 70.3 68.6 67.7 67.5 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 29.6 29.1 26.1 24.3 23.1 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.3 86.7 84.7 83.5 83.4 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 45.1 45.5 46.7 47.6 48.4 0.7 pps
Female 46.6 47.2 46.4 46.1 46.5 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 19.5 19.4 17.0 16.5 15.5 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 59.6 60.2 59.1 58.7 58.9 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 23.0 24.0 25.4 26.2 28.1 1.9 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 22846.2 23010.5 22650.1 22496.5 22582.7 0.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.3 0.3 -1.6 -0.7 0.3 1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.0 0.7 -1.6 -0.7 0.4 1.1 pps
Male 0.8 -0.1 -1.9 -1.1 -0.1 1.0 pps
Female 1.3 1.9 -1.1 0.0 1.2 1.2 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 23.4 22.9 22.5 22.7 22.5 -0.2 pps
Male 16.7 16.3 16.1 16.3 16.1 -0.2 pps
Female 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.4 6.4 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 13.2 13.3 12.5 12.8 13.4 0.6 pps
Male 11.2 11.5 10.8 11.4 12.3 0.9 pps
Female 16.0 15.7 14.6 14.5 14.7 0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 13.4 14.1 14.1 14.8 15.2 0.4 pps
Male 4.6 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.5 0.4 pps
Female 26.8 27.8 27.9 29.0 29.3 0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.1 6.7 7.8 8.4 8.4 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 20.3 21.3 25.4 27.8 29.1 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.8 6.4 7.4 8.1 8.0 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.9 0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.5 8.6 9.6 10.5 10.8 0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.7 6.2 7.3 8.0 7.9 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.5 4.6 5.6 5.8 5.5 -0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.0 6.7 7.6 8.2 8.1 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.3 8.5 11.2 11.7 12.2 0.5 pps
Male 4.9 5.5 6.8 7.6 7.6 0.0 pps
Female 7.9 8.5 9.3 9.7 9.6 -0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 47.4 45.6 44.4 48.4 51.9 3.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.6 40.4 39.9 40.1 39.9 -0.5 %
Male 41.9 41.7 41.1 41.3 41.2 -0.2 %
Female 37.8 37.7 37.4 37.6 37.5 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -2.1 -2.6 1.4 -2.0 -3.4 pps
Building and construction 3.2 0.4 -1.4 -1.8 -3.5 -1.7 pps
Services 1.5 0.9 -1.7 0.1 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -0.8 -4.8 -3.6 0.3 3.9 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.0 3.0 -0.1 2.0 1.1 -0.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.1 1.3 -0.4 1.9 0.0 -1.8 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.3 4.1 4.7 2.0 2.3 0.3 pps
Wage and salaries 3.8 3.5 -1.0 0.9 1.8 0.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.4 -1.4 -3.9 2.5 0.1 -2.4 pps
2010-2011
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Cyprus 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 752 758 763 771 773 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 518 524 528 534 535 0.1 %
(% of total population) 68.9 69.1 69.2 69.3 69.2 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 383 386 391 398 396 -0.5 %
Male 209 210 213 215 215 0.0 %
Female 174 176 178 183 181 -1.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 73.9 73.6 73.9 74.4 74.0 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 41.6 41.8 41.1 40.6 37.8 -2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.7 86.4 86.6 87.2 87.5 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 57.7 56.6 58.5 59.6 58.0 -1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 73.7 73.0 73.5 73.2 72.4 -0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 75.5 76.8 76.1 79.1 79.8 0.7 pps
Male 82.9 82.0 82.0 81.7 81.3 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 43.9 43.2 42.2 40.3 39.8 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 95.0 94.0 93.5 93.5 93.2 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 74.9 73.0 74.8 75.0 73.6 -1.4 pps
Female 65.4 65.7 66.2 67.4 66.8 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 39.7 40.5 40.2 40.8 36.1 -4.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.7 79.1 79.7 80.9 81.9 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 41.5 41.1 42.7 44.8 43.0 -1.9 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 71.0 70.8 69.9 69.7 68.1 -1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 37.5 38.0 35.5 33.8 29.4 -4.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.8 83.7 82.6 82.5 81.6 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 55.9 54.8 55.9 56.8 55.2 -1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 52.9 50.9 51.8 52.7 50.6 -2.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 73.6 74.1 72.5 71.4 69.3 -2.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 86.5 86.5 84.8 83.1 81.5 -1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 60.6 58.6 57.5 55.0 53.0 -2.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 10.3 12.3 12.5 14.7 15.1 0.4 pps
Male 80.0 79.2 77.6 76.6 74.7 -1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 39.1 39.5 36.4 33.8 30.6 -3.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.4 91.4 89.2 88.4 86.5 -1.9 pps
Older (55-64) 72.6 70.8 71.6 71.3 69.8 -1.5 pps
Female 62.4 62.8 62.5 63.0 61.6 -1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 35.9 36.7 34.5 33.7 28.3 -5.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.5 76.3 76.0 76.6 76.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 40.4 39.4 40.9 43.1 41.0 -2.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 367.9 371.1 369.3 372.3 364.1 -2.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.2 2.1 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 5.6 0.9 -0.5 0.8 -2.2 -3.0 pps
Male 4.2 0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -2.0 -1.8 pps
Female 7.4 1.2 -0.4 2.0 -2.3 -4.4 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 17.5 16.9 16.6 15.5 15.1 -0.4 pps
Male 13.0 12.6 11.9 11.0 10.9 -0.1 pps
Female 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.2 -0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 13.3 14.0 13.5 13.6 13.7 0.1 pps
Male 7.6 8.2 7.5 6.9 7.0 0.1 pps
Female 19.2 20.0 19.9 20.6 20.7 0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 6.4 6.8 7.4 8.1 8.7 0.6 pps
Male 3.0 3.4 3.9 4.9 5.9 1.0 pps
Female 10.4 10.8 11.5 11.8 12.1 0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.1 3.8 5.5 6.4 7.9 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 10.2 9.0 13.8 16.7 22.4 5.7 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.3 3.3 4.7 5.7 7.2 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 3.1 3.2 4.3 4.7 4.9 0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 5.1 5.2 6.6 7.7 8.0 0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.0 3.7 5.6 6.3 8.7 2.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.4 3.0 4.5 5.7 7.2 1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.7 3.4 4.9 5.7 7.4 1.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.7 5.4 8.0 8.7 9.9 1.2 pps
Male 3.6 3.4 5.4 6.3 8.1 1.8 pps
Female 4.6 4.3 5.5 6.4 7.7 1.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 18.6 13.6 10.3 20.3 20.9 0.6 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.4 40.5 40.2 40.7 40.7 0.0 %
Male 41.7 41.8 41.6 41.9 41.6 -0.7 %
Female 38.7 38.7 38.4 39.2 39.5 0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -3.0 6.3 2.4 -0.7 -3.1 pps
Building and construction 4.9 2.3 -4.7 -5.8 -4.9 0.9 pps
Services 2.9 1.8 -2.8 -0.1 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 0.1 -2.1 -3.0 -4.2 -1.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.0 3.2 5.3 -0.2 2.0 2.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -1.3 -1.3 5.2 -1.9 0.0 1.9 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.6 6.2 3.8 1.9 1.7 -0.2 pps
Wage and salaries 6.8 8.0 4.9 0.0 2.5 2.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.8 1.4 -1.3 1.1 -0.1 -1.2 pps
2010-2011
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Latvia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 2281 2271 2261 2248 2230 -0.8 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 1573 1568 1560 1549 1536 -0.8 %
(% of total population) 69.0 69.0 69.0 68.9 68.9 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1145 1167 1153 1134 1125 -0.8 %
Male 591 597 583 570 572 0.2 %
Female 555 570 570 564 554 -1.8 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 72.8 74.4 73.9 73.2 73.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 43.0 42.9 41.7 40.4 38.4 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.2 88.9 88.5 88.5 88.1 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 60.3 63.3 61.4 57.2 59.8 2.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 72.8 73.8 73.6 73.1 73.0 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 69.9 77.8 75.7 74.0 74.7 0.7 pps
Male 77.6 78.6 77.0 75.8 76.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 48.9 48.8 46.8 43.0 42.5 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.0 92.2 91.1 91.3 91.1 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 67.9 68.8 63.8 58.9 63.1 4.2 pps
Female 68.3 70.5 71.0 70.7 70.2 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 36.8 36.7 36.3 37.7 34.2 -3.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.6 85.7 86.1 85.9 85.2 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 54.6 59.3 59.7 55.8 57.3 1.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 68.3 68.7 61.0 59.3 61.8 2.5 pps
Young (15-24) 38.3 37.2 27.7 26.4 27.3 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.3 82.6 74.7 73.4 75.8 2.4 pps
Older (55-64) 57.7 59.4 53.2 48.2 51.1 2.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 38.6 37.1 29.4 28.3 30.8 2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 74.3 74.5 64.6 61.5 63.2 1.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 86.9 86.9 82.3 80.6 84.0 3.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 67.4 58.1 51.7 50.6 52.8 2.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.9 10.5 9.3 8.7 9.0 0.3 pps
Male 72.5 72.1 61.0 59.2 62.8 3.6 pps
Young (15-24) 43.4 42.4 29.3 27.8 30.0 2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.6 85.4 74.5 72.9 76.2 3.3 pps
Older (55-64) 64.6 63.1 53.2 47.6 52.6 5.0 pps
Female 64.4 65.4 60.9 59.4 60.8 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 33.1 31.9 26.0 25.0 24.4 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.1 79.9 74.9 73.8 75.4 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 52.4 56.7 53.3 48.7 49.9 1.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1075.1 1076.3 950.9 918.9 949.3 3.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.6 0.9 -13.2 -4.8 -8.1 -3.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.7 0.1 -11.7 -3.4 3.3 6.7 pps
Male 2.8 -0.8 -15.6 -3.6 5.4 9.0 pps
Female 2.5 1.1 -7.6 -3.2 1.4 4.5 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 8.8 8.5 9.7 9.9 10.2 0.3 pps
Male 5.8 5.7 6.1 5.9 6.2 0.3 pps
Female 3.0 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.0 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 4.2 3.3 4.4 6.8 6.5 -0.3 pps
Male 5.6 4.6 5.9 8.9 7.9 -1.0 pps
Female 2.8 1.9 3.0 5.0 5.2 0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 5.6 5.5 8.4 9.3 8.8 -0.5 pps
Male 4.4 3.9 7.0 7.5 7.3 -0.2 pps
Female 6.9 7.1 9.6 11.0 10.3 -0.7 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.5 8.0 18.2 19.8 16.2 -3.6 pps
Young (15-24) 10.7 13.1 33.6 34.5 29.1 -5.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.6 7.2 15.8 17.0 13.9 -3.1 pps
Older (55-64) 4.4 6.2 13.4 15.6 14.5 -1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 10.8 14.6 31.4 32.3 28.0 -4.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.9 7.7 18.7 20.4 17.6 -2.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.7 4.2 8.4 10.5 6.8 -3.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.2 7.1 16.4 17.6 14.6 -3.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 11.1 23.5 26.1 21.2 -4.9 pps
Male 6.9 8.6 21.7 23.1 18.6 -4.5 pps
Female 6.0 7.4 14.8 16.7 13.8 -2.9 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 26.3 25.7 26.7 45.1 54.6 9.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.8 40.7 40.6 40.2 40.3 0.2 %
Male 42.6 41.3 41.1 40.6 40.8 0.5 %
Female 40.8 40.0 40.0 39.8 39.8 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -15.1 -5.0 -3.2 -7.4 -4.2 pps
Building and construction 23.1 1.7 -38.7 -19.5 -6.5 13.0 pps
Services 4.6 4.7 -9.4 -4.4 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -2.9 -18.8 0.8 -10.1 -10.9 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 35.1 15.7 -12.7 -5.5 17.2 22.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 11.9 2.4 -11.6 -3.4 11.2 14.6 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 30.1 22.3 -0.1 -2.9 3.4 6.3 pps
Wage and salaries 43.3 19.4 -26.6 -10.4 6.8 17.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 5.8 -4.2 -5.3 4.7 14.8 10.1 pps
2010-2011
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Lithuania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 3385 3366 3350 3311 3231 -2.4 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 2319 2316 2309 2283 2210 -3.2 %
(% of total population) 68.5 68.8 68.9 68.9 68.4 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1575 1584 1612 1610 1591 -1.2 %
Male 796 801 805 800 797 -0.4 %
Female 779 783 807 810 794 -2.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 67.9 68.4 69.8 70.5 72.0 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 27.4 30.8 30.4 29.6 29.4 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.0 85.5 87.3 88.5 90.0 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 55.6 55.6 57.6 56.8 58.4 1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 67.9 68.3 69.8 70.5 72.0 1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 69.3 76.1 63.8 72.0 69.0 -3.0 pps
Male 71.0 71.4 72.0 72.4 74.3 1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 31.8 35.4 33.8 32.8 33.5 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.9 87.4 88.3 89.2 91.0 1.9 pps
Older (55-64) 63.4 63.0 63.9 62.9 64.9 1.9 pps
Female 65.0 65.5 67.8 68.8 69.7 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 22.8 26.0 26.7 26.3 25.0 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.2 83.8 86.3 87.9 89.0 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 49.7 50.0 52.9 52.2 53.4 1.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.9 64.3 60.1 57.8 60.7 2.9 pps
Young (15-24) 25.2 26.7 21.5 19.2 19.7 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.5 81.2 76.3 73.8 77.3 3.5 pps
Older (55-64) 53.4 53.1 51.6 48.6 50.5 1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 25.9 20.7 17.7 14.4 15.3 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 68.6 68.1 61.9 57.6 59.9 2.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 88.1 87.7 85.9 85.4 87.5 2.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.4 64.0 59.8 57.5 60.4 2.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 pps
Male 67.9 67.1 59.5 56.8 60.9 4.1 pps
Young (15-24) 29.6 30.9 22.0 20.2 21.9 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.3 82.7 74.6 71.4 76.3 4.8 pps
Older (55-64) 60.8 60.2 56.0 52.3 54.6 2.3 pps
Female 62.1 61.8 60.7 58.7 60.5 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 20.5 22.2 20.9 18.2 17.4 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.8 79.7 78.0 76.1 78.3 2.2 pps
Older (55-64) 47.9 47.7 48.3 45.8 47.4 1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1505.8 1490.2 1387.5 1319.6 1342.1 1.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.8 -0.7 -6.8 -5.1 2.0 7.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.0 -1.0 -6.9 -4.9 1.7 6.6 pps
Male 2.4 -1.2 -11.4 -5.6 4.0 9.6 pps
Female 1.7 -0.8 -2.2 -4.2 -0.3 3.9 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.7 10.0 10.2 9.1 8.9 -0.1 pps
Male 7.5 6.6 6.4 5.4 5.3 -0.1 pps
Female 4.2 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.7 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 3.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.8 0.4 pps
Male 4.8 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.8 0.5 pps
Female 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.9 0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.1 6.5 8.0 7.7 8.2 0.5 pps
Male 6.5 4.7 6.7 6.3 6.5 0.2 pps
Female 9.7 8.3 9.1 8.9 9.8 0.9 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.3 5.8 13.7 17.8 15.4 -2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 8.2 13.4 29.2 35.1 32.9 -2.2 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.0 4.9 12.5 16.8 14.1 -2.7 pps
Older (55-64) 3.8 4.4 10.4 14.5 13.5 -1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.7 13.7 30.9 41.1 39.5 -1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.1 6.7 16.4 21.9 19.2 -2.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.1 3.0 6.1 7.8 6.4 -1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.3 5.9 13.9 18.0 15.6 -2.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 4.3 6.1 17.1 21.2 17.8 -3.4 pps
Female 4.3 5.6 10.4 14.5 13.0 -1.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 32.0 21.1 23.2 41.4 51.9 10.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.0 40.3 39.9 39.8 39.9 0.3 %
Male 40.6 40.9 40.5 40.4 40.4 0.0 %
Female 39.3 39.7 39.4 39.3 39.4 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -23.0 9.2 -6.9 -3.9 3.0 pps
Building and construction 15.9 -3.7 -26.3 -23.8 0.4 24.2 pps
Services 4.6 4.0 -4.9 -0.4 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 1.2 -13.1 -7.9 2.1 10.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 13.9 14.3 -9.9 -1.0 3.6 4.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 4.8 4.2 -6.4 -2.9 -1.6 1.2 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 21.3 17.8 -6.5 -4.7 2.8 7.5 pps
Wage and salaries 18.8 15.8 -16.7 -3.5 6.1 9.6 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 6.8 3.6 -8.6 6.9 3.8 -3.1 pps
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Luxembourg 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 465 467 481 488 500 2.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 316 318 330 335 344 2.7 %
(% of total population) 68.0 68.1 68.5 68.6 68.9 0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 211 213 227 229 234 2.3 %
Male 118 120 128 128 131 1.9 %
Female 94 92 99 100 103 2.9 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 66.9 66.8 68.7 68.2 68.0 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 26.6 29.1 32.3 24.7 24.9 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.8 83.4 84.8 85.7 85.7 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 32.6 35.1 39.3 40.5 40.3 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 62.7 62.7 64.8 64.3 63.7 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.1 71.9 73.3 72.8 72.8 0.0 pps
Male 75.0 74.7 76.5 76.0 75.0 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 30.7 30.8 34.8 26.7 26.2 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.9 93.8 94.1 94.8 93.9 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 36.3 39.6 47.7 48.9 48.4 -0.5 pps
Female 58.9 58.7 60.7 60.3 60.7 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 22.4 27.0 29.2 22.5 23.2 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.7 72.9 75.3 76.3 77.1 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 29.2 30.4 30.8 32.2 32.0 -0.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.2 63.4 65.2 65.2 64.6 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 22.5 23.9 26.7 21.2 20.7 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.9 80.0 81.2 82.3 82.0 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 32.0 34.1 38.1 39.6 39.2 -0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 49.8 48.4 45.0 43.8 44.2 0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 67.4 65.3 65.8 66.7 64.4 -2.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 83.5 83.7 83.8 83.8 83.7 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 33.7 33.5 33.6 33.7 32.9 -0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 30.4 29.9 31.5 31.5 31.7 0.2 pps
Male 72.3 71.5 73.2 73.1 72.1 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 26.7 27.1 29.0 22.1 22.8 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.2 90.2 90.8 92.0 90.8 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 35.4 38.8 46.6 47.8 47.0 -0.8 pps
Female 56.1 55.2 57.0 57.2 56.9 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 18.3 20.6 24.2 20.4 18.4 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.7 69.5 71.4 72.5 72.8 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 28.8 29.5 29.6 31.4 31.2 -0.2 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 202.6 201.8 214.8 218.6 222.4 1.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 4.5 4.7 1.0 1.8 2.7 0.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 4.0 -0.4 6.4 1.8 1.7 0.0 pps
Male 2.4 1.6 6.1 1.0 1.9 0.9 pps
Female 5.8 -2.8 6.9 2.7 1.7 -1.0 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 7.0 6.1 7.4 7.2 7.7 0.5 pps
Male 4.5 3.7 5.0 4.7 4.9 0.2 pps
Female 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.8 0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 6.8 6.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 0.0 pps
Male 6.2 5.9 6.3 6.2 6.3 0.1 pps
Female 7.6 6.6 8.3 8.3 8.2 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 17.8 17.9 17.6 17.5 18.0 0.5 pps
Male 2.6 2.7 4.5 3.4 4.3 0.9 pps
Female 37.1 38.2 34.9 35.8 35.9 0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 4.9 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 15.2 17.9 17.2 14.2 16.8 2.6 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.4 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.4 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) : : : : : : pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 5.8 6.6 8.2 6.1 8.3 2.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 3.4 5.9 4.3 4.0 4.4 0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.2 2.4 4.2 3.8 3.7 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.5 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.9 7.3 7.3 6.1 6.4 0.3 pps
Male 3.4 4.1 4.5 3.8 3.9 0.1 pps
Female 5.1 5.9 5.9 5.5 6.2 0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 28.7 32.2 23.2 29.3 28.6 -0.7 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.8 40.4 41.4 41.4 41.3 -0.2 %
Male 41.2 40.9 42.4 42.2 42.1 -0.2 %
Female 40.0 39.3 39.3 39.6 39.6 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : : : : : : pps
Building and construction 5.1 : : : : : pps
Services 5.1 : : : : : pps
Manufacturing industry : : : : : : pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.7 2.2 1.8 2.6 2.0 -0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.1 -2.1 1.7 -2.2 -2.6 -0.4 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.2 3.1 4.0 2.2 3.0 0.8 pps
Wage and salaries 8.9 6.8 1.7 4.7 4.7 0.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.1 -3.8 -6.2 0.8 -1.1 -1.9 pps
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Hungary 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 9907 9893 9867 9852 9833 -0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 6800 6794 6771 6769 6770 0.0 %
(% of total population) 68.6 68.7 68.6 68.7 68.9 0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4209 4178 4172 4225 4247 0.5 %
Male 2290 2267 2260 2270 2292 1.0 %
Female 1919 1911 1912 1955 1954 0.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 61.9 61.5 61.6 62.4 62.7 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 25.6 25.0 24.6 24.9 24.8 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.0 80.1 80.2 80.9 81.3 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 34.5 33.1 35.0 37.3 39.2 1.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.9 61.4 61.5 62.4 62.7 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 68.0 70.4 73.8 67.8 63.6 -4.3 pps
Male 69.0 68.3 68.2 68.3 68.8 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 29.3 28.6 27.7 27.7 27.3 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.9 87.0 86.9 87.2 88.3 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 43.6 40.5 42.6 43.1 44.0 0.8 pps
Female 55.1 55.0 55.3 56.7 56.8 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 21.8 21.3 21.5 22.1 22.1 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.2 73.3 73.6 74.6 74.3 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 27.3 27.0 28.8 32.4 35.2 2.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 57.3 56.7 55.4 55.4 55.8 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 21.0 20.0 18.1 18.3 18.3 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.6 74.4 72.9 72.5 73.1 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 33.1 31.4 32.8 34.4 35.8 1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 27.3 27.2 25.7 25.9 25.7 -0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 64.8 63.3 61.6 61.1 61.1 0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 80.0 79.5 78.1 77.8 78.4 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.9 56.2 54.9 55.0 55.4 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.0 pps
Male 64.0 63.0 61.1 60.4 61.2 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 24.2 23.1 19.9 20.0 19.9 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.3 81.0 78.9 77.9 79.6 1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 41.7 38.5 39.9 39.6 39.8 0.2 pps
Female 50.9 50.6 49.9 50.6 50.6 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 17.8 16.9 16.3 16.6 16.7 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 67.9 67.9 66.9 67.1 66.6 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 26.2 25.7 27.0 30.1 32.4 2.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3897.0 3849.2 3751.2 3750.1 3779.0 0.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.0 -1.4 -2.8 0.3 0.3 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)
-0.2 -1.2 -2.5 0.0 0.8 0.8 pps
Male 0.2 -1.5 -3.2 -1.0 1.7 2.7 pps
Female -0.7 -0.9 -1.8 1.2 -0.3 -1.4 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.8 11.6 11.9 11.7 11.4 -0.4 pps
Male 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.8 -0.1 pps
Female 3.8 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.5 -0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 7.3 7.8 8.4 9.6 8.9 -0.7 pps
Male 7.7 8.6 9.0 10.0 9.4 -0.6 pps
Female 6.8 7.0 7.8 9.2 8.4 -0.8 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 3.9 4.3 5.2 5.5 6.4 0.9 pps
Male 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.6 4.4 0.8 pps
Female 5.5 5.8 7.1 7.6 8.8 1.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.4 7.8 10.0 11.2 10.9 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 18.0 19.9 26.5 26.6 26.1 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.0 7.3 9.4 10.7 10.2 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 4.2 5.0 6.3 7.8 8.7 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 17.5 18.9 23.4 25.3 24.9 -0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.6 7.2 9.4 10.6 10.6 0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.9 2.8 4.0 4.7 4.5 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.4 7.9 10.1 11.3 11.0 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 11.2 8.4 8.9 0.5 pps
Male 7.1 7.6 10.3 11.6 11.0 -0.6 pps
Female 7.7 8.1 9.7 10.7 10.9 0.2 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 46.8 46.5 41.6 49.3 47.9 -1.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.7 40.7 40.5 40.5 40.3 -0.5 %
Male 41.5 41.5 41.1 41.1 40.9 -0.5 %
Female 39.6 39.8 39.8 39.8 39.5 -0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -7.1 -5.0 0.8 3.7 2.9 pps
Building and construction 2.8 -2.1 -5.4 -5.9 -2.1 3.8 pps
Services -0.2 1.7 -2.2 1.9 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -0.8 -6.4 -1.1 3.6 4.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 6.4 6.8 -1.4 -2.3 5.2 7.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.9 1.5 -4.8 -5.3 1.9 7.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 9.7 7.9 2.3 -0.7 5.5 6.2 pps
Wage and salaries 6.8 5.1 -2.3 1.0 4.2 3.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.1 2.4 -4.2 0.9 1.3 0.4 pps
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Malta 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 409 411 414 416 418 0.7 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 285 288 290 289 289 0.1 %
(% of total population) 69.7 70.1 70.0 69.5 69.0 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 166 169 171 174 178 2.1 %
Male 112 113 113 114 115 1.0 %
Female 54 57 58 60 63 4.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 58.4 58.8 59.1 60.3 61.6 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 53.1 52.2 51.3 51.4 51.8 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.7 70.8 71.8 73.1 74.7 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 29.5 30.5 29.6 31.5 32.7 1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.5 58.9 59.0 60.2 61.5 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 57.5 56.1 60.0 64.1 64.5 0.3 pps
Male 77.6 76.9 76.7 77.8 78.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 56.9 55.2 55.1 55.1 56.4 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.2 93.6 93.7 94.4 94.8 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 47.5 47.9 47.6 50.3 51.5 1.2 pps
Female 38.6 40.2 40.7 42.3 44.0 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 48.9 49.1 47.5 47.3 46.9 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 44.0 46.8 48.8 51.0 53.6 2.7 pps
Older (55-64) 12.4 13.1 11.7 13.5 14.1 0.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 54.6 55.3 55.0 56.1 57.6 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 45.7 45.8 43.9 44.8 44.7 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 66.2 67.4 68.0 68.8 70.6 1.8 pps
Older (55-64) 28.4 29.1 27.9 30.2 31.8 1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 45.6 46.6 45.9 47.4 47.4 0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 71.6 71.7 72.8 70.3 72.3 2.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.0 84.6 83.6 83.9 86.1 2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 53.2 53.8 53.2 54.2 55.9 1.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.6 -0.3 pps
Male 73.0 72.6 71.5 72.4 73.6 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 48.2 47.8 46.2 47.8 48.6 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.9 89.5 88.9 88.9 89.7 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 46.0 46.5 45.2 47.9 50.2 2.2 pps
Female 35.7 37.4 37.6 39.2 40.9 1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 43.3 44.1 41.4 41.5 40.4 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 41.2 44.0 45.8 47.9 50.6 2.8 pps
Older (55-64) 11.7 12.5 11.0 12.8 13.8 1.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 155.5 159.1 159.3 162.0 166.3 2.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.2 2.6 -0.3 2.4 2.4 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 3.2 2.3 0.1 1.7 2.7 1.0 pps
Male 1.1 0.5 -0.4 0.6 1.7 1.1 pps
Female 8.0 6.2 0.8 4.1 4.5 0.4 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 13.8 13.1 13.3 13.8 13.0 -0.7 pps
Male 11.5 11.1 11.2 11.8 10.9 -0.9 pps
Female 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.2 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 5.1 4.2 4.8 5.6 6.5 0.9 pps
Male 3.7 3.3 3.6 4.6 5.7 1.1 pps
Female 7.7 5.8 6.8 7.3 7.9 0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 10.6 11.1 10.7 11.7 12.4 0.7 pps
Male 4.0 4.0 4.4 5.0 5.4 0.4 pps
Female 24.6 25.3 23.2 24.5 25.5 1.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.5 6.0 6.9 6.9 6.5 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 13.9 12.2 14.4 13.0 13.7 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.2 5.1 5.6 6.0 5.4 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) : : : : : : pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.6 8.4 9.1 9.2 9.1 -0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) : : 4.7 5.2 4.4 -0.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.4 6.1 6.8 6.9 6.5 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 5.9 5.6 6.6 6.9 6.2 -0.7 pps
Female 7.6 6.9 7.6 7.1 7.1 0.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 41.9 42.2 43.5 46.3 46.2 -0.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.0 41.2 41.0 40.5 40.3 -0.5 %
Male 41.9 42.0 41.8 41.4 41.3 -0.2 %
Female 38.6 39.1 38.9 38.5 38.0 -1.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -6.3 7.3 2.2 -5.5 -7.7 pps
Building and construction 3.2 0.1 -4.0 -2.3 -1.1 1.2 pps
Services 4.1 4.9 1.5 3.6 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -6.1 -5.8 -1.6 -3.7 -2.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.7 4.8 3.3 -0.4 0.7 1.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -1.1 1.7 0.8 -3.2 -1.6 1.7 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 0.2 0.9 2.1 1.1 1.9 0.8 pps
Wage and salaries 5.2 7.8 2.3 1.9 3.4 1.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.2 1.5 -2.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 pps
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Netherlands 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 16180 16190 16223 16350 16400 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 10986 10970 10970 11017 10994 -0.2 %
(% of total population) 67.9 67.8 67.6 67.4 67.0 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8622 8704 8742 8614 8614 0.0 %
Male 4680 4705 4700 4632 4609 -0.5 %
Female 3942 3999 4042 3982 4005 0.6 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 78.5 79.3 79.7 78.2 78.4 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 72.7 73.2 72.8 69.0 68.8 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 88.5 88.8 87.9 87.5 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 52.8 54.7 56.8 55.9 58.5 2.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 79.1 79.8 80.2 78.7 78.9 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 65.1 68.8 68.4 67.0 67.2 0.2 pps
Male 84.6 85.3 85.3 83.7 83.5 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 73.1 73.7 72.7 68.6 67.8 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.0 94.5 94.4 93.3 93.0 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 64.0 65.9 67.6 67.3 68.6 1.3 pps
Female 72.2 73.3 74.1 72.6 73.1 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 72.4 72.6 72.9 69.4 69.9 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.2 82.5 83.0 82.4 81.9 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 43.5 46.0 44.5 48.4 3.9 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 76.0 77.2 77.0 74.7 74.9 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 68.4 69.3 68.0 63.0 63.5 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.4 86.8 86.3 84.7 84.2 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 50.9 53.0 55.1 53.7 56.1 2.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 61.0 62.8 62.2 59.2 59.8 0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 79.9 80.9 80.9 78.7 78.5 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.5 88.0 87.6 86.6 86.7 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 72.8 73.8 73.6 71.7 71.7 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.6 0.1 pps
Male 82.2 83.2 82.4 80.0 79.8 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 68.9 69.8 67.5 62.6 62.7 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.1 93.0 92.0 90.0 89.4 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 61.5 63.7 65.4 64.5 65.8 1.3 pps
Female 69.6 71.1 71.5 69.3 69.9 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 67.9 68.8 68.4 63.5 64.4 0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.7 80.5 80.7 79.3 79.0 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 40.1 42.2 44.7 42.8 46.4 3.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8345.1 8467.6 8443.4 8226.9 8231.7 0.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.6 1.5 -0.7 -0.4 0.7 1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.4 1.5 -0.3 -2.6 0.1 2.6 pps
Male 1.7 0.9 -1.0 -2.5 -0.5 2.0 pps
Female 3.2 2.2 0.6 -2.6 0.7 3.3 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.0 12.1 12.4 13.8 13.7 -0.1 pps
Male 8.0 8.0 8.1 9.2 9.0 -0.1 pps
Female 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 17.9 17.9 18.0 18.3 18.2 -0.1 pps
Male 16.4 16.2 16.0 16.9 17.0 0.1 pps
Female 19.5 19.8 20.2 19.8 19.5 -0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 46.3 46.8 47.7 48.3 48.5 0.2 pps
Male 22.5 22.8 23.6 24.2 24.3 0.1 pps
Female 74.8 75.2 75.7 76.2 76.5 0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 3.6 3.1 3.7 4.5 4.4 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 5.9 5.3 6.6 8.7 7.6 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 2.5 2.0 2.8 3.7 3.7 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 3.6 3.2 3.1 4.0 4.2 0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 5.3 4.6 5.5 7.4 6.9 -0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 2.9 2.4 3.1 4.0 4.1 0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.8 2.8 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.1 2.6 3.2 4.3 4.2 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 6.5 6.2 7.0 9.5 9.7 0.2 pps
Male 3.1 2.8 3.7 4.4 4.5 0.1 pps
Female 4.1 3.4 3.8 4.5 4.4 -0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 39.3 34.4 24.2 27.5 33.5 6.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.1 41.0 41.2 41.4 0.5 %
Male 41.9 41.7 41.6 41.8 42.0 0.5 %
Female 38.9 38.9 38.8 38.9 39.1 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -1.9 -2.0 -0.7 -0.6 0.1 pps
Building and construction 1.2 1.8 -1.8 -2.4 -1.8 0.6 pps
Services 3.1 1.2 -2.0 -2.0 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 0.9 -2.6 -2.9 -0.9 2.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.0 3.4 2.1 1.2 1.5 0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.6 1.1 2.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.3 3.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 pps
Wage and salaries 6.1 4.8 1.2 0.4 1.8 1.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.3 0.3 -3.0 2.0 0.3 -1.7 pps
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Austria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 8191 8220 8238 8259 8290 0.4 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 5551 5576 5588 5606 5644 0.7 %
(% of total population) 67.8 67.8 67.8 67.9 68.1 0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4149 4182 4207 4209 4248 0.9 %
Male 2257 2259 2252 2256 2275 0.9 %
Female 1891 1923 1955 1953 1973 1.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 74.7 75.0 75.3 75.1 75.3 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 60.8 60.8 60.5 58.8 59.9 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.4 87.3 87.7 87.7 88.1 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 39.8 41.9 42.1 43.3 42.9 -0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.3 75.7 75.9 75.8 76.0 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.5 69.5 70.3 70.1 70.5 0.4 pps
Male 81.7 81.4 81.0 80.9 81.1 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 65.0 64.6 64.0 63.6 64.9 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.7 93.0 92.6 92.5 92.8 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 51.3 52.8 52.3 53.0 52.6 -0.4 pps
Female 67.8 68.6 69.6 69.3 69.5 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 56.7 56.9 57.0 54.1 55.0 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.1 81.5 82.8 82.8 83.4 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 28.9 31.6 32.4 34.2 33.7 -0.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 71.4 72.1 71.6 71.7 72.1 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 55.5 55.9 54.5 53.6 54.9 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.0 84.4 84.0 84.2 84.9 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 38.6 41.0 41.1 42.4 41.5 -0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 51.9 51.0 49.1 49.3 49.9 0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 75.9 77.1 76.6 76.7 76.8 0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 86.5 86.1 86.1 85.1 85.9 0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.0 64.5 64.2 63.9 64.0 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 7.4 7.6 7.5 7.8 8.1 0.4 pps
Male 78.4 78.5 76.9 77.1 77.8 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 59.6 59.5 57.3 57.9 59.8 1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.6 90.2 88.5 88.7 89.6 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 49.8 51.8 51.0 51.6 50.6 -1.0 pps
Female 64.4 65.8 66.4 66.4 66.5 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 51.5 52.3 51.6 49.4 50.1 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.5 78.6 79.5 79.7 80.2 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 28.0 30.8 31.7 33.7 32.9 -0.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3963.2 4019.8 4002.4 4021.1 4069.6 1.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.8 2.0 -0.7 0.8 1.7 0.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.1 1.4 -0.4 0.5 1.2 0.7 pps
Male 2.3 0.5 -1.8 0.6 1.5 0.8 pps
Female 1.8 2.6 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.7 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.7 11.1 10.9 11.3 11.3 0.1 pps
Male 7.5 7.2 7.1 7.3 7.3 0.1 pps
Female 4.1 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.6 0.3 pps
Male 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.8 9.7 -0.1 pps
Female 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.9 9.5 0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 21.8 22.6 23.7 24.3 24.3 0.0 pps
Male 6.2 6.9 7.4 7.8 7.8 0.0 pps
Female 40.7 41.1 42.4 43.3 43.4 0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.4 3.8 4.8 4.4 4.2 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 8.7 8.0 10.0 8.8 8.3 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.9 3.4 4.2 4.0 3.8 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 3.0 2.1 2.4 2.2 3.2 1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.8 8.1 10.1 8.7 8.6 -0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 3.7 3.3 4.2 4.0 3.6 -0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.5 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.4 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.8 3.4 4.2 3.9 3.6 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.6 7.8 10.4 8.7 8.4 -0.3 pps
Male 3.9 3.6 5.0 4.6 4.0 -0.6 pps
Female 5.0 4.1 4.6 4.2 4.3 0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 26.8 24.2 21.3 25.2 25.9 0.7 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 43.1 42.9 42.0 41.9 42.1 0.5 %
Male 43.9 43.7 42.8 42.7 42.8 0.2 %
Female 41.4 41.1 40.4 40.4 40.6 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -1.2 -0.7 -1.2 -0.5 0.7 pps
Building and construction 2.0 3.4 0.1 0.5 2.0 1.5 pps
Services 2.2 2.2 -1.2 1.4 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 1.2 -3.8 -1.3 1.2 2.5 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.1 3.2 1.7 1.2 1.9 0.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.6 1.3 1.2 -0.4 1.1 1.4 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.5 4.8 4.3 1.2 4.0 2.8 pps
Wage and salaries 5.3 5.5 0.8 2.0 3.9 1.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.9 -0.5 -3.1 1.2 1.0 -0.2 pps
2010-2011
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Poland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 37277 37158 37196 37368 37503 0.4 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 26299 26266 26338 26527 26618 0.3 %
(% of total population) 70.5 70.7 70.8 71.0 71.0 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 16610 16765 17039 17414 17599 1.1 %
Male 9086 9170 9310 9492 9616 1.3 %
Female 7524 7595 7728 7922 7983 0.8 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 63.2 63.8 64.7 65.6 66.1 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 33.0 33.1 33.8 34.5 33.6 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.7 82.5 83.4 84.1 84.2 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 31.8 33.3 34.5 36.7 39.6 2.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.2 63.8 64.7 65.6 66.1 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 69.7 71.4 72.6 68.2 70.1 1.9 pps
Male 70.0 70.9 71.8 72.4 73.0 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 36.5 36.5 38.1 39.1 38.7 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.9 88.8 89.4 89.7 89.8 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 44.8 46.8 47.5 48.9 51.6 2.7 pps
Female 56.5 57.0 57.8 59.0 59.4 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 29.3 29.6 29.4 29.7 28.2 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.6 76.3 77.5 78.6 78.7 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 20.6 21.6 23.2 25.9 29.1 3.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 57.0 59.2 59.3 59.3 59.7 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 25.8 27.4 26.8 26.3 24.9 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.9 77.5 77.6 77.1 77.2 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 29.7 31.6 32.3 34.0 36.9 2.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 24.9 25.5 24.6 23.6 23.5 -0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 61.0 63.3 62.7 62.0 62.2 0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 82.8 83.7 83.7 82.7 82.4 -0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.9 59.1 59.3 59.2 59.6 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 pps
Male 63.6 66.3 66.1 65.6 66.3 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 29.2 31.0 30.4 30.3 29.6 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.1 84.0 83.7 82.6 83.0 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 44.1 44.3 45.3 47.8 2.6 pps
Female 50.6 52.4 52.8 53.0 53.1 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 22.4 23.7 23.2 22.1 20.1 -2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 68.8 71.0 71.6 71.7 71.4 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 19.4 20.7 21.9 24.2 27.3 3.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 14996.5 15557.4 15629.5 15718.9 15879.6 1.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 4.5 3.9 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 4.6 3.7 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.5 pps
Male 4.2 3.8 0.1 0.2 1.6 1.4 pps
Female 5.1 3.7 1.0 1.0 0.3 -0.7 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 18.7 18.3 18.3 18.5 18.5 0.0 pps
Male 12.3 12.0 12.0 12.1 12.2 0.0 pps
Female 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 28.2 26.9 26.4 27.2 26.9 -0.3 pps
Male 28.4 26.2 26.2 27.3 27.5 0.2 pps
Female 27.9 27.6 26.6 27.1 26.2 -0.9 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.3 -0.3 pps
Male 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.7 -0.3 pps
Female 11.7 10.9 10.9 10.8 10.4 -0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 9.6 7.1 8.2 9.6 9.7 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 21.7 17.3 20.6 23.7 25.8 2.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 8.4 6.1 7.0 8.4 8.4 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 6.8 5.3 6.3 7.1 6.9 -0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 16.5 12.8 15.4 18.4 19.2 0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 10.3 7.6 8.8 10.6 10.5 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.7 3.8 4.4 5.0 5.3 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 9.7 7.2 8.3 9.7 9.8 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 9.0 6.4 7.8 9.3 9.0 -0.3 pps
Female 10.4 8.0 8.7 10.0 10.5 0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 51.4 33.5 30.3 31.1 37.2 6.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.2 41.8 41.4 41.3 41.1 -0.5 %
Male 43.9 43.4 42.9 42.8 42.5 -0.7 %
Female 39.9 39.7 39.4 39.3 39.2 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -0.9 -4.5 -2.8 -0.3 2.5 pps
Building and construction 14.5 16.0 5.5 -2.4 2.9 5.3 pps
Services 5.0 3.4 3.2 2.5 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 4.7 -5.2 -3.3 1.9 5.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 4.9 8.9 3.5 4.7 5.1 0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.9 5.6 -0.2 3.3 1.9 -1.4 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 10.5 10.1 5.1 1.2 4.5 3.3 pps
Wage and salaries 11.1 15.3 3.8 5.0 : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.2 1.2 1.2 3.4 3.3 -0.1 pps
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Portugal 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10604 10623 10638 10636 10647 0.1 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7135 7145 7143 7114 7097 -0.2 %
(% of total population) 67.3 67.3 67.1 66.9 66.7 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 5285 5299 5263 5264 5261 -0.1 %
Male 2801 2811 2775 2755 2762 0.3 %
Female 2484 2488 2488 2509 2499 -0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 74.1 74.2 73.7 74.0 74.1 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 41.9 41.6 39.2 36.7 38.8 2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 88.0 87.9 88.7 88.4 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 54.4 54.4 53.9 54.0 53.7 -0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 73.8 73.8 73.4 73.7 73.8 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 81.4 82.2 79.8 80.8 82.1 1.3 pps
Male 79.4 79.5 78.5 78.2 78.5 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 45.3 44.4 40.8 38.6 41.1 2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.8 93.2 92.4 92.5 92.3 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 63.0 63.0 62.7 61.8 61.6 -0.2 pps
Female 68.8 68.9 69.0 69.9 69.8 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 38.4 38.6 37.5 34.8 36.4 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.8 82.9 83.4 84.9 84.5 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 46.7 46.6 45.9 47.0 46.5 -0.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 67.8 68.2 66.3 65.6 64.2 -1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 34.9 34.7 31.3 28.5 27.2 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.0 81.6 79.7 79.2 77.8 -1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 50.9 50.8 49.7 49.2 47.9 -1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 65.7 65.8 62.9 61.8 59.6 -2.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 64.8 65.8 66.3 66.1 65.9 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 84.2 84.7 84.3 82.8 80.9 -1.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.1 65.0 63.4 62.8 62.0 -0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.2 -0.6 pps
Male 73.8 74.0 71.1 70.1 68.1 -1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 39.1 38.5 33.2 30.4 29.3 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.2 87.6 84.5 83.9 81.6 -2.3 pps
Older (55-64) 58.6 58.5 57.5 55.6 54.2 -1.4 pps
Female 61.9 62.5 61.6 61.1 60.4 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 30.6 30.8 29.4 26.5 24.9 -1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.9 75.8 74.9 74.6 74.1 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 44.0 43.9 42.7 43.5 42.1 -1.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4836.6 4872.2 4735.5 4663.4 4557.4 -2.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.0 0.5 -2.6 -1.5 -1.5 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.1 0.7 -2.8 -1.5 -2.3 -0.8 pps
Male 0.1 0.5 -3.9 -1.8 -2.9 -1.1 pps
Female 0.1 1.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.6 -0.4 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 19.0 18.8 18.5 17.5 16.5 -1.0 pps
Male 11.2 10.9 11.1 10.5 10.4 -0.2 pps
Female 7.8 7.9 7.5 7.0 6.2 -0.8 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 22.4 22.9 22.0 23.0 22.2 -0.8 pps
Male 21.8 21.7 20.8 22.4 22.0 -0.4 pps
Female 23.0 24.2 23.3 23.7 22.4 -1.3 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.4 10.1 1.7 pps
Male 4.7 4.1 4.3 4.9 7.0 2.1 pps
Female 13.6 13.9 13.0 12.3 13.7 1.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.9 8.5 10.6 12.0 12.9 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 16.6 16.4 20.0 22.4 30.1 7.7 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.9 7.4 9.5 11.1 12.1 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 6.5 6.6 7.7 8.9 10.8 1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.7 8.3 11.0 12.5 14.6 2.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.2 7.9 9.7 11.4 13.4 2.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 7.6 7.0 6.5 7.2 9.3 2.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.3 7.9 9.7 11.1 13.0 1.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 12.1 10.9 16.4 18.9 22.1 3.2 pps
Male 8.0 7.9 10.7 11.8 12.7 0.9 pps
Female 10.0 9.2 10.5 12.2 13.2 1.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 47.1 47.4 44.2 52.3 48.1 -4.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.5 40.4 40.4 40.5 41.3 2.0 %
Male 41.3 41.2 41.2 41.3 42.2 2.2 %
Female 39.5 39.4 39.3 39.5 40.1 1.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -0.7 -1.7 -3.8 -2.8 1.0 pps
Building and construction 0.9 -2.6 -8.0 -3.9 -5.6 -1.7 pps
Services 0.7 2.1 -1.7 -1.3 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -1.9 -7.4 -3.2 -1.3 1.9 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.6 3.0 2.8 1.4 -0.9 -2.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.7 1.4 1.9 0.3 -1.5 -1.9 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5.3 4.3 3.3 1.4 -0.3 -1.7 pps
Wage and salaries 4.2 2.9 0.2 : : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.4 -0.5 -0.3 3.0 -0.1 -3.1 pps
2010-2011
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Romania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 21551 21517 21484 21447 21384 -0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 15046 15042 15028 14999 14968 -0.2 %
(% of total population) 69.8 69.9 69.9 69.9 70.0 0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 9483 9457 9485 9547 9480 -0.7 %
Male 5261 5294 5313 5352 5281 -1.3 %
Female 4222 4164 4172 4195 4200 0.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 63.0 62.9 63.1 63.6 63.3 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 30.5 30.4 30.9 31.2 31.1 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.0 78.3 78.5 79.5 79.1 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 42.4 44.2 43.9 42.5 41.5 -0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.0 62.9 63.1 63.6 63.3 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 66.9 62.9 64.7 0.0 : : pps
Male 70.1 70.6 70.9 71.5 70.7 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 35.9 35.9 35.9 36.2 35.4 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.9 85.8 86.3 87.5 86.5 -1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 52.1 55.1 54.5 52.7 51.6 -1.0 pps
Female 56.0 55.2 55.4 55.8 56.0 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 24.9 24.7 25.8 26.1 26.7 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.0 70.7 70.6 71.4 71.7 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 33.9 34.7 34.7 33.5 32.7 -0.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.8 59.0 58.6 58.8 58.5 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 24.4 24.8 24.5 24.3 23.8 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.6 74.4 73.7 74.4 74.1 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 43.1 42.6 41.1 40.0 -1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 40.3 41.0 42.0 43.0 40.5 -2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 63.9 63.5 62.2 62.2 62.3 0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.8 85.7 84.1 82.4 82.1 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.7 59.0 58.5 58.8 58.4 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 64.8 65.7 65.2 65.7 65.0 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 28.3 29.1 28.3 28.1 27.0 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.6 80.9 80.5 81.5 80.7 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 50.3 53.0 52.3 50.3 48.9 -1.4 pps
Female 52.8 52.5 52.0 52.0 52.0 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 20.2 20.2 20.6 20.4 20.4 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 68.5 67.8 66.9 67.2 67.4 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 33.6 34.4 34.1 33.0 32.2 -0.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8842.5 8882.2 8804.7 8822.0 8750.0 -0.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.4 0.0 -2.0 -1.4 0.4 1.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.1 0.4 -0.9 0.2 -0.8 -1.0 pps
Male 0.6 1.3 -0.7 0.5 -1.4 -1.9 pps
Female -0.6 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 18.6 18.2 18.4 19.5 17.9 -1.6 pps
Male 13.4 13.2 13.4 14.3 12.9 -1.4 pps
Female 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.2 4.9 -0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.5 0.4 pps
Male 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.8 0.6 pps
Female 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.7 9.3 -0.4 pps
Male 8.3 8.1 8.0 9.6 8.7 -0.9 pps
Female 8.9 9.3 9.1 9.9 10.1 0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.4 5.8 6.9 7.3 7.4 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 20.1 18.6 20.8 22.1 23.7 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.8 5.1 6.1 6.6 6.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.7 0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.6 8.6 8.9 7.2 8.6 1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.9 6.0 7.3 8.3 8.1 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.0 2.7 4.4 5.4 5.2 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.8 6.1 7.2 7.6 7.7 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 7.2 6.7 7.7 7.9 7.9 0.0 pps
Female 5.4 4.7 5.8 6.5 6.8 0.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 50.0 41.3 31.6 34.9 41.9 7.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.1 41.0 40.7 40.7 40.7 0.0 %
Male 41.8 41.7 41.4 41.3 41.3 0.0 %
Female 40.1 40.0 39.9 40.0 40.0 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : : -0.1 5.1 1.9 -3.2 pps
Building and construction 22.1 : -1.2 -5.5 1.2 6.7 pps
Services 0.6 : 0.4 -3.3 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : : -9.7 -7.5 1.1 8.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 22.0 31.9 -1.9 7.6 3.8 -3.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 7.5 14.5 -5.9 1.5 -4.0 -5.5 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 21.1 20.4 12.0 5.2 7.0 1.8 pps
Wage and salaries 22.8 36.3 -6.6 3.4 5.1 1.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 5.9 7.3 -4.7 -0.2 2.0 2.2 pps
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Slovenia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 2015 2033 2037 2048 2051 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 1412 1422 1414 1422 1421 -0.1 %
(% of total population) 70.1 70.0 69.4 69.4 69.2 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1007 1021 1016 1017 998 -1.8 %
Male 547 554 550 551 540 -2.1 %
Female 460 466 466 466 459 -1.5 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 71.3 71.8 71.8 71.5 70.3 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 41.8 42.9 40.9 39.9 37.4 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.3 90.1 89.6 90.0 90.1 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 34.6 34.2 36.9 36.5 33.3 -3.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.3 71.8 71.9 71.5 70.2 -1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.3 71.6 64.5 68.9 73.2 4.3 pps
Male 75.8 75.8 75.6 75.4 73.9 -1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 47.7 47.6 45.3 44.4 41.9 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.3 91.6 91.2 91.7 91.8 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 46.7 46.4 48.2 47.5 42.7 -4.9 pps
Female 66.6 67.5 67.9 67.4 66.4 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 35.4 37.4 35.8 34.8 32.3 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.3 88.5 88.0 88.1 88.4 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 23.1 22.2 25.6 25.5 23.7 -1.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 67.8 68.6 67.5 66.2 64.4 -1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 37.6 38.4 35.3 34.1 31.5 -2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.3 86.8 84.9 83.7 83.1 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 33.4 32.8 35.6 35.0 31.2 -3.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 43.1 42.9 41.1 39.7 35.3 -4.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 70.8 72.0 70.0 68.6 66.4 -2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.5 87.5 88.1 86.6 85.5 -1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 67.2 67.7 66.8 65.2 63.1 -2.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.3 0.4 pps
Male 72.7 72.7 71.0 69.6 67.7 -1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 43.2 43.0 39.1 37.6 35.7 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.1 88.6 86.4 85.2 84.8 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 45.2 44.7 46.4 45.5 39.5 -6.0 pps
Female 62.6 64.2 63.8 62.6 60.9 -1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 31.5 33.2 31.0 30.0 26.9 -3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.4 84.8 83.2 82.1 81.3 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 22.2 21.1 24.8 24.6 22.8 -1.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 957.0 975.2 954.8 941.5 914.8 -2.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.3 2.6 -1.8 -2.5 -1.7 0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.2 1.9 -2.1 -1.4 -2.8 -1.4 pps
Male 2.9 1.4 -2.9 -1.3 -2.9 -1.6 pps
Female 1.2 2.5 -1.1 -1.5 -2.7 -1.2 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.0 9.3 10.1 11.6 11.9 0.3 pps
Male 7.4 6.8 7.5 8.2 8.4 0.2 pps
Female 2.6 2.5 2.6 3.4 3.5 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 18.4 17.3 16.2 17.1 18.0 0.9 pps
Male 16.3 15.2 14.9 15.2 16.4 1.2 pps
Female 20.7 19.6 17.6 19.2 19.7 0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.1 8.1 9.5 10.3 9.5 -0.8 pps
Male 6.5 6.2 7.4 7.4 7.1 -0.3 pps
Female 10.0 10.4 12.1 13.6 12.2 -1.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.2 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 10.1 10.4 13.6 14.7 15.7 1.0 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.4 3.8 5.5 7.3 7.8 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 3.3 4.0 3.6 4.0 6.3 2.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.4 6.6 9.5 12.5 14.4 1.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.0 4.4 6.4 7.6 8.7 1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.3 3.4 3.2 4.3 5.0 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.3 1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 14.8 13.8 11.9 -1.9 pps
Male 4.0 4.0 5.9 7.5 8.2 0.7 pps
Female 5.9 4.8 5.8 7.1 8.2 1.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 45.7 42.2 30.1 43.3 44.2 0.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.8 41.6 41.3 41.2 40.7 -1.2 %
Male 42.5 42.3 41.9 41.8 41.3 -1.2 %
Female 40.8 40.6 40.4 40.4 40.0 -1.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -2.1 -1.7 -2.0 -2.5 -0.5 pps
Building and construction 10.9 12.2 -0.9 -9.5 -11.4 -1.9 pps
Services 4.0 3.7 0.3 -0.6 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : -0.5 -9.5 -6.2 -0.2 6.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 6.2 7.2 1.8 4.4 1.7 -2.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.9 3.0 -1.1 5.4 1.2 -4.3 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5.4 9.5 2.5 2.4 2.1 -0.3 pps
Wage and salaries 10.1 10.3 -1.1 1.2 -0.6 -1.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.5 0.8 -6.1 3.5 2.2 -1.3 pps
2010-2011
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Slovak Republic 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 5391 5396 5409 5422 5435 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3873 3892 3917 3926 3932 0.1 %
(% of total population) 71.8 72.1 72.4 72.4 72.3 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2646 2679 2680 2696 2707 0.4 %
Male 1464 1481 1491 1491 1508 1.1 %
Female 1182 1198 1189 1205 1200 -0.5 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 68.3 68.8 68.4 68.7 68.9 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 34.6 32.4 31.4 31.1 30.2 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.9 87.8 87.2 86.9 87.0 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 38.8 41.9 42.8 45.1 46.0 0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 68.3 68.8 68.4 68.7 68.9 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 71.2 77.6 74.2 59.5 72.1 12.6 pps
Male 75.9 76.4 76.3 76.1 76.7 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 38.9 37.8 37.1 36.4 37.3 0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.1 93.4 93.6 92.9 93.5 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 57.0 59.9 58.7 59.7 58.9 -0.8 pps
Female 60.8 61.3 60.6 61.3 61.0 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 30.2 26.8 25.4 25.5 22.8 -2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.7 82.1 80.7 80.9 80.4 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 23.3 26.4 29.0 32.2 34.6 2.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 60.7 62.3 60.2 58.8 59.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 27.6 26.2 22.8 20.6 20.2 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.0 80.1 77.8 75.8 76.5 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 35.6 39.2 39.5 40.5 41.4 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.7 15.9 14.3 14.3 14.9 0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 69.0 70.1 67.1 65.1 65.5 0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 83.1 83.9 80.3 78.0 76.8 -1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 60.6 62.1 60.1 58.6 59.4 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 pps
Male 68.4 70.0 67.6 65.2 66.3 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 30.9 30.8 26.8 23.8 25.0 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.0 86.4 84.2 81.4 82.6 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 52.6 56.7 54.9 54.0 52.6 -1.4 pps
Female 53.0 54.6 52.8 52.3 52.7 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 24.1 21.5 18.7 17.4 15.1 -2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.0 73.7 71.2 70.1 70.4 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 21.2 24.2 26.1 28.7 31.5 2.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2350.5 2423.4 2356.6 2307.2 2339.3 1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.1 3.2 -2.0 -1.5 1.8 3.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.4 3.1 -2.8 -2.1 1.4 3.5 pps
Male 2.4 2.9 -2.7 -3.2 1.9 5.1 pps
Female 2.4 3.3 -2.8 -0.7 0.8 1.5 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.8 13.6 15.5 15.8 15.8 0.0 pps
Male 9.6 10.3 11.3 11.7 11.6 -0.2 pps
Female 3.1 3.3 4.2 4.1 4.3 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 5.0 4.5 4.3 5.6 6.5 0.9 pps
Male 4.9 4.4 4.5 5.5 6.2 0.7 pps
Female 5.1 4.7 4.0 5.8 6.7 0.9 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.8 3.9 0.1 pps
Male 1.0 1.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.0 pps
Female 4.3 4.1 4.5 5.2 5.6 0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.6 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 20.3 19.0 27.3 33.6 33.2 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 10.2 8.8 10.9 13.0 12.2 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 8.2 6.4 7.7 10.1 10.0 -0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 45.1 39.6 41.7 44.3 42.4 -1.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 9.4 8.1 11.5 14.1 13.4 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.1 3.6 4.3 5.8 5.8 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.6 -0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 10.0 8.4 11.5 14.3 13.6 -0.7 pps
Female 12.8 11.0 12.9 14.7 13.6 -1.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 74.2 69.5 54.0 64.0 67.8 3.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.8 40.4 39.9 40.3 40.4 0.2 %
Male 41.7 41.3 40.7 41.1 41.2 0.2 %
Female 39.5 39.1 38.8 39.2 39.2 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -1.1 -7.1 -9.1 3.4 12.5 pps
Building and construction 5.1 9.3 3.9 -2.2 -1.8 0.4 pps
Services 2.6 3.6 1.1 0.2 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 4.1 -11.0 -4.2 3.6 7.8 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 8.7 7.0 3.6 4.4 0.9 -3.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 7.5 4.0 4.9 3.9 -0.7 -4.7 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 7.3 5.4 3.8 1.0 5.5 4.5 pps
Wage and salaries 10.6 7.5 1.1 2.6 4.5 1.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 8.2 2.4 -3.0 5.8 1.5 -4.3 pps
2010-2011
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Finland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 5266 5289 5317 5343 5365 0.4 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3497 3514 3527 3537 3518 -0.5 %
(% of total population) 66.4 66.4 66.3 66.2 65.6 -0.6 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2642 2669 2644 2634 2637 0.1 %
Male 1358 1376 1355 1360 1366 0.5 %
Female 1284 1293 1289 1274 1271 -0.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 75.6 76.0 75.0 74.5 74.9 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 53.4 53.5 50.4 49.4 50.5 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.0 88.6 88.2 87.5 87.6 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 58.8 59.7 59.1 60.2 60.9 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.7 76.0 75.0 74.6 75.2 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.5 72.3 71.7 69.3 67.6 -1.7 pps
Male 77.2 77.9 76.4 76.4 77.2 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 53.2 53.4 49.7 49.4 50.5 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.4 91.2 90.6 90.5 90.9 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 59.1 60.6 58.7 60.1 61.4 1.3 pps
Female 73.8 73.9 73.5 72.5 72.7 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 53.6 53.5 51.2 49.3 50.5 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.6 85.9 85.7 84.4 84.3 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 58.4 58.8 59.5 60.3 60.4 0.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 70.3 71.1 68.7 68.1 69.0 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 44.6 44.7 39.6 38.8 40.4 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.3 84.3 82.4 81.6 82.3 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 55.0 56.5 55.5 56.3 57.0 0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 46.4 46.4 43.0 41.1 41.2 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 73.9 75.1 71.9 71.2 72.2 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.1 85.6 84.4 84.0 84.3 0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 69.2 69.8 67.4 66.8 67.5 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.1 pps
Male 72.1 73.1 69.5 69.4 70.6 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 44.5 44.3 37.7 37.7 39.5 1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.0 87.3 84.3 83.9 84.8 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 55.1 57.1 54.6 55.6 56.8 1.1 pps
Female 68.5 69.0 67.9 66.9 67.4 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 44.7 45.0 41.5 40.0 41.2 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.6 81.2 80.5 79.2 79.6 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 55.0 55.9 56.3 56.9 57.2 0.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2458.5 2497.2 2423.3 2410.1 2428.5 0.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.2 2.6 -2.6 -0.1 1.1 1.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.8 1.6 -3.0 -0.5 0.8 1.3 pps
Male 1.5 1.9 -4.5 0.1 1.2 1.1 pps
Female 2.1 1.2 -1.3 -1.2 0.3 1.5 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.5 11.8 12.6 12.2 12.2 0.0 pps
Male 7.9 8.0 8.5 8.3 8.3 0.1 pps
Female 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.0 3.9 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 15.9 14.9 14.5 15.4 15.5 0.1 pps
Male 12.3 11.1 10.5 12.3 12.6 0.3 pps
Female 19.4 18.7 18.3 18.4 18.4 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 13.4 12.7 13.3 13.9 14.1 0.2 pps
Male 8.3 7.9 8.3 8.9 9.4 0.5 pps
Female 18.8 17.8 18.5 19.0 19.0 0.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4 7.8 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 16.5 16.5 21.5 21.4 20.1 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.3 4.9 6.7 6.8 6.2 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 6.3 5.4 6.2 6.5 6.4 -0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 13.0 12.8 15.3 16.7 16.7 0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.1 6.4 9.2 9.0 8.3 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.6 3.3 4.1 4.5 4.0 -0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.8 6.2 8.1 8.2 7.7 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 16.7 15.8 18.0 19.6 16.8 -2.8 pps
Male 6.5 6.1 8.9 9.1 8.4 -0.7 pps
Female 7.2 6.7 7.6 7.6 7.1 -0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 22.8 18.4 16.7 24.0 22.2 -1.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.2 39.2 38.6 39.0 39.0 0.0 %
Male 40.7 40.6 40.1 40.4 40.5 0.2 %
Female 37.4 37.3 36.8 37.2 37.1 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -1.0 -0.7 0.7 -3.9 -4.6 pps
Building and construction 7.1 3.6 -5.7 1.9 2.6 0.7 pps
Services 2.2 3.5 -3.2 0.7 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 2.1 -7.4 -3.9 -0.6 3.3 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.7 4.4 2.3 1.8 3.4 1.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.6 1.4 0.8 1.3 0.3 -1.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 6.3 4.1 4.3 0.6 2.6 2.0 pps
Wage and salaries 6.1 7.1 -0.5 2.5 4.5 1.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.1 -2.2 -6.1 3.4 1.6 -1.8 pps
2010-2011
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Sweden 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 9147 9203 9297 9363 9419 0.6 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 6002 6046 6080 6101 6113 0.2 %
(% of total population) 65.6 65.7 65.4 65.2 64.9 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4750 4797 4799 4852 4906 1.1 %
Male 2482 2508 2513 2550 2569 0.7 %
Female 2268 2289 2286 2302 2337 1.5 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 79.1 79.3 78.9 79.5 80.2 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 52.2 52.8 51.0 51.7 52.6 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.0 90.4 90.0 90.6 91.0 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 72.8 72.8 73.9 74.5 75.9 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 79.7 79.8 79.4 80.1 81.0 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 68.6 71.8 72.5 71.0 70.3 -0.7 pps
Male 81.4 81.7 81.4 82.3 82.7 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 51.8 52.6 51.1 52.1 52.6 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.9 93.1 92.8 93.6 93.8 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 76.2 76.5 77.8 79.1 79.9 0.8 pps
Female 76.8 76.9 76.4 76.7 77.7 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 52.7 53.1 51.0 51.4 52.5 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.1 87.6 87.1 87.5 88.1 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 69.4 69.0 69.9 69.8 71.8 2.0 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 74.2 74.3 72.2 72.7 74.1 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 42.2 42.2 38.3 38.7 40.5 1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.1 86.5 84.5 85.0 86.0 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 70.0 70.1 70.0 70.5 72.3 1.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 56.8 55.9 50.1 46.6 47.5 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 81.4 81.6 78.7 78.9 80.1 1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.6 88.1 87.0 87.1 86.9 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.2 71.1 68.8 69.2 70.5 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 0.1 pps
Male 76.5 76.7 74.2 75.1 76.3 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 42.0 42.2 37.6 38.2 40.1 1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.1 89.4 86.9 88.0 88.8 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 72.9 73.4 73.2 74.2 75.7 1.5 pps
Female 71.8 71.8 70.2 70.3 71.8 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 42.3 42.1 38.9 39.2 41.0 1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.0 83.5 81.9 82.0 83.2 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 67.0 66.7 66.7 66.8 68.9 2.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4453.3 4493.8 4391.4 4437.5 4529.4 2.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.3 0.9 -2.4 1.1 2.2 1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.3 0.9 -2.3 1.0 2.1 1.0 pps
Male 2.3 1.0 -2.8 1.6 1.8 0.2 pps
Female 2.3 0.8 -1.7 0.4 2.4 1.9 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 9.6 9.4 9.6 9.8 9.4 -0.4 pps
Male 7.1 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.8 -0.3 pps
Female 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 -0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 17.2 15.8 14.9 15.4 15.9 0.5 pps
Male 14.7 13.2 12.6 13.5 14.0 0.5 pps
Female 19.7 18.5 17.3 17.3 17.9 0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 24.2 25.7 26.0 25.3 24.7 -0.6 pps
Male 10.5 11.9 12.6 12.2 12.0 -0.2 pps
Female 39.5 40.9 40.5 39.7 38.7 -1.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.1 6.2 8.3 8.4 7.5 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 19.3 20.2 25.0 25.2 22.9 -2.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.6 4.5 6.5 6.4 5.7 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 4.0 3.8 5.3 5.4 4.7 -0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 11.9 12.6 16.7 18.2 16.7 -1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.2 5.0 7.7 7.6 6.9 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.6 3.4 4.5 4.5 4.2 -0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 5.9 5.9 8.0 7.9 6.9 -1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 13.0 14.3 16.8 18.8 20.7 1.9 pps
Male 5.9 5.9 8.6 8.5 7.6 -0.9 pps
Female 6.5 6.6 8.0 8.2 7.5 -0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 13.9 12.7 13.2 17.8 18.6 0.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.6 39.6 39.2 39.9 39.8 -0.3 %
Male 40.5 40.5 40.0 40.7 40.5 -0.5 %
Female 38.1 38.2 37.9 38.5 38.5 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : 1.5 -0.5 1.2 -0.8 -2.0 pps
Building and construction 7.6 7.2 -1.0 4.0 5.1 1.1 pps
Services 2.1 2.3 -1.7 1.8 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 0.3 -9.8 -1.5 0.9 2.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.2 1.5 1.6 3.0 0.8 -2.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.4 -1.6 -0.4 2.0 -0.1 -2.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.4 2.4 3.7 2.0 2.7 0.7 pps
Wage and salaries 7.0 5.5 0.1 3.1 5.7 2.6 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.0 -1.5 -2.7 5.0 1.7 -3.3 pps
2010-2011
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United Kingdom 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 59862 60305 60734 61099 61510 0.7 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 39845 40094 40318 40441 40599 0.4 %
(% of total population) 66.6 66.5 66.4 66.2 66.0 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 30089 30409 30525 30529 30721 0.6 %
Male 16260 16416 16433 16433 16512 0.5 %
Female 13829 13993 14093 14096 14209 0.8 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 75.5 75.8 75.7 75.5 75.7 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 61.7 61.7 59.7 59.2 58.8 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 84.9 85.1 85.0 85.3 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 59.3 59.9 60.3 59.9 59.7 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.8 76.1 76.0 75.7 75.8 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.5 73.3 73.1 73.6 74.3 0.6 pps
Male 82.2 82.4 82.0 81.7 81.7 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 64.6 64.8 62.0 61.8 61.5 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.6 91.6 91.7 91.4 91.7 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 69.0 69.9 70.3 69.1 68.5 -0.6 pps
Female 69.0 69.4 69.5 69.4 69.7 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 58.7 58.4 57.4 56.4 56.0 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.6 78.2 78.7 78.6 79.1 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 50.0 50.2 50.6 51.1 51.3 0.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 71.5 71.5 69.9 69.5 69.5 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 52.9 52.4 48.4 47.6 46.4 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.3 81.4 80.2 79.8 80.1 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 57.4 58.0 57.5 57.1 56.7 -0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 60.1 56.2 54.1 52.3 52.6 0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 76.7 75.1 72.4 71.5 71.7 0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.2 85.3 84.2 84.0 82.6 -1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.2 65.8 64.2 63.7 63.2 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.2 0.6 pps
Male 77.5 77.3 74.8 74.5 74.5 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 54.4 53.8 48.5 48.5 47.0 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 87.7 85.7 85.4 85.9 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 66.3 67.3 66.2 65.0 64.2 -0.8 pps
Female 65.5 65.8 65.0 64.6 64.5 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 51.4 51.0 48.2 46.6 45.7 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.6 75.2 74.7 74.3 74.5 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 48.9 49.0 49.2 49.5 49.6 0.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 28477.7 28670.8 28183.5 28109.6 28207.3 0.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.7 0.7 -1.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.6 0.7 -1.7 -0.3 0.3 0.6 pps
Male 0.8 0.4 -2.5 -0.1 0.4 0.5 pps
Female 0.4 1.1 -0.7 -0.5 0.3 0.8 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.6 12.5 12.7 13.0 13.1 0.1 pps
Male 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.2 0.1 pps
Female 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 5.7 5.3 5.5 6.0 6.0 0.0 pps
Male 5.1 4.7 5.1 5.6 5.6 0.0 pps
Female 6.4 5.9 5.9 6.4 6.4 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 24.2 24.2 25.0 25.7 25.5 -0.2 pps
Male 9.4 9.8 10.4 11.0 11.0 0.0 pps
Female 41.4 41.0 41.7 42.4 42.2 -0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 5.3 5.6 7.6 7.8 8.0 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 14.3 15.0 19.1 19.6 21.1 1.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.9 4.3 6.0 6.3 6.4 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 3.2 3.1 4.6 4.7 5.0 0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 9.5 10.4 13.3 14.2 14.6 0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.2 5.6 7.9 8.3 8.7 0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.6 2.8 4.0 4.1 4.4 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 5.2 5.6 7.6 7.8 8.1 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 7.7 7.0 8.9 9.0 9.5 0.5 pps
Male 5.6 6.1 8.6 8.6 8.7 0.1 pps
Female 5.0 5.1 6.4 6.8 7.3 0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 23.7 24.1 24.5 32.6 33.4 0.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.0 41.0 41.1 41.1 0.0 %
Male 42.7 42.4 42.3 42.4 42.4 0.0 %
Female 38.6 38.4 38.6 38.6 38.6 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : : : : : : pps
Building and construction : : : : : : pps
Services : : : : : : pps
Manufacturing industry : : : : : : pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.2 1.5 2.7 2.7 2.0 -0.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.9 -1.5 1.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.6 4.2 0.3 2.1 1.6 -0.5 pps
Wage and salaries 6.1 2.5 -0.2 1.1 2.5 1.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.9 -1.7 -2.4 1.6 0.2 -1.4 pps
2010-2011
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European Union (27 countries) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 488555 490665 492290 493724 495163 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 329256 330447 330935 331176 331418 0.1 %
(% of total population) 67.4 67.3 67.2 67.1 66.9 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 231817 233946 234740 235240 236015 0.3 %
Male 127582 128462 128374 128286 128304 0.0 %
Female 104235 105484 106366 106954 107711 0.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.4 70.8 70.9 71.0 71.2 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 44.2 44.3 43.7 43.0 42.7 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.3 84.6 84.7 84.9 85.0 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 47.2 48.1 49.1 49.7 50.9 1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.4 70.7 70.9 71.0 71.2 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.9 71.7 71.7 71.7 71.8 0.1 pps
Male 77.7 77.9 77.8 77.6 77.6 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 47.6 47.8 46.9 46.1 45.7 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.9 92.0 91.8 91.7 91.6 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 57.0 57.9 58.6 58.9 59.5 0.6 pps
Female 63.2 63.7 64.1 64.4 64.9 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 40.6 40.8 40.4 39.7 39.6 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.7 77.3 77.7 78.1 78.4 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 38.0 38.8 40.2 41.2 42.8 1.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 64.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 37.3 37.4 35.0 34.0 33.6 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.0 79.5 78.0 77.6 77.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 44.6 45.6 46.0 46.3 47.4 1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 48.6 48.1 46.1 45.1 44.8 -0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 70.1 70.5 68.9 68.4 68.4 0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 83.7 83.7 82.8 82.3 82.0 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.2 61.4 60.2 59.7 59.8 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.5 0.1 pps
Male 72.5 72.7 70.7 70.1 70.1 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 40.4 40.3 37.1 36.2 35.7 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.8 86.9 84.6 83.9 83.9 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 53.9 55.0 54.8 54.6 55.2 0.6 pps
Female 58.2 58.9 58.4 58.2 58.5 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 34.2 34.4 32.9 31.8 31.4 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.2 72.0 71.4 71.3 71.4 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 35.9 36.8 37.8 38.6 40.2 1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 215063.3 217401.5 213526.3 212405.0 213047.3 0.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.8 0.9 -1.8 -0.5 0.3 0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.8 1.1 -1.8 -0.5 0.3 0.8 pps
Male 1.6 0.7 -2.7 -0.8 0.1 0.9 pps
Female 2.1 1.6 -0.7 -0.2 0.5 0.7 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 14.4 14.2 14.3 14.5 14.4 -0.1 pps
Male 10.1 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.0 -0.1 pps
Female 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 14.6 14.1 13.6 13.9 14.0 0.1 pps
Male 13.9 13.3 12.7 13.3 13.6 0.3 pps
Female 15.3 15.0 14.5 14.6 14.6 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 17.6 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.8 0.2 pps
Male 7.0 7.0 7.4 7.9 8.1 0.2 pps
Female 30.8 30.6 31.0 31.4 31.6 0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.7 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 15.5 15.6 19.9 20.9 21.3 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.4 6.3 8.2 8.9 9.0 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 5.5 5.1 6.3 6.8 6.8 0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 10.9 11.6 14.9 16.2 16.7 0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.0 6.5 8.4 9.1 9.0 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.0 3.9 5.0 5.5 5.6 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.9 6.7 8.5 9.1 9.1 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 12.0 12.2 16.4 16.8 16.8 0.0 pps
Male 6.6 6.7 9.1 9.7 9.6 -0.1 pps
Female 7.9 7.6 9.0 9.6 9.8 0.2 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 42.7 36.9 33.1 39.9 42.9 3.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.2 41.0 40.7 40.8 40.8 0.0 %
Male 42.3 42.1 41.7 41.9 41.9 0.0 %
Female 39.2 39.1 38.9 39.1 39.1 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -1.6 -1.9 0.1 -1.2 -1.3 pps
Building and construction 5.3 0.3 -5.4 -4.1 -3.0 1.1 pps
Services 2.1 1.8 -1.5 0.0 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 0.1 -6.3 -3.5 0.2 3.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.3 0.6 -1.3 3.1 2.1 -1.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.8 -0.3 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.5 4.0 2.5 1.7 2.7 1.0 pps
Wage and salaries 5.7 1.8 -3.3 2.7 : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.4 -0.6 -2.6 2.6 1.3 -1.3 pps
2010-2011
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Euro Area 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 321714 323405 324479 325409 326437 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 215245 216137 216363 216443 216676 0.1 %
(% of total population) 66.9 66.8 66.7 66.5 66.4 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 152508 154015 154404 154509 155024 0.3 %
Male 84598 85095 84853 84595 84523 -0.1 %
Female 67910 68919 69551 69915 70501 0.8 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.9 71.3 71.4 71.4 71.5 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 44.4 44.4 43.6 42.5 42.2 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.7 85.0 85.1 85.2 85.2 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 46.1 47.1 48.4 49.4 50.8 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.9 71.3 71.4 71.4 71.6 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.7 71.4 71.4 71.4 71.4 0.0 pps
Male 78.6 78.7 78.4 78.2 78.1 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 47.8 47.8 46.7 45.4 44.9 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.0 93.0 92.6 92.4 92.2 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 55.6 56.5 57.5 58.3 59.1 0.8 pps
Female 63.1 63.8 64.3 64.6 65.0 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 40.9 41.0 40.5 39.4 39.4 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.3 77.0 77.5 77.9 78.2 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 37.0 38.1 39.8 41.0 43.0 2.0 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 65.5 65.9 64.5 64.2 64.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 37.7 37.5 35.0 33.7 33.5 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.0 79.3 77.7 77.3 77.2 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 43.2 44.3 45.1 45.8 47.1 1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 50.2 49.9 47.7 46.8 46.4 -0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 70.8 71.2 69.9 69.5 69.3 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 82.6 83.0 82.1 81.6 81.6 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 60.4 60.4 59.2 58.8 58.8 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 0.1 pps
Male 73.3 73.3 71.1 70.4 70.3 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 41.0 40.5 37.1 35.9 35.6 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.7 87.4 84.9 84.1 83.9 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 52.3 53.3 53.5 53.8 54.6 0.8 pps
Female 57.7 58.4 58.0 57.9 58.2 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 34.3 34.4 32.8 31.5 31.3 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.3 71.2 70.6 70.5 70.6 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 34.5 35.7 37.1 38.1 40.0 1.9 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 140992.1 142335.2 139641.4 138854.5 139231.3 0.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.8 0.8 -1.9 -0.5 0.2 0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.0 1.0 -1.9 -0.6 0.3 0.8 pps
Male 1.5 0.3 -2.9 -1.0 -0.1 0.9 pps
Female 2.5 1.7 -0.6 -0.1 0.7 0.8 pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 14.6 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.4 -0.1 pps
Male 10.2 10.0 10.0 10.1 10.0 -0.1 pps
Female 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 16.6 16.3 15.4 15.6 15.8 0.2 pps
Male 15.8 15.2 14.2 14.8 15.1 0.3 pps
Female 17.7 17.4 16.6 16.5 16.6 0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 18.9 18.9 19.5 19.9 20.4 0.5 pps
Male 6.8 6.8 7.3 7.6 8.1 0.5 pps
Female 34.2 34.1 34.4 34.8 35.2 0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.6 7.6 9.6 10.1 10.1 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 15.1 15.6 19.8 20.6 20.6 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.8 6.9 8.9 9.6 9.7 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 6.3 5.9 6.9 7.4 7.3 -0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 10.8 11.7 15.1 16.5 17.0 0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.1 6.9 8.6 8.9 8.8 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.5 4.3 5.5 5.9 6.1 0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.1 7.0 8.7 9.3 9.4 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 12.9 13.2 17.8 18.2 18.2 0.0 pps
Male 6.7 7.0 9.4 10.0 9.9 -0.1 pps
Female 8.7 8.5 9.8 10.3 10.5 0.2 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 44.3 39.3 35.6 42.5 45.2 2.7 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.1 40.9 40.5 40.8 40.8 0.0 %
Male 42.2 42.0 41.5 41.8 41.8 0.0 %
Female 39.1 39.0 38.7 38.9 39.0 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture : -1.8 -2.2 -1.2 -2.4 -1.2 pps
Building and construction 3.8 -2.2 -6.6 -3.8 -3.9 -0.1 pps
Services 2.1 1.6 -1.7 0.0 : : pps
Manufacturing industry : 0.2 -5.6 -3.4 -0.1 3.3 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.6 3.3 1.4 1.6 2.2 0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.3 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.7 3.5 2.7 1.5 2.8 1.3 pps
Wage and salaries 4.8 4.3 -0.5 1.4 : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.2 -0.4 -2.6 2.5 1.3 -1.2 pps
2010-2011
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Austria
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean  :    :    :   
median  :    :    :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 26.40 26.20  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 47.95 48.17 48.41
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.63 42.94 43.35
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 47.95 48.17 48.41
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 43.19 43.43 43.69
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.21 1.93 1.93
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.92 2.37 2.37
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.50 1.50 1.50
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 3.25 3.25 3.25
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.55 0.55 0.55
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.55 0.55 0.55
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.51 0.51 0.51
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.51 0.51 0.51
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Last three data points
 
Belgium
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 45.80 44.70  :   
median 52.60 51.40  :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 27.60 28.00  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 55.33 55.37 55.50
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 50.95 51.11 51.27
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 55.34 55.39 55.55
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 49.40 49.51 49.75
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.15 2.18 2.18
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.68 1.73 1.73
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 2.63 2.63 2.63
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 4.13 4.13 4.13
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.57 0.67 0.66
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.58 0.63 0.63
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.52 0.53 0.53
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.52 0.53 0.53
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD unlimited unlimited unlimited
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD unlimited unlimited unlimited
Last three data points
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Bulgaria
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 39.10 36.30 34.00
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 16.80 16.10  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 33.81 32.50 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 29.00 27.78 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 33.81 32.50 :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 33.81 32.50 :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :    :   
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.47 0.54 0.76
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.47 0.54 0.76
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.15 0.15 0.14
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.15 0.15 0.14
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 4 4
Last three data points
 
Czech Republic
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 34.30 33.30 32.50
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 27.00 26.90  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.01 42.13 42.35
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.24 37.22 37.49
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 42.01 42.13 42.51
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.72 38.90 39.47
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.90 1.90 1.96
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 3.31 3.31 3.05
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.50 0.50 0.88
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 2.13 2.13 2.13
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.53 0.66 0.70
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.30 0.32 0.36
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.30 0.32 0.36
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.30 0.32 0.36
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 11 11
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 5 5
Last three data points
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Germany
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean  :    :    :   
median  :    :    :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 22.10 22.10  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 50.94 49.22 49.81
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 46.29 44.30 45.01
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 50.94 49.22 49.81
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 46.03 45.01 45.64
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.34 2.09 2.12
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.68 2.68 3.00
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 2.00 1.50 1.25
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 3.75 3.75 3.75
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.60 0.60 0.62
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.60 0.60 0.62
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.44 0.45 0.42
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.36 0.37 0.35
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 18 18 18
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data points
 
Denmark
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean  :    :    :   
median  :    :    :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 13.10 12.90  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 39.53 38.30 38.40
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 36.36 35.03 35.18
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 39.53 38.30 38.40
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.98 36.69 36.80
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.50 1.50 1.50
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.63 1.63 1.63
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.38 1.38 1.38
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 3.88 3.88 3.13
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.61 0.60 0.61
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.61 0.60 0.61
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.61 0.60 0.61
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.58 0.58 0.57
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 48 48 48
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 48 48 48
Last three data points
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Estonia
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 36.40 35.50 33.50
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 39.17 40.05 40.14
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 35.93 36.86 37.05
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 39.17 40.05 40.14
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.74 38.64 38.78
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :   2.10
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :   2.46
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :   1.75
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :   3.25
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.54 0.53 0.54
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.44 0.44 0.44
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.18 0.21 0.24
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.18 0.21 0.24
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data points
 
Greece
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 46.60 43.40 56.40
median 59.30 55.20 71.80
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 20.60  :    :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 39.32 39.32 38.83
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 39.40 39.36 38.66
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.17 38.24 38.04
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.41 34.41 35.61
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 3.50 2.73 2.73
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.25 2.33 2.33
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 4.75 3.13 3.13
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 3.25 3.25 3.25
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.53 0.52 0.53
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.53 0.52 0.53
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.35 0.33 0.33
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Last three data points
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Spain
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 37.60 37.80 36.70
median 45.40 44.70  :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 26.60 26.30  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.26 39.75 39.89
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 36.78 38.30 38.47
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.26 39.75 39.89
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.35 36.48 36.63
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.93 2.98 2.98
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.61 2.46 2.46
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.25 3.50 3.50
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 3.13 3.13 3.13
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.61 0.60 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.61 0.60 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.61 0.60 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.23 0.23 0.24
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 24 24 24
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 4 4
Last three data points
 
Finland
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean  :    :    :   
median  :    :    :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 22.40 22.10  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.50 42.48 42.73
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 39.82 39.90 40.23
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 42.50 42.48 42.73
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.07 36.97 37.19
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.09 2.02 1.96
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.31 2.17 2.17
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.88 1.88 1.75
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 2.63 2.63 2.38
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.51 0.52 0.54
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.51 0.52 0.54
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.51 0.52 0.54
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.44 0.44 0.45
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 23 23 23
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 23 23 23
Last three data points
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France
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 47.00 46.50  :   
median 59.40 58.80  :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 33.20 33.40  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 49.30 49.35 49.38
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 46.42 46.52 46.59
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 49.30 49.35 49.38
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 45.94 46.21 46.50
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.98 3.05 3.05
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.34 2.47 2.47
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.63 3.63 3.63
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 2.13 2.13 2.13
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.66 0.67 0.66
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.66 0.67 0.66
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.66 0.67 0.66
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.34 0.34 0.34
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 36 36 36
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 7 4 4
Last three data points
 
Hungary
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 38.30 38.00 38.60
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 28.20 25.60  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 53.10 46.60 49.38
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 48.16 41.66 41.09
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 53.10 46.60 49.38
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 46.16 43.79 45.15
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.27 1.52 1.65
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.92 1.92 1.92
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.63 1.13 1.38
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 2.88 2.88 2.88
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.59 0.58 0.56
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.33 0.33 0.30
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.23 0.25 0.22
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.23 0.25 0.22
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Last three data points
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Ireland
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 44.90 44.70 44.50
median 49.50  :    :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 14.20 13.40  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 24.74 25.83 26.75
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 19.09 20.80 22.13
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 24.74 25.83 26.78
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 16.16 16.73 21.28
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 0.93 1.11 1.11
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.60 1.60 1.60
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.25 0.63 0.63
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 2.38 2.38 2.38
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.50 0.50 0.50
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.50 0.50 0.50
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.50 0.50 0.49
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.50 0.50 0.49
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 15 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 12 9 9
Last three data points
 
Italy
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean  :    :    :   
median  :    :    :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer  :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 46.79 47.17 47.61
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.21 44.72 45.27
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 46.79 47.17 47.61
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 43.46 44.01 44.51
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.70 1.82 1.89
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.77 1.77 1.77
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.63 1.88 2.00
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 4.88 4.88 4.88
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.59 0.59 0.59
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.59 0.59 0.59
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 8 8 8
Last three data points
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Lithuania
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 42.40 43.60 42.60
median  :   59.40  :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 28.40 27.80  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 40.73 40.66 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.87 39.78 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 40.73 40.66 :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.94 38.84 :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :    :   
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.61 0.68 0.43
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.16 0.20 0.21
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.16 0.20 0.21
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.16 0.20 0.21
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data points
 
Luxembourg
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 47.80 48.60 49.30
median 59.70 60.20 61.50
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 14.00 14.00  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 32.29 32.72 34.35
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 25.29 25.88 27.64
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 33.87 34.31 35.96
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 27.36 27.67 29.22
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :   3.25
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :   2.75
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :   3.75
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :   3.88
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.85 0.84 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.85 0.84 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.44 0.46 0.46
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.44 0.46 0.46
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Last three data points
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Latvia
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 41.30 41.90 44.80
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 21.60 20.90  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.20 44.22 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.48 40.17 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 42.20 44.22 :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 41.54 43.48 :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :    :   
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.83 0.84 0.87
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.41 0.42 0.43
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.23 0.26 0.29
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.23 0.26 0.29
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 9 9
Last three data points
 
Malta
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 46.50 47.20 48.30
median 54.80 56.00 57.40
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 8.90  :    :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 22.28 22.39 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 20.92 21.09 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 22.28 22.39 :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 17.67 18.14 :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :    :   
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.41 0.43 0.41
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.41 0.43 0.42
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.41 0.43 0.42
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.41 0.43 0.42
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Last three data points
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Netherlands
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 43.90 44.70  :   
median 52.00 51.70  :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer  :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.02 38.10 37.76
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 34.28 34.34 34.03
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.02 38.10 37.76
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 33.25 33.49 33.11
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.73 2.12 1.95
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 3.08 3.05 2.72
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 2.38 1.19 1.19
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 3.00 3.00 3.00
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.74 0.74 0.74
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.70 0.70 0.70
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.70 0.70 0.70
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.54 0.53 0.53
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 38 38 38
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 3 3 3
Last three data points
 
Poland
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 40.00 40.80 38.50
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer  :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 34.12 34.19 34.31
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 31.35 31.51 31.80
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.12 34.19 34.31
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 33.13 33.23 33.41
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.40 1.65 1.90
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.06 2.06 2.06
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.75 1.25 1.75
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 4.13 4.13 3.63
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.46 0.45 0.50
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.46 0.45 0.44
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.24 0.23 0.21
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.24 0.23 0.21
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 18 18 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data points
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Portugal
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 42.80 42.40 42.20
median 57.80 59.80  :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 19.10 19.10  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.47 37.62 39.54
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 35.23 35.58 38.62
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.47 37.62 39.00
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 32.67 32.66 33.14
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 3.67 3.67 3.15
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 4.33 4.33 4.17
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.00 3.00 2.13
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 2.88 2.88 1.88
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.84 0.84 0.75
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.84 0.84 0.75
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.84 0.84 0.75
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.17 0.17 0.17
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 38 38 38
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Last three data points
 
Romania
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 34.90 32.40  :   
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 24.10 23.20  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.40 44.32 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.21 42.32 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 44.40 44.32 :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 43.11 43.12 :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :    :   
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :    :   
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.42 0.48 0.44
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.42 0.48 0.44
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.08 0.10 0.09
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.08 0.10 0.09
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 15 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 9 6
Last three data points
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Sweden
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean  :    :    :   
median  :    :    :   
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 32.90 32.90  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.23 42.76 42.80
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 40.46 39.97 40.06
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 43.23 42.76 42.80
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 41.29 40.65 40.69
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.24 2.24 1.87
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.86 2.86 2.86
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.63 1.63 0.88
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 3.75 3.75 3.75
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.50 0.48 0.47
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.50 0.48 0.47
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.50 0.48 0.47
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.44 0.43 0.43
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 21 21 21
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 14 14 14
Last three data points
 
Slovenia
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 44.20 50.50 52.70
median : : :
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 14.40 14.30  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.24 42.54 42.50
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.46 37.80 37.77
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 42.24 42.54 42.50
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 39.72 38.57 38.54
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD  :    :   2.51
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD  :    :   3.15
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD  :    :   1.88
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD  :    :   2.88
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.64 0.65 0.73
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.64 0.65 0.68
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.33 0.33 0.32
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.33 0.33 0.32
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 24 24 24
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 3 3 3
Last three data points
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Slovak Republic
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 35.70 36.00 36.10
median 46.80 47.50 47.70
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 25.70 25.50  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.71 37.92 38.87
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 33.41 33.63 34.71
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.71 37.92 38.87
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.36 34.67 36.09
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.80 1.34 1.44
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.47 2.31 2.50
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.13 0.38 0.38
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 4.00 3.75 3.75
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.71 0.64 0.64
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.21 0.20 0.20
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.21 0.20 0.20
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.21 0.20 0.20
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 4 4
Last three data points
 
United Kingdom
List of policy variables
Monthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, to %); Eurostat 2009 2010 2011
mean 38.60 38.70 38.80
median 49.60 50.10 50.50
2009 2010 2011
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 15.70 15.70  :   
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 32.41 32.58 32.50
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - Married couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 30.06 30.27 30.19
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 32.41 32.58 32.50
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 29.10 29.37 28.48
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 0.60 0.75 0.75
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 0.95 1.12 1.12
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.25 0.38 0.38
Employment Protection Legislation for collective dismissals; OECD 2.88 2.88 2.88
2008 2009 2010
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.38 0.38 0.37
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.38 0.38 0.37
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.38 0.38 0.37
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. social assistance; EC/OECD 0.38 0.38 0.37
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data points
 
 
 
